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 Discussions about the permissibility of students using enhancements in education are 
often framed by the question, “Is a student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs 
cheating?” Some argue that students who use them are cheating because these drugs 
provide an unfair advantage that violates rules of fair competition in education. Others 
argue that students who use them are not cheating because these drugs are merely another 
progressive educational tool such as a calculator or computer. Although the question of 
cheating is interesting, it is only one question concerning the permissibility of 
enhancement in education. Another interesting question is, “What kinds of students do 
we want in our academic institutions?” I suggest that one plausible answer to this 
question concerns the ideals of human excellence or virtues. The students we want in our 
academic institutions are virtuous or at least possess certain virtues. I argue that a virtuous 
student may choose to use cognitive-enhancing drugs for reasons of self-improvement. 
That a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive-enhancing drugs for reasons of self-
improvement illustrates that under certain conditions, motivation can determine the 
permissibility of using enhancements. Building upon this, I suggest a virtues-based 
institutional rule for governing and guiding students’ use of cognitive enhancers in an 
academic institution, for the right reasons. This “ideals of human excellence” or “virtues” 
approach offers interesting and unique insights for issues of enhancement in education 
(and for issues of pharmaceutical enhancement in general); it may turn out that the 
uneasiness many people have about students using cognitive-enhancing drugs has less to 
do with issues of enhancement and more to do with the motivation and character of 
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Chapter 1 Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs in Education  
1. Introduction  
“Is a student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs cheating?” This question often 
frames the contemporary discussion of enhancement in education about the permissibility 
of students using cognitive-enhancing. For reasons of fairness, some argue that a student 
who uses a cognitive-enhancing drug is cheating. For reasons of increasing productivity, 
others argue that a student who uses a cognitive-enhancing drug is not cheating. 
However, whether a student who uses a cognitive-enhancing drug is cheating or not, the 
assumption is that most academic institutions already have in place institutional rules for 
governing student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs.  
In this research project, I argue that there are two problems with the contemporary 
discussion of enhancement in education. First, framing the permissibility of student use 
of cognitive-enhancing drugs as a question of cheating is not particularly useful. The 
answers to this question do not provide conclusive reasons for whether the use of 
cognitive-enhancing drugs is cheating. Second, despite the assumption of many in this 
discussion, academic institutions’ current institutional rules, such as those prohibiting a 
student from using illegal drugs in academic activities, do not decisively determine the 
permissibility of student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs for enhancement in education. 
These two problems result in no advancement of contemporary discussion of 
enhancement in education as well as only a cursory examination regarding permissibility 
and institutional rules related to student use of enhancements in education. 
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Yet it is of practical and philosophical importance that permissibility and institutional 
rules concerning student use of enhancements in education are addressed. First, it is 
likely that the use of cognitive-enhancing drugs among students is only going to increase. 
Currently in the United States, nearly 21 million young people (ages 10 to 19 years old) 
are prescribed cognitive-enhancing drugs each year, an increase of 26 percent since 2007 
(Schwarz 2012). In the ten years from 1993 to 2003, the global use of cognitive-
enhancing drugs increased three times, and spending on cognitive-enhancing drugs 
increased nine times to $2.4 billion in 2003. The United States is 83 percent of the global 
market for cognitive-enhancing drugs. From 2003 to 2007, annual use and spending on 
these enhancements in developing nations exceeded 20 percent (Scheffler, et al. 2007). 
 Second, as our neurological understanding of human cognition advances, it cannot be 
assumed that the technological means accessible for improving a person’s cognitive 
capacities will only be pharmaceutical. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (which uses 
electromagnetic induction to alter the magnetic field in a person’s brain) has been shown 
to augment a person’s working memory (Fregni, et al. 2005). Genetic modification of 
mice has been shown to enhance their memory performance with respect to retention and 
has illustrated that genetic modification on mammals is possible (Tang, et al. 1999) (Tan, 
et al. 2006). Moreover, recent discoveries have identified three human genes—DAT1, 
DRD2, and DRD4—linked to the behaviors surrounding attention, motivation, cognitive 
skill, intelligence, and violence (Beaver, et al. 2011). So it is reasonable to think that 
genetic modification capable of enhancing human cognition will be available sooner 
rather than later.  
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The increased use of cognitive-enhancing drugs and the advancement in enhancement 
technology prudently both suggest the need to address questions about the permissibility 
and institutional rules regarding student use of enhancements in education. The role of 
enhancements in education also is philosophically significant because education and 
enhancement of intellectual capacities are valued instrumentally and as being good for 
their own sakes. Whether student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs is permitted or 
prohibited, current academic institutional rules need to be redesigned. This would result 
in shaping the attitudes and sentiments of students about enhancements and education. 
The shaping of students’ attitudes and sentiments about enhancement and education is 
likely to have reverberations across social, economic, and cultural domains. 
To advance the contemporary discussion of enhancement in education, this research 
project addresses questions of permissibility and institutional rules regarding student use 
of enhancements in education in a manner that is framed by three questions and 
structured by two goals.  
1.2 Questions and Goals of Research Project 
    This research project examines the following three questions: 
1. Is student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs in education permissible? 
2. Is a student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs cheating? 
3. What should be the institutional rules regarding student use of cognitive-
enhancing drugs?  
 
These three questions concerning enhancement in education serve as an operational 
outline. By examining and addressing these three questions, this research project 
stretches across differing fields of philosophy such as normative ethics, neuroethics, and 
moral psychology. It also relies on clinical ethics, medical practices, social psychology, 
and neuroscience to provide further context and substance to this project’s philosophical 
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claims.1 Since questions concern both students and institutions, this research project 
works in both ideal and non-ideal theory. 
1.3 Goals of Research Project 
By examining and addressing these three questions, this research project has two 
goals. The first is to examine and address the two problems with the contemporary 
discussion of enhancement in education. These problems can best be understood and 
identified by first examining how current institutional rules of academic institutions do 
not decisively determine the permissibility of student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs. 
Since current institutional rules in academic institutions do not decisively determine the 
permissibility of cognitive-enhancing drugs, I next examine the question of cheating and 
how arguments that attempt to answer this question are inconclusive. Moving forward 
from this first goal, my research project offers an approach for considering student use of 
enhancements in education as well as the kind of institutional rules that could be used to 
govern the use of enhancement in education.  
The second goal of my research project concerns the type of approach I provide. I 
offer a systematic approach toward enhancement in education. The typical approach for 
addressing enhancement in education and the questions of cheating, permissibility, and 
institutional rules is to focus on these questions one at a time and in isolation. For 
instance, when questions concerning the permissibility of student use of cognitive-
enhancing drug were addressed, implications for institutional rules were not addressed. 
When questions concerning institutional rules to govern student use of these 
                                                
1 Consider Maria Von Herbert’s response to Immanuel Kant that although his moral theory had given her a 
reason not to commit suicide, it was not of much help otherwise:  “I’ve read the metaphysics of morals and 
the categorical imperative, and it doesn’t help a bit” (Langton 2007). 
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enhancements were addressed, implications for the attitudes and sentiments these rules 
would develop in students were not addressed. This is not to say that the answers to these 
particular questions were wrong but rather that focusing on single questions in isolation 
fails to yield a cohesive viewpoint about enhancement in education. This research project 
attempts to advance a systematic, cohesive viewpoint toward enhancement in education.   
A systematic approach offers a conceptual framework for elucidating the role of 
cognitive-enhancing drugs in education. A systematic approach examines not only the 
role of but also the implications that enhancements could have on education, institutional 
rules in an academic institution, and the ethos of students. By offering a systematic 
approach—even if it turns out to be wrong—this research project yields at least one way 
to understand enhancement in education and to advance the contemporary discussion of 
enhancement in education. With these questions and goals as frames, I now offer a brief 
summary of this research project’s systematic approach.  
1.4 The Ideals of the Human Excellence or Virtues-Based Approach  
 Instead of beginning by asking questions about permissibility, cheating, or 
institutional rules regarding enhancement in education, I offer a systematic approach that 
begins by asking, “What kind of students do we want in our academic institutions?” I 
suggest that one plausible answer concerns the ideals of human excellence or virtues.2 3  
The virtues are the properties of a person that make their possessor an ideal of human 
excellence. The students we want in our academic institutions are virtuous or at least 
possess certain virtues. I argue that a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive-
                                                
2 I use “ideals of human excellence” and “virtues” interchangeably.  
3 The genesis of this proposal’s argument of asking a different question about enhancement in education 
from the perspective of the ideals of human excellence or virtues arose from discussions of the work of 




enhancing drugs for reasons of self-improvement. This indicates a motivation that 
determines the permissibility of using the enhancement. In respect to the question of 
whether a student’s use of cognitive-enhancing drugs in education is permissible, this 
virtues-based approach holds that students in academic institutions are permitted to use 
cognitive-enhancing drugs if their reasons for using these enhancements are reflective of 
the ideals of human excellence.  
Because it is a student’s motivation that determines the permissibility of using 
cognitive-enhancing drugs, this virtues-based approach would generate the following 
institutional rule: Students are permitted to use cognitive enhancers if their reasons for 
using them are reflective of the ideals of human excellence. This rule not only governs 
student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs but also provides guidance for a student to 
determine which uses of cognitive-enhancing drugs are permitted or prohibited in 
education.  
Because this virtues-based institutional rule relies on a student’s motivation to 
determine permissibility, it structures and develops the motivations of students and 
shapes their ethos about the use of enhancements in education.  
The aim of this virtues-based approach is to offer a way for motivation and character 
to be included as relevant considerations in the discussion of enhancement in education. 
In the contemporary discussion, the use of enhancements often is considered solely with 
respect to their consequences for students and education as a whole; rules focus on 
whether cognitive-enhancing drugs violate the institutional rules of education. However, 
within this discussion, motivation and character often are overlooked as relevant 
considerations for assessing not only a student’s use of cognitive-enhancing drugs but 
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also in evaluating the role enhancements are to have in education. Generally speaking, it 
is reasonable to think that some students have motivations for using cognitive-enhancing 
drugs that are good reasons reflective of good character. Offering a way for motivation 
and character to be relevant considerations in assessing student use of cognitive 
enhancers brings more depth and complexity to the contemporary discussion of 
enhancement in education. It also raises the interesting implication that it might not the 
use of cognitive-enhancing drugs that is troubling but rather the character of the students 
using them that is troubling.  
1.5 Why the Ideals of Human Excellence or Virtues 
As the foundation for an approach toward assessing enhancement in education, the 
ideals of human excellence or virtues is likely to raise some concerns. However, the use 
of the ideals of human excellence or virtues is not an indication of a failing in other 
normative ethical theories; instead, the ideals of human excellence or virtues help to 
explain our intuitions about certain cases of students using cognitive-enhancing drugs and 
are at least one element of a normative account of enhancement in education. Moreover, 
there are three reasons for thinking that the ideals of human excellence provide 
interesting and unique insight into the questions and issues regarding a student’s use of 
enhancement in education.  
1.5.1 Different Perspective 
 First, the ideals of human excellence or virtues offer a different perspective for 
viewing enhancement in education. Although focusing on the permissibility of certain 
behaviors and actions is still important, in some situations it might be worthwhile to ask 
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what sort of person would behave and act in that way. Thomas Hill (1983) provides some 
illustrative examples of such situations:  
Sometimes we may not regard an act wrong at all though we see it as 
reflecting something objectionable about the person who does it. Imagine, 
for example, one who laughs spontaneously to himself when he reads a 
newspaper account of a plane crash that kills hundred. Or, again, consider 
an obsequious grandson who, having waited for his grandmother’s 
inheritance with mock devotion, then secretly spits on her grave when at 
last she dies. The moral uneasiness which it arouses is explained more by 
our view of the agent than by any conviction that what he did was 
immoral. Had he hesitated and asked, “Why shouldn’t I spit on her grave” 
it seems more fitting to ask him to reflect on the sort of person he is than 
to try to offer reasons why he should refrain from spitting. (Hill 1983, 
215) 
 
Although it is permissible for an individual to laugh at news of an airplane crash or spit 
on their grandmother’s grave, asking about permissibility does not directly illustrate why 
these actions are objectionable. However, asking what sort of people would laugh at 
tragedy or spit on their grandmother’s grave does, to a large degree, illuminate why these 
are regarded as objectionable acts. That people laugh at others’ tragedies or spit on their 
grandmother’s grave reflects poorly on that person’s character. This is not the sort of 
person to admire, emulate, or even associate with.  
In the context of education and a student who is using a cognitive-enhancing drug, 
imagine that the use of this enhancement is permitted in education. Now consider a 
student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs because it assists them in completing the 
minimum number of assignments required to pass the course, allowing this student to 
skip lectures and discussion sections. Although the student’s actions are permitted, it is 
reasonable to think that this is not the sort of student an academic institution would want. 
Alternatively, imagine that the use of cognitive-enhancing drugs is prohibited but that a 
student is using these enhancements simply because this student greatly values learning. 
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The student’s actions are prohibited, but it is reasonable to think that an academic 
institution would want this sort of student. 
 Using the ideals of human excellence or virtues to consider enhancement in 
education indicates—even if vaguely—something about the sort of student to want in 
education. Moreover, the ideals of human excellence or virtues help demonstrate that the 
reasons a student has for using a cognitive-enhancing drug are important in assessing 
enhancements in education.  
1.5.2 Aspirational and Practical Value of Virtues 
Another reason is that the ideals of human excellence or virtues function as 
something to aspire to and also can serve as a practical guide. As something to aspire to, 
the ideals of human excellence or virtues focus not only on the kind of person an 
individual should be but also provide certain ideal properties that people should aim to 
possess.4 For the sake of the argument, consider honesty, courage, or compassion to be 
properties for a person. It is reasonable to think that even if an individual regularly failed 
to meet these ideals, this person should still aspire to them. Constantly working on 
developing virtues, whether by an individual or the community, is valued not only as 
being instrumentally beneficial but also good for its own sake.  As John Stuart Mill 
succinctly notes,  
The contented man, or the contented family, who have no ambition to 
make any one else happier, to promote the good of their country or their 
neighborhood, or to improve themselves in moral excellences, excite in us 
neither admiration nor approval. (Mill 1971, 409) 
 
                                                
4 That virtues are something to aspire to is a point emphasized through most of Julia Annas’ work, a major 
influence on how I think about virtues (Annas 2006; 2011). 
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In the context of enhancement in education, this virtues-based institutional rule not 
only stipulates permitted reasons for students to use cognitive-enhancing drugs, but it 
also stipulates the ideals of human excellence students should aspire to attain in respect to 
using enhancements. Although many students are likely not to use cognitive-enhancing 
drugs for reasons reflective of the ideals of human excellence, that some students fail to 
use cognitive-enhancing drugs for these reasons does not make the ideals of human 
excellence offered by this virtues-based institutional rule any less worthy of aspiration. 
While virtues are the properties of a person that make their possessor an ideal of 
human excellence, these virtues also function to serve as a practical guide for those who 
lack virtues, serving as a point of reference for an individual to orient or guide their 
behavior.  
At first it is difficult to understand how the ideals of human excellence or virtues 
serve as a practical guide; however, consider the uncontroversial and common practice of 
using an idealization as a guide. For example, ideal gas law is a hypothesis about the 
behavior of gas if it were to exist in a perfect, idealized state. Finding or even putting gas 
in such a state is unrealistic and unachievable. However, ideal gas law serves as a 
practical guide for other experiments. By understanding gas as it would exist under ideal 
conditions, scientists orient or guide their research project and build their basis of 
knowledge.  
Similarly, the ideals of human excellence or virtues can serve as a practical guide for 
people.5 For most virtue ethics theories, people are assumed to have had some life 
                                                
5 Linda Zagzebski (2011) recently put forward an outline for an Exemplarist virtue theory in which a moral 
exemplar, even if an ideal, provides an outline for a moral theory.   
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experience as well as a grasp of ethical discourse and certain values.6 The virtues are then 
used to orient or guide this person toward the appropriate excellence. For example, a 
person with the virtue of compassion provides to charity when possible. Individuals who 
lack but want to develop compassion rely on this virtue to guide them and work toward 
developing the virtue of compassion by first giving to charity whenever possible. 
For enhancement in education, consider the freshman undergraduate student. This 
student likely was already exposed to cognitive-enhancing drugs being used for a wide 
variety of reasons. This virtues-based institutional rule offers the freshman certain ideals 
of human excellence or virtues as a guide toward using cognitive-enhancing drugs for the 
proper reasons. Since the ideals of human excellence or virtues function as something to 
aspire to and as a practical guide, a virtues-based approach provides an interesting 
perspective on enhancement in education.  
1.5.3 Rich and Diverse Historical Tradition 
The ideals of human excellence or virtues provide a rich and diverse historical 
tradition to draw upon. From Confucian philosophers to Aristotle and through to current 
virtue ethicists such as Rosalind Hursthouse, Julia Annas, and Christine Swanton, 
conceptions of the ideals of human excellences or virtues have played a role in many 
areas of philosophy, particularly in normative ethics. It is often assumed that the ideals of 
human excellence or virtues are thought of as independent, separate, or in opposition to 
other approaches in normative ethics. This is an incorrect assumption; conceptions of 
virtues have roles in normative theories that typically are taken as being on opposite 
spectrums of normative ethics, such as David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Consider that 
                                                
6 As a matter of historical note Aristotle’s lectures were given to young nobility who had already gone 
through a sufficient level of education (Crisp 1997; Hughes 2001). 
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Hume and Kant are on opposite spectrums of the normative ethics spectrum with regard 
to the role of reason in morality, but both still provide a place for virtues within their 
respective moral theories.  
On one end of the spectrum is David Hume, a sentimentalist who famously stated, 
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any 
office than to serve and obey them” (Hume 2001, 266). A broad account of Hume would 
hold that moral judgment is based on sentiments or motivations; to judge a person is to 
judge their character traits. Moreover, certain character traits are taken as being virtues, 
either natural or artificial, that are, roughly, socially useful.7   
On the other end of the spectrum, Immanuel Kant in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals holds that it is reason and a human being’s rational capacities that 
bind us to moral obligations: 
Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as a ground 
of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, 
the command, “thou shalt not lie,” does not hold only for human beings, as 
if other rational beings did not have to heed it, and so with all the other 
moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the ground of obligation 
here must not be sought in the nature of the human being or in the 
circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in 
concepts of pure reason (4:389). 
 
Yet even Kant has a conception of virtue as being the courage to act with respect to the 
moral law, whether it is a perfect or imperfect duty (4:421n) (6:405).  
The important point is not to highlight differences between Hume and Kant’s 
accounts of reason or their conceptions of virtues; instead it is to emphasize that differing 
normative approaches, specifically approaches that are often regarded as being 
                                                
7 Providing an exposition of Hume’s often complicated but interesting conception of virtue is to go too far 
afield. Yet at least in the Treatise, Hume’s notion of virtues is based on human sentiments and convention 
(cf: Hume 2001, Part 3: 367-378). 
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diametrically opposed, still include conceptions of virtues. The ideals of human 
excellence or virtues need not necessarily be regarded as always being a conception that 
is independent, separate, or in opposition to other approaches in normative ethics, but as a 
conception that can work within most if not all normative approaches.  
Moreover, ideals of human excellence or virtues have a rich and diverse historical 
tradition for this research project to draw from. While the conception of virtues put 
forward in this research paper shares many common features with an Aristotelian 
conception, it also shares many features with Buddhist and Confucian conceptions of 
virtues. Thus the rich and diverse historical tradition of ideals of human excellence or 
virtues allows for this research project to put forward a conception of virtues that cannot 
easily be categorized as being Aristotelian, Buddhist, or Confucian. 
In the context of enhancement in education, the ideals of human excellence or virtues 
provide an approach that is, prima facie, not opposed to other normative ethical theories. 
By drawing upon a rich and diverse historical tradition, this research project’s conception 
of the ideals of human excellence or virtues can focus on a student’s action in a manner 
that, for example, a strictly Buddhist, Confucian, or Aristotelian approach on the 
importance of character could not.  
Therefore, because the ideals of human excellence or virtues provide a different 
perspective, are aspirational and practical, and come from a rich and diverse historical 
tradition, it is plausible to think that the ideals of human excellence or virtues offer an 
interesting and unique perspective for issues of enhancement in education.  
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1.6 Overview of Dissertation 
This introductory chapter concludes with an outline of the manner in which this 
research project examines and addresses questions of permissibility, cheating, and 
institutional rules and works to advance the discussion of enhancement in education.  
The following chapter begins with defining and clarifying the conceptions of 
enhancement, cognitive-enhancing drugs, and education. The project then examines the 
permissibility of student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs with regard to current 
institutional rules governing use of enhancements in most academic institutions. The 
argument put forward in this chapter is that because of the complexities of neurology, 
pharmacology, and medical-prescribing practices for pharmaceuticals, current 
institutional rules do not decisively determine the permissibility of student use of 
enhancements.  
Since current institutional rules do not decisively determine the permissibility of 
student use of cognitive enhancers, the focus moves to the question of cheating. This 
question of cheating has generated two well entrenched arguments that face difficult 
challenges that illustrate that these arguments do not provide conclusive reasons for 
thinking that a student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs is cheating. 
Chapter Three presents a virtues-based approach that offers a conception of virtues 
and an account of virtuous students. According to this virtues-based approach, a virtuous 
student may choose to use cognitive-enhancing drugs and is justified in using these 
enhancements because of their motivations. This virtues-based approach then formulates 
a virtues-based institutional rule for governing student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs 
in education. While working within the confines of ideal theory to formulate a virtues-
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based institutional rule, the conditions or disorders of prosopagnosia and psychopathy are 
used to argue that the goal of academia is to attain understanding (taken as an ability to 
draw upon information and apply it to one’s life) rather then to obtain knowledge (taken 
as knowledge and facts).  This chapter concludes with a response to potential criticisms, 
arguing that the virtues offered are of significant value to persons, that academia at least 
has a responsibility to foster an environment in which virtues can develop, and that even 
if students are not required to develop these virtues, there are reasons for thinking that 
they should.  
In Chapter Four, this research project transitions from working within the realm of 
ideal theory to that of non-ideal theory. With certain idealized conditions regarding 
academic institutions and students no longer in place, I examine whether this virtues-
based institutional rule could work. The aim of this chapter is to highlight that even under 
non-ideal conditions, this virtues-based institutional rule offers ideals of human 
excellence, motivation, and character that are relevant considerations. Motivation and 
character can be implemented in academic institutions operating under non-ideal 
conditions to govern student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs.  
A reason for implementing this virtues-based institutional rule is because students in 
academic institutions have less-than-ideal psychological dispositions and are not always 
compliant with institutional rules. I then provide three advantages of using this virtues-
based approach and institutional rule: it addresses concerns about the medicalization of 
cognitive enhancers, it shapes students’ practical reasoning about enhancement, and it 
resists oversimplifying issues of enhancement in academia.  
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In the fifth chapter, I return to reexamine the question of cheating. I contend that this 
virtues-based institutional rule is not only consistent with existing institutional rules and 
policies but also provides a better justification for permissibility of these enhancements 
than what currently exists. It offers a way to acknowledge and support concerns about 
fairness and improving well-being.  
In the end, this virtues-based approach and institutional rule might be incorrect. 
Nevertheless, enhancement in academia involves matters concerning the value of 
education, the permissibility of pharmaceutical enhancements, and the sort of character 
one wants students to have. This research project, either part or all of it, might be wrong; 
however, any investigation into enhancement in academia will have to consider the 
motivation and character of students.  
I conclude by noting that the ideals of human excellence or virtues approach can be 
extended beyond the discussion of enhancement in academia. As neuroscience and 
pharmacology advance, there are questions about the application and limitation of using 
pharmaceuticals to augment a person’s memory and moral capacities. I contend that any 
approach to pharmaceutically enhancing a person’s memory and moral capacities 
encounters the problems of complexity, philosophical overextension, and potential 
explanation biases. The ideals of human excellence or virtues approach can adequately 
handle these problems and demonstrates that whether it is enhancement in education or 
the pharmaceutical enhancement of a person’s memory and moral capacities, motivation 





Chapter 2 Cognitive Enhancers, Academia, and Rules 
2.1. Defining Enhancement, Cognitive Enhancing Drugs, and Education  
To understand issues of enhancement in education, I must first define the use of the 
terms enhancement, cognitive-enhancing drugs, and education. Enhancement usually is 
defined broadly and in respect to the treatment-enhancement distinction. According to 
this distinction, treatment is the use of biomedical technologies or medical procedures to 
restore persons or their capacities to proficient functioning levels. Enhancement, then, is 
the use of biomedical technologies or medical procedures to augment persons or their 
capacities to higher functioning levels.8 On this distinction, many hold that treatments are 
necessary and morally justified since they restore a person to normal functioning levels, 
whereas enhancements are not justified. 
In general, there are theoretical difficulties in maintaining a sharp distinction between 
treatment and enhancement; many biomedical technologies or medical procedures 
considered necessary “treatments” seem more like enhancements (e.g., vaccinations and 
fluoride supplementation), and many “enhancements” are not biomedical technologies or 
medical procedures (e.g., exercise and relaxation techniques).9 Some philosophers such 
as Allen Buchanan make a further argument that literacy and numeracy are enhancements 
because in respect to human history, they are rather recent developments and, in fact, 
augment persons by altering their neurology (Buchanan 2008). In light of these 
theoretical difficulties, it is better to recognize the distinction between treatment and 
                                                
8 While Christopher Boorse and Norman Daniels hold differing conceptions of health, disease, treatment, 
and enhancement, they maintain that there is a distinction between treatment and enhancement, even if it is 
often difficult to conceptualize or pin down (Boorse1981; Daniels 2000; Daniels 2008). 
9 John Harris and Allen Buchanan, among others, argue convincingly that the distinction between treatment 
and enhancement is at best tenuous and at worst tragically misleading (Buchanan 2000); Buchanan 2008; 
Buchanan 2011; Harris 2007).  
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enhancement as continuous rather than as providing distinct categories, and also perhaps 
to recognize that treatment does not always have (at least prima facie) greater moral 
justification than enhancement.  
For present purposes, however, I accept the distinction between treatment and 
enhancement as referring to the clinical use of these biomedical technologies or medical 
procedures. Treatment refers to the clinical use of biomedical technologies or medical 
procedures for conditions or disorders to restore persons or capacities to appropriate 
functioning levels. Enhancement, then, refers to the use of biomedical technologies or 
medical procedures to augment persons or capacities that function at appropriate levels to 
higher functioning levels.  
2.2 Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs 
The biomedical technologies or medical procedures used for enhancement range 
widely from genetic engineering to cosmetic surgery. The type of enhancement I focus on 
is psychotropic pharmaceutical enhancement. Psychotropic pharmaceuticals are chemical 
compounds used specifically to alter a person’s neurological capacities or processes 
(Katzung 2009).  
The psychotropic pharmaceuticals most often used for enhancement are usually those 
that augment specific capacities involved in cognition: memory, affective, and executive 
functions, such as working-memory and cognitive control (Singh and Kelleher 2010; 
Schermer, et al. 2009; Stein 2008; Smith and Farah 2011). Among psychotropic 
pharmaceutical enhancements, I focus on those that augment executive function of 
cognitive control, specifically the cognitive-control capacities of focus and concentration. 
I refer to these psychotropic pharmaceutical enhancements as cognitive enhancers when 
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they are used to augment a person’s capacities of focus and concentration to higher 
functioning levels and for a longer period. 
The development and standard clinical use of cognitive enhancers is as a treatment 
for conditions or disorders such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), 
Learning Disabilities (LD), and narcolepsy. The chemical compounds in cognitive 
enhancers do not directly target cognition because cognition is a complex interaction 
between a multiplicity of mental functions and neurological processes.10 Instead, the 
chemical compounds in cognitive enhancers target neurotransmitters in certain regions or 
systems of the brain (Housden, Morein-Zamir and Sahakian 2011; (Katzung 2009).  
By amplifying, influencing, or blocking certain neurotransmitters in the cortical and 
sub-cortical systems—in a way not fully understood by neuroscience or pharmacology — 
cognitive enhancers have improved the functioning of the capacities of focus and 
concentration in many cases (Smith and Farah 2011; O’Reilly 2010). For persons with 
ADHD and LD, the use of cognitive enhancers restores their impaired capacities of focus 
and concentration to appropriate functioning levels. Since cognitive enhancers affect the 
capacities of focus and concentration, they are used for persons with narcolepsy to 
maintain appropriate levels of alertness and wakefulness.  
While the development and use of cognitive enhancers is as treatment, there is 
evidence indicating that, to some degree, cognitive enhancers do improve the capacities 
of focus and concentration in unimpaired persons to higher functioning levels. The 
degree to which they do so varies between individuals: for a few individuals, cognitive 
enhancers actually impede cognition; for others, their capacities are augmented only 
                                                
10 This conception of cognition as mental functions and neurological process is neutral in respect to theories 
of mind and cognitive science debates concerning computation theory of mind, cognitive heuristics, and the 
debate concerning extended and embedded mind hypotheses (Horst 2011; Herbert 2010; Levy 2007). 
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slightly; and for most, the augmentation is only moderate (Mehta, et al. 2000; Housden, 
Morein-Zamir and Sahakian 2011). Yet in many cases, even moderate augmentation of 
focus can assist a person with declarative learning and be tremendously beneficial to their 
cognition overall (Smith and Farah 2011; Sandberg, 2011; Sandberg and Savulescu 
2011).  
While cognitive enhancers may be used for enhancement, there are risks involved. As 
pharmaceuticals, cognitive enhancers can be a stimulant, like methylphenidate (Trade-
names: Ritalin™ or Concerta™) or dextroamphetamine and amphetamine (Trade-name: 
Adderall™), or non-stimulant, such as modafinil (Trade-name: Provigil™). 
Pharmaceutical stimulants in particular have potentially dangerous side effects.11 By 
amplifying certain neurotransmitters in the cortical and sub-cortical systems, the use of 
cognitive enhancers may result in emotional and aggressive behavior, anxiety, insomnia, 
and—because they interact with the brain’s rewards center—dependence, severe 
withdrawal, and depression (Smith and Farah 2011; Stein 2008; National Center on 
Addiction and Substance Abuse 2005). The side effects are dangerous enough to warrant 
concern whether use is for treatment or enhancement.  
2.2.1 Education  
Although they often have dangerous side effects and provide at best only moderate 
augmentation, cognitive enhancers’ ability to augment the functioning of the capacities of 
focus and concentration suggests profound implications for our lives and, in particular, 
                                                
11 It does not follow from my focus on the side effects of pharmaceutical stimulants that pharmaceutical 
non-stimulants are safer. Many of the side effects of non-stimulants mirror those of pharmaceutical 
stimulants. Traditionally, many held that since pharmaceutical non-stimulants were not amphetamine 
based, they were less dangerous in respect to addiction. However, there is a dispute on whether this is 
actually true. Since empirical studies and questions on the addictiveness of pharmaceutical non-stimulants 
have only recently begun, I remain neutral to the question of whether pharmaceutical non-stimulants are 
less addictive than pharmaceutical stimulants. 
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for our academic institutions. The central goal of my project is to elucidate the proper 
role of cognitive enhancers within education and our academic institutions. Elucidating 
the role of cognitive enhancers across the entire domain of education and within all the 
diverse institutions in our educational system is, however, simply too difficult and broad 
for one research project. For simplicity, I limit the scope of my project to the academic 
institutions of colleges and universities, which I refer to as academia, and focus on 
undergraduate education.  
While I return to the issue of academia in subsequent chapters, I will stipulate it rather 
broadly here. The goal of academia is to expose students to the sciences, arts, and 
humanities, which facilitates the development of intellectual capacities. Developing our 
intellectual capacities is not only prudent but also good for human well-being. Therefore, 
exposing students to the sciences, arts, and humanities is both instrumentally beneficial 
and good for a student’s own sake.  
The achievement of, or at least the strive to achieve, this goal is done by structuring 
the academic activities within academia around two aims:  
1st Aim: Progressively provide students with information of greater depth.  
 
2nd Aim: Progressively work to improve students’ skill sets of reading 
comprehension, arithmetic, writing, and critical thinking. 
 
As a student progresses through academia, the first aim structures the courses and course 
levels to be progressively more challenging and complex. For example, a beginning-level 
chemistry course in academia is typically more challenging and comprehensive than a 
chemistry course taken in high school; moreover, as chemistry courses advance to upper 
tier or graduate level, the information is of greater depth. When a student is presented 
with information that is evermore demanding and intricate, then the second aim structures 
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the academic activities such that the student’s skill sets must also advance. To work 
through advanced chemistry, a student must consistently expand and refine their skill sets 
of reading comprehension, arithmetic, and critical thinking.  So activities in academia are 
structured around these two aims.  
Although academic institutions certainly have different measures of assessment, and 
some may (rarely) not have any measures at all, I stipulate that assessment of students in 
academic activities is a fundamental component of academia. It is either to a set standard, 
such as assessing a student’s work against the accepted standard of chemistry, or against 
the conceptual standard for students at that level, such as assessing a student’s academic 
activities against what an average student at that level could achieve. This assessment of 
students is in a competitive environment.  
While these are the general goals and aims of academia, my research project 
concentrates on the role of cognitive enhancers among students in academia. Among 
undergraduate and graduate students surveyed, 20 percent reported using cognitive 
enhancers, out of which 90 percent indicated that the use was for enhancement, not for 
treatment (White, Becker-Blease and Grace-Bishop 2006).12 To illustrate some of the 
context and considerations of undergraduate students’ use of cognitive enhancers, I 
provide the following three cases. 
Undergraduate students Teresa, Edith, and Oliver are studying Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations in a philosophy class. When studying Wittgenstein, which 
involves the academic tasks of researching, reading, and writing, Teresa takes 10 
                                                
12 That 20 percent of undergraduate and graduate students reported using cognitive enhancers is alarming 
because the use of prescription stimulants for non-medical purposes among all Americans between 21 and 




milligrams of dextroamphetamine every four to six hours. Teresa has ADHD, and this 
cognitive enhancer allows her capacities of focus and concentration to function at 
proficient levels.  
While studying Wittgenstein, Edith also takes 10 milligrams of dextroamphetamine 
every four to six hours, but unlike Teresa, Edith does not have a condition or disorder; 
instead she uses a cognitive enhancer because of her passion for philosophy. Using 
cognitive enhancers enables her capacities of focus and concentration to function at 
higher levels, allowing her not only to work efficiently and effectively on these academic 
tasks but also to devote more of her time to learning philosophy.  
The last student, Oliver, also takes 10 milligrams of dextroamphetamine every four to 
six hours, but he does not take this cognitive enhancer as treatment for a neurological 
disorder or because of a passion for learning philosophy. He takes it because he spent the 
majority of the lectures and discussion sections posting pithy comments on Facebook and 
not paying attention. He doesn’t understand the material and is using the cognitive 
enhancer to improve his capacities of focus and concentration while he pulls an “all-
nighter” to write his final paper. 
In the broadest terms, the cases of Teresa, Edith, and Oliver describe some, but 
certainly not all, of the considerations and contexts involved in the use of cognitive 
enhancers. Although these three cases do not account for all considerations and contexts 
pertaining to the use of cognitive enhancers, they can be used to illustrate the sort of 
cases that fall outside the range of my project’s interest. At the moment, my interest is not 
on cases involving cognitive enhancers as a treatment. I take Teresa’s use of cognitive 
enhancer as being treatment and will not consider her case or similar cases when 
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explicating the role of cognitive enhancers in academia. My interest is in cases like those 
of Oliver and Edith: the 90% of students using cognitive enhancers in academia where 
the use is strictly for enhancement.  
My project begins by evaluating whether this use of cognitive enhancers in academia 
is permissible. My assessment of a student’s “act” of using an enhancement relies on a 
stipulated distinction between an “act” and an “action”.13 An act is often taken in the 
narrow sense of a person’s particular behavior or a singular instance, whereas an action 
broadly includes the person’s act but also an account of the relevant circumstances and 
considerations. In some cases, one need only rely on an act in the narrow sense when 
evaluating a person, such as in murder or rape. Yet in the case of student use of cognitive 
enhancers, it seems that a description of the situation and considerations, such as the 
particulars of an academic environment or the reasons a student takes the cognitive 
enhancer, is needed in our assessment. Thus in evaluating whether the use of cognitive 
enhancers in academia is permissible, I consider the situation and a student’s reasons for 
using an enhancement.  
An initial way to evaluate the permissibility of student use of cognitive enhancers is 
in respect to the current rules in academia. For simplicity, I take rules in academia as 
referring to the institutional rules: the regulations or protocols governing students’ actions 
in academia. Starting with institutional rules is important since these rules stipulate, or at 
least indirectly indicate, which actions are permitted and prohibited for students. 
Although I cannot provide an exhaustive account in the following section of all 
institutional rules that in some way pertain to cognitive enhancers, I examine the 
                                                
13 Although this stipulated distinction is attributed to Christine Korsgaard, Jon Garthoff brought this 
distinction to my attention (Korsgaard 2009). 
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institutional rules most commonly used in evaluating the use of cognitive enhancers: 
those prohibiting a student from using illegal drugs in academic activities and those 
concerning cheating.  
2.3 Enhancement in Academia: Institutional Rules and Permissibility 
Evaluating the permissibility of Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers starts 
by asking about institutional rules: “What are the regulations or codes governing student 
use of cognitive enhancers in academia?” Typically the institutional rules considered as 
governing student use of cognitive enhancers are (i) those prohibiting a student from 
using illegal drugs in academic activities and (ii) those concerning cheating. In respect to 
these institutional rules, the standard evaluation of Oliver and Edith’s cases is that in 
principle, their use of cognitive enhancers is impermissible. According to the first rule, 
their use of cognitive enhancer is impermissible because it involves the illegal use of a 
prescription pharmaceutical. For the second rule, their use of cognitive enhancers is 
impermissible because it is cheating.  
I think that this standard evaluation of Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers 
is disputable. The institutional rule prohibiting students from using illegal drugs in 
academic activities clearly stipulates that the distinction between a permitted and a 
prohibited use of cognitive enhancers depends on whether a student has a legal 
prescription. Yet the complexities of neurology, pharmacology, and medicine are such 
that who gets a legal prescription is often rather arbitrary and an unreliable factor for 
determining permissibility. Thus although one does not want students in academia to use 
illegally obtained cognitive enhancers, it is not clear that having a legal prescription 
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decisively determines that the use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement is 
impermissible in academia.  
In respect to institutional rules concerning cheating, the first problem is that there are 
often no rules stipulating that the use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement is cheating, 
which has led the discussion of enhancement in academia often to center on the question, 
“Is a student who uses cognitive enhancers for enhancement cheating?” This question of 
cheating has generated two well entrenched positions that are inconclusive and thus fail 
to advance the discussion of enhancement in academia.  
In the following sections, beginning with the rule prohibiting a student from using 
illegal drugs in academic activities, I examine current institutional rules and their 
evaluations of cognitive-enhancer use, and I argue that the permissibility of student use of 
cognitive enhancers is not determined decisively by these rules.  
2.3.1 Institutional Rules Prohibiting a Student from Using Illegal Drugs  
 Most if not all academic institutions have rules that prohibit a student from using an 
illegal drug during academic activities. It is illegal to use certain pharmaceuticals without 
a prescription issued by a medical professional or to misuse a prescription 
pharmaceutical. Misuse often is stipulated as the use of a prescription pharmaceutical 
without having a prescription and—importantly—the use of a prescription 
pharmaceutical to experience certain feelings (Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration 2010).  
Typically the second stipulation of misuse is interpreted as the use of prescription 
pharmaceuticals for “off-label” effects or purposes (“off label” means to use psychotropic 
pharmaceuticals for reasons other than the “indication or usage” approved by a regulatory 
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body such as the Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines Agency).  By 
this conception of misuse, although persons may have a legal prescription for a 
pharmaceutical, because they use it for the off-label effect of experiencing certain 
feelings (e.g., to get high), it is illegal. In academia, the institutional rule prohibiting a 
student from using illegal drugs during academic activities includes the off-label misuse 
of a drug.  
In respect to this institutional rule, the evaluation of Oliver and Edith’s cases goes as 
follows. If Oliver and Edith do not have a prescription for these cognitive enhancers, then 
their use is illegal. Moreover, even if Oliver and Edith have a legal prescription, their use 
of these cognitive enhancers for enhancement is off label and an illegal misuse of the 
pharmaceutical. Since the use of illegal drugs or the misuse of a legal prescription is 
prohibited in academia, Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is considered 
impermissible. The conclusion is that student use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement 
is impermissible because of an institutional rule prohibiting illegal drug use by students.   
Provisionally, it seems reasonable that according to this institutional rule, Oliver and 
Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is impermissible. If Oliver and Edith obtained these 
cognitive enhancers illegally, then they are prohibited from using them. In fact, this 
institutional rule holds that even if these cognitive enhancers were legally obtained, 
Oliver and Edith’s use of them is to be considered a misuse because they are using this 
prescription pharmaceutical for off-label effects and purposes. For the moment, I am 
going to bracket this rule’s conception of misuse and the rule’s reliance on having a legal 
prescription: I argue that this reliance on having a legal prescription is problematic.  
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Consider that in this institutional rule, what makes a student’s use of cognitive 
enhancers permissible is that they have a legal prescription. Accordingly, this rule holds 
that a student with a legal prescription is permitted to use the drug, whereas a student 
without a prescription is prohibited from using cognitive enhancers. However, upon 
further reflection, having a legal prescription is an unreliable factor for determining 
permitted and prohibited use of cognitive enhancers because obtaining a legal 
prescription rests on a medical professional making a difficult diagnosis or, in many 
cases, is simply a matter of a particular medical professional’s discretion regarding 
enhancement.  
First, consider that there is great difficulty in making an accurate diagnosis of the 
conditions or disorders requiring cognitive enhancers. These conditions or disorders often 
do not have an easily identifiable list of necessary or sufficient symptoms to make a 
diagnosis. For example, ADHD consists of a set of heterogeneous symptoms that span 
from environmental, physical, and social dimensions (Parens and Johnston 2009; Singh 
2008). These symptoms do not fit within clear and distinct categories but are on a 
continuum (L. Singh 2008). As a result, when a physician or psychiatrist makes a 
diagnosis, they are often relying on their discretionary judgment for assessing the degree 
of these symptoms.  
However, this discretionary judgment in assessing symptoms and diagnosing ADHD 
has been called into question in respect to consistency, precision, and validity (Singh 
2008; Schermer et al. 2009). In many cases, individuals diagnosed as having ADHD may 
not actually have it and, worse, some with ADHD are not diagnosed as having it. In fact, 
there is also a small but growing empirical literature that suggests that some students who 
 
 29 
claim they use cognitive enhancers for explicit enhancement purposes may be self-
medicating an undiagnosed condition or disorder (L. Singh 2008).  A medical 
professional might simply misdiagnose a student and, in doing so, prescribe cognitive 
enhancers to students who do not need it and also not prescribe to those that do.  
Moreover, there is a dearth of guidelines for clinicians about prescribing 
pharmaceuticals for enhancement. Consider that the American Academy of Neurology 
(AAN) recently published a guide for neurologists recommending different approaches to 
handling requests for “neuroenhancement” from healthy patients (Larriviere, et al. 2009). 
Although the AAN’s guide neither promotes nor discourages prescribing cognitive-
enhancers to healthy patients, it does suggest that the decision to prescribe cognitive 
enhancers as an enhancement rests upon a neurologist’s discretion. In addition to the 
difficulty of discretionary judgments for the diagnosis of a condition or disorder, a 
neurologist could simply decide that in certain situations, it is appropriate to prescribe 
patients cognitive enhancers for enhancement.  
The problem in relying on having a legal prescription to determine permissibility of 
students using cognitive enhancers is that obtaining a legal prescription might be the 
result of something as arbitrary as which particular medical professional they consult. 
Consider the following: let’s say that Oliver, Edith, and Teresa all go to see the same 
medical professional. Oliver and Edith tell the medical professional that if prescribed 
cognitive enhancers, their academic work will improve because their capacities of focus 
and concentration will be augmented. This medical professional, who also has pro-
enhancement sympathies, agrees and prescribes cognitive enhancers. Teresa consults the 
same medical professional and her symptoms of ADHD are mistaken for those of a 
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behavioral disorder. She is not prescribed cognitive enhancers and later illegally obtains 
cognitive enhancers from a friend. According to the institutional rule prohibiting students 
from using illegal drugs in academic activities, Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive 
enhancers is permissible because of a legal prescription but Teresa’s use of cognitive 
enhancers is not.  
Now let’s imagine a possible world, exactly like our world, except that the medical 
professional whom Oliver, Edith, and Teresa visit does not have pro-enhancement 
sentiments. In this possible world, the medical professional does not prescribe Oliver and 
Edith cognitive enhancers but does accurately diagnose Teresa and prescribes her 
cognitive enhancers. According to the institutional rule prohibiting students from using 
illegal drugs in academic activities, Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is now 
prohibited and, because of a legal prescription, Teresa’s is permitted.  
By comparing these two possible scenarios and their applications of the institutional 
rule to the cases of Oliver, Edith, and Teresa, it seems reasonable to want a justification 
for why Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is permissible in the first scenario 
but impermissible in the second scenario. The justification is that in one possible world, 
they consulted a medical professional who had positive sentiments about enhancement, 
and in the other possible world, the medical professional lacked positive sentiments about 
enhancement. Although this explanation of the difference between the two worlds is 
accurate, it is too arbitrary to serve as a justification. The justification for why one 
student is permitted to use cognitive enhancers but another is not should not stem from 
the random assignment of a medical professional.  
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Moreover, that Teresa, who has a condition or disorder requiring the use of cognitive 
enhancers, might be improperly denied access to cognitive enhancers in some situations 
should also give us pause. It does not take a possible world experiment for us to realize 
that, as it stands, it is likely that many students who think they are using cognitive 
enhancers as an enhancement are in fact using them as a treatment and, alternatively, 
many students who think they are using cognitive enhancers for treatment are really using 
them as an enhancement. Therefore, obtaining a legal prescription is not a reliable factor, 
and its unreliability is a reason for thinking that the institutional rule prohibiting the use 
of illegal drugs does not decisively determine that student use of cognitive enhancers for 
enhancement is impermissible. 
2.3.2 Misuse of a Pharmaceutical 
One might object to the preceding section because in bracketing this institutional 
rule’s stipulation of misuse, the rule’s ability to explain adequately why certain uses of 
cognitive enhancers are impermissible has been removed. The rule’s stipulation is a 
conception of misuse that always deems off-label uses of prescription pharmaceuticals to 
be misuse because the medical indication of cognitive enhancers is for treatment of 
certain conditions or disorders, not enhancement. Even if a medical professional is not 
violating prescription guidelines, they are prescribing a pharmaceutical for off-label 
effects, and this is a misuse. In cases like those of Oliver and Edith, because they are 
using cognitive enhancers for enhancement, which is an off-label effect even if they have 
a legal prescription, their use should be prohibited because it is for off-label purposes and 
therefore a misuse.  
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The problem with the objection to this institutional rule’s conception of misuse is that 
it is based upon the presupposition that off-label use of prescription pharmaceuticals is 
always misuse (Dresser and Frader 2009). However, such a conception of misuse is 
inaccurate because off-label use of pharmaceuticals is, in fact, a common and necessary 
practice in medicine. A medical professional may prescribe a pharmaceutical specifically 
for the off-label effect. In the palliative care of patients in end-of-life stages, a medical 
professional’s reason for prescribing certain pharmaceuticals often is explicitly for the 
off-label effect (the term for a medical professional’s reasoning for prescribing 
pharmaceuticals or treatments is called an “indication”). The most common reason for 
using morphine is as an analgesic, but morphine’s off-label effect is the suppression of 
breathing rate. In palliative treatment, morphine is a common, if not standard, form of 
treatment to reduce the strain and anxiety of heavy and labored breathing and to dry out 
fluids that accumulate in respiratory passages (Enck 2002). Although this use of 
morphine is for the off-label effect, it certainly is not a misuse. Similarly, the off-label 
effects of cognitive enhancers combined with standard treatments are increasingly 
implemented in new developmental therapies for the conditions or disorders of 
schizophrenia or Alzheimer’s disease (Hogarty MSW et al., 2004; Stein 2008; Housden, 
Morein-Zamir and Sahakian 2011). In these cases, it is not clear that off-label use is 
misuse.  
One might think that the difference between using cognitive enhancers for 
schizophrenia or Alzheimer’s disease and Oliver and Edith’s use is that the former is for 
treatment and the latter is for enhancement. However, we should note that the 
demarcation line between the clinical use of cognitive enhancers for treatment and for 
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enhancement is not all that clear. Since modafinil provides alertness and energy, a 
physician may prescribe it to a healthy patient without narcolepsy to help them adjust to 
working different shifts (e.g., moving from a day to a night shift) or prescribe it to a 
patient to prevent jetlag. In these cases, the physician is prescribing pharmaceuticals to 
augment their patient’s capacities, but it seems equally plausible that they are treating a 
condition or disorder whose duration is extremely short.  
Further, it is plausible that a physician could prescribe modafinil as a prophylactic 
treatment to prevent fatigue and inattentiveness. This use of modafinil, in fact, has gone 
on for the past 30 years with combat pilots in the United States military (Caldwell, et al. 
2004). One might consider the treatment of fatigue and inattentiveness as inappropriate, 
but in the case of patients with multiple sclerosis, this is exactly the medical indication 
for prescribing them methylphenidate, dextroamphetamine, and modafinil.  The difficulty 
in delineating the clinical use of cognitive enhancers for treatment and enhancement and 
this rule’s inaccurate conception of misuse is another reason for thinking that the rule 
does not help definitively determine that student use of cognitive enhancers for 
enhancement is impermissible.  
In summary, for reasons concerning the unreliability of obtaining a legal prescription 
as well as holding an inaccurate conception of misuse, the institutional rule prohibiting a 
student from using illegal drugs in academic activities does not decisively determine that 
students’ use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement is impermissible. 
The preceding examination of this institutional rule is not exhaustive and one can 
certainly find flaws in the argument presented. Yet even in conceding these defects, it 
still seems reasonable that the argument is significant because it illustrates that many 
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presuppositions about neurology, pharmacology, and medicine that this institutional rule 
takes for granted are inaccurate.  
The focus in the following section concerns the other institutional rule commonly 
applied to evaluating students’ use of cognitive enhancers: cheating.  
2.4 Institutional Rules Concerning Cheating  
Often applied separately or in conjunction with other institutional rules, the rules 
relevant to students’ use of cognitive enhancers include those surrounding cheating. The 
basis for these institutional rules is that in academia, there are regulations or codes 
governing fair competition. These are not meant to ensure that everyone will finish 
academic competition equally but rather to ensure that the rules pertaining to competition 
are fair (e.g., when playing golf, only counting half of my shots is not a fair competition). 
Although academic competition inevitably involves inequalities because not all students 
have equal academic skills, it does not follow that any action of a competing student is 
permissible to compensate for unequal skill sets. Even if you are terrible at logic, you 
cannot bring a logic textbook to a “closed-book” logic exam. 
 An institutional rule concerning cheating is a rule that stipulates which actions 
constitute cheating. A factor used to determine which actions constitute cheating 
considers whether the action provides the student with an unfair advantage. In the case of 
cognitive enhancers, it seems plausible to think that Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive 
enhancers provides them with an unfair advantage since it boosts their capacities of focus 
and concentration to higher functioning levels. By using cognitive enhancers, Oliver and 
Edith’s capacities of focus and concentration are operating at levels beyond those of their 
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peers, violating fairness in competition in academia.14 If one applies this institutional rule 
to Oliver and Edith’s cases, then their uses of cognitive enhancers are impermissible 
because they are cheating (Greely, et al. 2008; Goodman 2010; Schermer 2008).15  
Despite the prominence and reasonableness of thinking that Oliver and Edith are 
violating an institutional rule concerning cheating, upon reflection, the problem is that 
using cognitive enhancers does not easily fit within the normal paradigm of cheating. 
According to Stuart P. Green (2004), cheating is “the intentional violation of a rule in 
order to gain an unfair advantage over others.” Yet few academic institutions have rules 
stipulating that a student is prohibited from using a cognitive enhancer for enhancement 
unless it is illegally obtained. As a result, it is not clear that institutional rules concerning 
cheating can apply to Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers. If Oliver and Edith 
are prohibited from using cognitive enhancers, it cannot be because it violates 
institutional rules concerning cheating. Thus it is also reasonable to think that 
institutional rules concerning cheating do not decisively determine the permissibility of 
cognitive enhancers for enhancement in academia.  
At this point, the use of Oliver and Edith’s cases is in respect to academia’s 
institutional rules prohibiting a student from using illegal drugs in academic activities and 
to those concerning cheating. The argument is that these rules do not decisively 
determine that a student’s use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement is impermissible. 
                                                
14 Some will consider academia as cooperation, not competition. However, as both Stuart P. Green and 
Bernard Gert have argued, cooperation does not exclude competition. For example, in a game, both parties 
are competing against the other. Yet the game is still cooperative in that they are playing the same game. 
One cannot play basketball against another person who is trying to play baseball. Both parties agree to play 
one specific game and adhere to one set of rules and regulations. In a similar sense, academia, even if 
considered in respect to cooperation, can involve competition (Green 2004; Gert 2005). 
15 Although Rob Goodman and Maartje Schermer do not consider the use of cognitive enhancers as 
cheating per se, both provide excellent examinations of the activities within academia in respect to 
cheating, unfair advantage, and enhancement (Goodman, 2010; Schermer 2008a; Schermer 2008b).  
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It does not follow from this argument that the use of cognitive enhancers is permitted in 
academia; it only follows that the evaluation of Oliver and Edith’s use of these 
enhancements as being impermissible can be reasonable disputed.  
That academia’s institutional rules fail to determine decisively the permissibility of 
student use of cognitive enhancers has led the discussion of enhancement in academia to 
focus on whether, in principle, the use of cognitive enhancers is cheating. This shifts the 
focus away from current or possible advances in biomedical technologies or medical 
procedures, prescribing practices in medicine, and societies’ perceptions of cognitive 
enhancement to center on whether the use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement in 
academia is fundamentally a question of cheating. The implication of this shift in focus is 
that before one is able to formulate institutional rules governing student use of cognitive 
enhancers in academia, one must determine whether there the use of these enhancements 
is cheating or not.  
In the following sections, I examine the question of cheating, the positions that think 
the use of cognitive enhancers is cheating (or not), and the ramifications this focus on the 
question of cheating has had on issues of enhancement in academia. 
2.5 Questions of Cheating 
“Anything worth having is worth cheating for.” 
—W.C. Fields 
 
 In the contemporary discussion of enhancement in academia, answering the question,  
“What should be the institutional rules governing student use of cognitive enhancers in 
academia?” requires an antecedent answer to the question of cheating: “Is a student who 
uses cognitive enhancers for enhancement cheating?” The permissibility of students using 
cognitive enhancers depends upon whether a student’s use of cognitive enhancers is 
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cheating. By answering the question of cheating, one is then able to formulate 
institutional rules for governing student use of cognitive enhancers in academia. If using 
cognitive enhancers is cheating, then academia should have institutional rules prohibiting 
students from using them; if using cognitive enhancer is not cheating, academia should 
have institutional rules that permit students to use them.  
It is understandable why the question of cheating frames the current discussion of 
enhancement in academia. First, at least under normal conditions, cheating is wrong. 
Second, if using cognitive enhancers is cheating, then it is easy to assess a student’s 
discrete act (did they use a cognitive enhancer or not?). Third, the notion of cheating 
encapsulates difficult and different conceptions of enhancements by regarding them as 
being “positional goods” (items that provide or give a person a competitive advantage). 
Finally, the question of cheating allows one easily to categorize answers to this question 
in one of two positions: those who think a student’s use of cognitive enhancers is 
cheating and those who do not. 
The question of cheating has generated two well-entrenched positions that are 
inconclusive and fail to advance the discussion of enhancement in academia. In the 
following, I reconstruct in broad strokes these two positions in broad strokes. Although 
this reconstruction of the two positions does not perfectly align with any particular 
author’s work, it does present the central arguments about cheating. After reconstructing 
a position’s argument, the challenges to the argument are presented, not as refutations but 
to show that the arguments are inconclusive. That these arguments afford no conclusive 
answers has prevented the discussion of enhancement in academia from advancing. In 
particular, there are few approaches that provide a framework for the role of enhancement 
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in academia and what academia’s institutional rules should be for governing students’ use 
of cognitive enhancers.  
2.5.1 Students Who Use Cognitive Enhancers Are Cheating 
For those who think a student who uses cognitive enhancers is cheating, their 
argument is that although academia currently lacks explicit or intentional institutional 
rules against the use of cognitive enhancers, there should be such a rule. Their reasoning 
is that a student who uses cognitive enhancers has an unfair competitive advantage 
against other students because her capacities of focus and concentration are functioning 
well beyond those of non-enhanced students. This student has more energy for studying 
(since cognitive enhancers are amphetamine based) and higher functioning levels of 
focus and concentration, while human physiology constrains students who are not using 
cognitive enhancers. Therefore, Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is in 
principle impermissible since these enhancements result in them having an unfair 
competitive advantage. The implication is that there should be institutional rules 
prohibiting students from using a cognitive enhancer in academia.  
Neil Levy’s Ethical Parity Principle (EPP) poses a challenge for those who think a 
student who uses cognitive enhancers is cheating (Levy 2007). Levy develops EPP in his 
discussion of extended and embedded hypotheses of human cognition. To understand 
EPP, I must briefly explicate both the extended and embedded human cognition 
hypotheses in cognitive science and neuroethics.  
The extended cognition hypothesis holds that human cognition should be understood 
as a set of internal and external mechanisms and processes; this leads many such as Levy 
and Andy Clark to argue that human cognition should be understood as extending beyond 
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a person’s cranium into the world (Levy 2007; Clark 2001; Horst 2011). Levy 
summarizes the view: 
[Human cognition] should be understood as the set of mechanisms and 
resources with which we think, and that set is not limited to the internal 
resources made up of neuron and neurotransmitters. Instead [human 
cognition] includes the set of tools we have developed for ourselves—our 
calculators, our books, even our fingers when we use them to count—and 
the very environment itself as it supports cognition. (Levy 2007, 29) 
 
In the extended cognition hypothesis, cognition is best understood as being transcranial. 
In other words, even though our neurons are separated from the environment by our 
skulls does not mean cognition ends there. For this hypothesis, the environment is a 
constitutive element of human cognition. However, many such as Frederick Adams, 
Kenneth Aizawa, and Robert Rupert oppose the extended hypothesis of human cognition 
because, broadly, to account for and assess human cognition, one needs to know in what 
form human cognition consists. Put otherwise, transcranial human cognition is simply too 
expansive (Adams and Aizawa 2008; Rupert 2004). For those who oppose the extended 
cognition hypothesis, their argument is not that the environment does not support and 
assist with human cognition but that if we are to understand the nature of human 
cognition, understanding it as extending into the environment is unhelpful and incorrect.   
The extended cognition hypothesis is a topic of great controversy and debate in 
cognitive science and neuroethics. For the purposes of my research paper, what is 
important is that the embedded cognition hypothesis and EPP are conceptions that result 
from the debate. In Levy’s defense of an extended cognition hypothesis, he argues that 
even those who oppose this hypothesis would reasonably agree that human cognition 
should be understood, at minimum, as being embedded in an environment. Unlike 
extended hypothesis, the embedded cognition hypothesis holds that while human 
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cognition is located within the cranium, environment scaffolding such as external tools 
and props are integral to human cognition (Horst 2011; Clark 2001). Levy states: 
What matters is that we acknowledge that it is the combination of our 
brains and the tools and props upon which we lean that makes us so smart 
... high-level cognition, the kinds of thinking that makes us [humans] the 
kind of species we are, is heavily dependent on the environment. (Levy 
2007, 59) 
 
In the embedded cognition hypothesis, human cognition is understood as being situated 
in an environment that supports and assists our cognition. Human cognition should not be 
thought of as extending from and consisting in our environment but rather that the 
environment is integral to supporting and assisting human cognition.  
The embedded cognition hypothesis is not only a reasonable way to understand 
human cognition—even opponents such as Frederick Adams, Kenneth Aizawa, and 
Robert Rupert agree—but is also particularly relevant in the case of academia. One does 
think, if only roughly, that our environment via external props such as books, calculators, 
smart phones, laptops, or the Internet plays a role in supporting and assisting student 
development of intellectual capacities. If the embedded cognition hypothesis is 
reasonable, and I think it is, then there are not only external props (books, notebooks, and 
laptops) but also internal props such as psychotropic pharmaceuticals. This means that 
cognitive enhancers are internal props because they assist and support cognition by 
augmenting a student’s capacities of focus and concentration.  
  Given that embedded cognition hypothesis is reasonable and that both internal and 
external props support and assist human cognition, the important issue is to devise a way 
to assess these props for permissibility. Levy offers EPP as fair way to do so: 
EPP: Alterations of external props are (ceteris paribus) ethically on par 
with alterations of the brain, to the precise extent to which our reasons for 
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finding alterations of the brain problematic are transferrable to alterations 
of the environment in which it is embedded. (Levy 2007, 61)16 
 
According to EPP, whether a prop is internal or external is by itself irrelevant. Instead, of 
importance are the reasons for why one might hold a certain prop as being permissible or 
impermissible (or problematic). For example, if it is impermissible to use memory-
enhancing psychotropic pharmaceuticals because they provide an unfair advantage to 
some students, then it follows that the use of a smart phone would also be impermissible 
for the same reason. Alternatively, if it is permissible to use memory-enhancing 
psychotropic pharmaceuticals because they do not provide a student with an unfair 
advantage, then it follows that the use of a smart phone is also permissible.  
Returning to the issue of cognitive enhancers in academia, EPP presents a challenge 
for those who think a student who uses cognitive enhancers is cheating. According to 
EPP, if cognitive enhancers are impermissible because they provide an unfair competitive 
advantage, then many commonly accepted external props would also be impermissible 
for the same reasons. Compare the internal prop of cognitive enhancers with external 
props like laptops or quiet apartments. Under EPP, if it is impermissible for a student to 
use cognitive enhancers because they provide an unfair advantage, then one could equally 
hold that it is impermissible for a student to use a laptop or to live in a quiet apartment. 
The strength of this argument is that cognitive enhancers, laptops, and quiet apartments 
function in a similar manner with respect to supporting and assisting human cognition. A 
laptop does not directly improve a student’s cognition, but it does support and assist with 
calculations and access to resources. Quiet apartments support and assist cognition by 
                                                
16 Levy actually provides two versions of EPP (weak and strong), but because I remain neutral on issues of 
the extended mind hypothesis, and with respect to the scope of this research project, we need only be 
concerned with what he terms the weak EPP (Levy 2007). 
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providing privacy and solitude for study. Similarly, cognitive enhancers support and 
assist cognition by augmenting a student’s capacities of focus and concentration. 
According to EPP, the reasons for deeming cognitive enhancers impermissible are 
transferable to quiet apartments or laptops. By extension, the argument that students who 
use cognitive enhancers are cheating also implies that students who use laptops or quiet 
apartments are cheating as well.  
One who thinks the use cognitive enhancers is cheating might concede that laptops 
and quiet apartments do provide some students with an advantage, but this advantage is 
not strong enough to be considered cheating. Although this is a plausible response, for 
those who think a student who uses cognitive enhancers is cheating, the challenge is 
providing conclusive reasons or formulating an argument that differentiates the 
advantages of quiet apartments and laptops from those of cognitive enhancers.    
A second and more difficult challenge is in distinguishing cognitive enhancers from 
other commonly accepted internal props like coffee and caffeine-based energy drinks. To 
illustrate, considered a modified EPP, which I refer to as EPP (internal). 
EPP (internal): Alterations of internal props are (ceteris paribus) ethically 
on par with other internal props, to the precise extent to which our reasons 
for finding one internal prop problematic is transferrable to other internal 
prop. 
 
According to EPP (internal), the focus is on the reasons why an internal prop is 
considered impermissible or problematic (or permissible) with respect to other internal 
props. The current argument contends that the reason cognitive enhancers are 
impermissible is because in elevating a student’s level of alertness and focus, these 
enhancements provide an unfair competitive advantage. Yet coffee and caffeine-based 
energy drinks are both permissible internal props that also provide students with elevated 
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levels of alertness and focus. In fact, empirical studies indicate that in some cases the use 
of coffee by a person whose capacities of focus and concentration functioned at average 
levels was more effective in providing alertness and higher scores on cognitive tests than 
was the use of cognitive enhancers (Randall, Fleck and Shneerson 2004; Wesensten, et al. 
2004). According to the EPP (internal), if cognitive enhancers are impermissible for 
reasons of unfair competitive advantage, then this reason is transferable to coffee and 
caffeine-based energy drinks, making them impermissible as well.  
Even if one concedes that coffee and caffeine-based energy drinks provide a 
competitive advantage, is this a reason for holding them to be impermissible? It is 
unpersuasive to think so, and the following example illustrates why. Let’s say that in 
Edith’s philosophy class there are two other students of note: Corey and Ian. Corey and 
Ian do not have conditions or disorders necessitating the need for cognitive enhancers and 
do not use them for enhancement. On the day of the final exam, Edith takes a cognitive 
enhancer in the morning, Corey drinks coffee with double espresso shots half an hour 
before class, and Ian takes and drinks nothing. In comparison to Ian, Corey’s capacities 
of focus and concentration augmented by coffee seem to be a competitive advantage but 
are not unfair. If it is a competitive advantage but not unfair, how does it differ from 
Edith’s use of a cognitive enhancer? Therefore, EPP (internal) shows that for those who 
think the use of cognitive enhancers is cheating, a challenge is distinguishing how the 
competitive advantage provided by coffee and caffeine-based energy drinks differ from 
that of a cognitive enhancer.  
A potential response could be that unlike coffee or energy drinks, cognitive enhancers 
have a greater potential for abuse and are more dangerous to a person’s health. The 
 
 44 
difference lies in health risks for students. An argument could be that the conjunction of 
competitive unfairness and risk to student health is a reason to prohibit a student from 
using cognitive enhancers while permitting a student to use coffee and caffeine-based 
energy drinks.  
 However, this potential response overlooks the acceptance of some risks to our 
health in the pursuit of enhancement. Caffeine can boost our capacities of focus and 
concentration, but it is highly addictive and causes headaches, anxiety, and withdrawal 
symptoms. Nicotine also improves our capacities of focus and concentration, but the most 
efficient delivery systems for it (cigarettes and chewing tobacco) have an established link 
to cancer and are highly addictive.17 Yet there is no limit on student consumption of 
coffee or caffeine-based energy drinks or their use of cigarettes and chewing tobacco 
because of health risk. So prohibiting the use of cognitive enhancers on the grounds of 
potential abuse, health risks, and competitive fairness seems to overlook the fact that 
many commonly accepted internal props also pose problems of abuse, health risks, and 
competitive fairness.   
Along with potential abuse, health risks, and competitive fairness, a salient 
consideration one might use to differentiate cognitive enhancers from coffee and 
caffeine-based energy drinks is that cognitive enhancers are biomedical technologies 
(pharmaceuticals) that are not yet commonly accepted or widely used. Although coffee 
and caffeine-based energy drinks may pose problems of abuse, health risks, and 
competitive fairness, a reason (one not transferable to cognitive enhancers) that they are 
permitted is that they are not relatively new biomedical technologies and are commonly 
                                                




accepted or widely used. However, this response does not provide a reason, at least not an 
in-principle reason, that differentiates cognitive enhancers from commonly accepted or 
widely used products. To illustrate, return to the examples of Edith, Corey, and Ian. 
Instead of coffee, Corey decides to use a Guarana-based drink. Guarana is a South 
American plant whose seeds contain a higher concentration of caffeine than those of 
coffee (www.drugs.com 2012). Currently, the FDA has not evaluated the safety or 
effectiveness of Guarana in products, but let’s stipulate that it is stronger and provides an 
augmentation of our capacities of focus and concentration that is on par with those of 
cognitive enhancers. Moreover, let’s grant that Guarana poses health risks similar to 
cognitive enhancers. On the day of the final exam, Edith takes a cognitive enhancer in the 
morning, Corey drinks a Guarana-based drink half an hour before class, and Ian takes and 
drinks nothing. In comparison to Ian, if this Guarana-based drink augments Corey’s 
capacities of focus and concentration, is that not an unfair advantage? If it is an unfair 
advantage, how does it differ from Edith’s use of a cognitive enhancer?  
Both cognitive enhancers and Guarana-based products provide augmentation to 
Corey and Edith’s capacities of focus and concentration that are greater than Ian’s 
capacities. Both enhancers are not commonly accepted or widely used, pose health risks 
or at least unknown health risks, and have the potential for abuse. It seems that if one 
wants to prohibit cognitive enhancers because they are not commonly accepted or widely 
used, then one also would have to prohibit a student from using a Guarana-based product. 
Yet the fact that this argument would hold that a Guarana-based product is also 
prohibited demonstrates that permissibility of a biomedical technology depends on 
common acceptance or wide use. At least in principle, that some things are commonly 
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accepted or widely used is not a reason that differentiates cognitive enhancers from 
coffee, caffeine-based energy drinks, or Guarana-based products.  
Therefore the EPP (internal) shows that for those who think the use of cognitive 
enhancers is cheating, a challenge lies in providing reasons for why the advantage 
provided by cognitive enhancers differs from the advantage that coffee and caffeine-
based energy drinks provide. Until they can provide such reasons, their claim that these 
enhancements are impermissible faces difficult challenges.  
 For those who think students who use cognitive enhancers are cheating, the 
challenges regarding competitive advantage do not indicate that the position is 
indefensible or that the countering position is correct. Instead they illustrate that this 
position does not provide conclusive reasons for thinking that the use of cognitive 
enhancers is necessarily cheating. Without conclusive reasons, the use of these 
enhancements in academia is not in principle impermissible. Thus, for reasons relating to 
cheating, it is difficult to argue that there should be institutional rules prohibiting students 
from using cognitive enhancers in academia.  
In the following section, I present the argument of and challenges to those who think 
that students who use cognitive enhancers are not cheating.   
2.5.2 Students Who Use Cognitive Enhancers Are Not Cheating 
 According to those who think that students who use cognitive enhancers are not 
cheating, these enhancements are progressive educational tools that will result in benefits 
for everyone in the long term. Thus, at least in respect to questions of cheating, one 
should not create institutional rules prohibiting a student from using cognitive enhancers.  
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In this argument, while cognitive enhancers are positional goods, they are also 
educational tools that maximize students’ intellectual capacities. As educational tools 
have progressed, once-forbidden things such as calculators and laptops sometimes gain 
acceptance and become almost mandatory. Like cognitive enhancers, calculators and 
laptops maximize a student’s intellectual abilities. Cognitive enhancers differ only in that 
this enhancement is a more direct (and perhaps more effective) tool for maximizing a 
student’s capacities (e.g., providing higher functioning for concentration, focus, and in 
some cases better spatial reasoning).  
Because cognitive enhancers maximize students’ intellectual capacities more directly 
and effectively, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that students who use these enhancers 
might be more likely to participate in academia, which could potentially increase the 
greater achievements of academia (e.g., obtaining a degree, making a scientific 
breakthrough, creating new philosophical approaches, writing eloquent poetry, etc.) 
(Mehlman 2004). If this is the case, then students who use cognitive enhancers likely will 
have a network effect for cognitive enhancers (Buchanan 2008; Buchanan 2011). A 
network effect for cognitive enhancers means that the value and importance of these 
enhancements rise as increasing numbers of students use cognitive enhancers to 
maximize their intellectual capacities.18 Thus, just as there was a network effect for cell 
phones, there will also be a network effect for cognitive enhancers.  
The overall increase in students’ use of cognitive enhancers would most likely 
amplify students’ productivity, likely resulting in the creation of more new goods, 
services, and scientific discoveries. Increasing students’ productivity and thereby creating 
                                                
18 Allen Buchanan considers the network effect of enhancements, both genetic and chemical, as being not 
only a fundamental reason for enhancing but also developing an ethics of enhancement (Buchanan 2008). 
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more goods, services, and scientific discoveries will result in benefits for the students, the 
university, and the general population in the long term.19 By using cognitive enhancers, 
students’ productivity will increase so that they can handle their academic workload 
efficiently and take more classes, which is beneficial because education is good for 
human well-being. The university stands to benefit from the prestige and grants brought 
in from scientific discoveries made by students. Everyone outside of academia stands to 
benefit from the new goods and services that result from students’ productivity.  
The analogy for cognitive enhancers and benefits is that of vaccination and herd 
immunity. Just as a herd’s immunity increases when most of its members are vaccinated, 
it seems just as likely that the benefits for everyone will increase with students’ use of 
cognitive enhancers.20 Thus, for those who think that a student who uses cognitive 
enhancers is not cheating, cognitive enhancers are merely a progressive educational tool 
that will likely end in benefits for everyone in the long term.   
The strength of this argument is in the sensibleness of two of its claims. First, it seems 
plausible that cognitive enhancers really are progressive educational tools that allow 
students to maximize their intellectual capacities. Although initially prohibited, 
calculators and computers provide sheer computational power allowing students to 
maximize their intellectual capacities. Similarly, if we allow a student’s specific 
capacities of focus and concentration to operate at higher functioning levels, then it seems 
more likely that a student will be able to maximize their intellectual capacities.  
                                                
19 Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels, Daniel Wikler, and Maxwell J. Mehlman have argued 
that the potentiality for benefiting everyone’s utility is a relevant consideration when discussing 
enhancement (Buchanan, et. al 2000; Buchanan 2008; Buchanan 2011; Mehlman, 2004). 




Second, the claim that through more students maximizing their intellectual capacities, 
there are greater chances of students creating new goods, services, and scientific 
discoveries also seems sensible. Allowing the use of cognitive enhancers also seems 
likely to increase the goods, services, and scientific discoveries well into a student’s post-
academia career (Sandberg and Savulescu 2011). Thus the use of cognitive enhancers is 
not cheating and one should not create rules prohibiting their use in academia.  
Yet there are challenges to this argument. First, it follows an implicit form of 
argumentation that Erik Parens refers to as an argument from precedence:    
We’ve always used means A to achieve end A; means B also aims to 
achieve end A; therefore means B is morally unproblematic. For example, 
we’ve always increased the teacher/child ratio and reduced classroom size 
(means A) to enhance student performance (end A); Ritalin (means B) 
also aims to achieve enhanced student performance (end A); therefore 
using Ritalin is morally unproblematic. (Parens 1998) 
 
The trouble with having the form of the argument from precedence is that the 
emphasis is on achieving a certain end, overlooking the fact that means to an end do 
matter. As Dan Brock points out,  
In many valued human activities, the means of acquiring the capacities 
required for the activity are part of the very definition of the activity and 
transforming them transforms and can devalue the activity itself. (Brock 
1998, 58) 
 
It is true that arguing that a reduced classroom size enhances student performance 
provides precedence for Ritalin, which also enhances student performance. However, 
there are many means for achieving an end that one would find unacceptable—even if 
these means did actually achieve a certain end. Threatening to physically harm your child 
is one method to motivate a child into studying, which likely would augment your child’s 
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academic performance.21  But threatening to harm your child to enhance academic 
performance devalues the activity of education.  Thus, while the argument from 
precedence is not a direct criticism of the use of cognitive enhancers in academia, it does 
suggest a need for further examination of the ends this position seeks to achieve. The 
question is whether the argument given by those who think that students who use 
cognitive enhancers are not cheating devalues the goal of academia.   
The challenge is that the argument devalues the goal of academia as much as it holds 
a myopic conception of academia. Although it is true that there are many academic 
activities and disciplines in academia that directly facilitate the creation of better goods, 
services, and scientific discoveries, we should note that not all academic activities and 
disciplines do so. As a whole, academia is intended to expose students to a multiplicity of 
areas (e.g., the sciences, arts, and humanities), while this argument seems to view 
academia in instrumental terms. There is nothing wrong with viewing academia in 
instrumental terms, but doing so does not accurately represent all the reasons we value it. 
We value academia not only because a student versed in the arts and humanities as well 
as the sciences is socially valuable but also because being versed in these activities and 
disciplines is often a good thing for human well-being. Put otherwise, the value of 
education is often for its own sake. Academia is thought to make a person better even if it 
does not result in new goods, services, or scientific discoveries. While this argument 
explains an important aspect of academia, that students who use cognitive enhancers may 
improve, it still does not capture many of the reasons for valuing academia. To argue that 
                                                
21 I say unnecessary because fear can be a good motivator. Yet there is a difference between an appropriate 
use of fear as a motivator, such as a parent telling a child, “if you don’t do well in this semester’s grades, 
I’ll reduce your allowance,” from an inappropriate use of fear as a motivator, such as a parent telling a 
child, “if you don’t do well, I’m going to hit you.”  
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students who use cognitive enhancers are not cheating because they potentially produce 
more goods, services, or scientific discoveries does not account for why we value 
academia. 
Another related challenge that is likely to arise from holding a myopic conception of 
academia concerns the implications of future technological advancements. If the value of 
academia is taken solely to be for the creation of better goods, services, and scientific 
discoveries, then it is reasonable that technological advances such as “uploading” 
academic information directly into a student’s brain can also be taken as a progressive 
educational tool. Simply uploading directly into a student’s brain may result in students 
producing better goods, services, and scientific discoveries, but this goes against the idea 
that academia is as much a process of development as it is an achievement. This myopic 
conception of academia in the argument that a student who uses cognitive enhancers is 
not cheating likely will lead to challenges from certain potential technological 
advancements. 
So far, the two positions’ arguments answering the question of cheating have been 
reconstructed and their challenges presented. Challenges have been raised for each 
position, but neither argument has been refuted. Nonetheless, these challenges indicate 
that neither position provides conclusive reasons as to whether the use of cognitive 
enhancers is cheating; as a result, they do not advance the discussion of enhancement in 
academia.  
While these two positions do not advance the discussion, they do demonstrate the 
importance of relying either on the considerations of rules (e.g., rules prohibiting 
cheating actions) or consequences (e.g., the use of cognitive enhancers results in benefits 
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for everyone), or a combination of the two, to evaluate a student’s use of cognitive 
enhancers. Any approach for determining the permissibility of cognitive enhancers needs 
to consider rules. In addition to rules, an approach must be sensitive to the consequences 
of students using cognitive enhancers. That the use of cognitive enhancers provides 
benefits for everyone or alternatively harms students by exposing them to dangerous side 
effects are substantial reasons in assessing their permissibility.  
 Although rules and consequences are two important considerations, there is another 
consideration that can assist in the evaluation of a student’s action: motivation, or the 
reason(s) a student has for using a cognitive enhancer.22 The reasons why a person acted 
in a particular way often provide clarity and assist in the evaluation of their action. 
Consider rules that prohibit stealing and the bad consequences of theft. If a person is 
caught stealing food from the cafeteria, the initial assessment is that the student’s action 
was wrong. But if it turns out that the person’s motivation for stealing food was because 
she could not afford any food, then it seems her motivation is an important consideration 
in the evaluation of her action.  
Even if minimally, motivation also provides clarity and assists in evaluating a person.  
Imagine that Bogart sends flowers to his girlfriend Izzy once a month. One can evaluate 
Bogart’s action in respect to rules (one has a duty to make one’s partner happy), 
consequences (the relationship usually is better after a partner sends or receives flowers), 
or both. Yet Bogart’s motivation for sending flowers can provide clarity and assist in our 
assessment of him. If his motivation in sending flowers is love, one would hold a high 
evaluation of him; however, if Bogart’s motivation in sending flowers is out of the guilt 
                                                
22 My account of motivation, as reason or reasons for acting, remains neutral on motivations, reasons, and 
the internalism and externalism debate.  
 
 53 
he feels from his monthly infidelity, our evaluation of him would not be so nice. A 
person’s motivation is significant person because an individual’s reason for acting does 
change the assessment of them. As illustrated by Kant’s remarks on good will, 
motivations matter: “It is impossible to conceive of anything at all in the world, or even 
out of it which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will” (4:393).  
Motivation provides clarity and assists not only in the evaluation of a person but in an 
evaluation of that person’s character.23 Compositionally, a person possesses many 
differing properties and qualities, but a person’s character refers to the combination of all 
of these properties and qualities in that individual (Homiak 2011). An assessment of a 
person’s character is not in regard to moral worth but rather an assessment of the kind of 
person he or she is. As it is a combination and embodiment of all of these properties and 
qualities, an individual’s character is something that is built up and expressed over time 
through choices and actions. 
It is difficult to distinguish motivation from character clearly; however, an 
individual’s reason for acting is often as reflective of their character. Moreover, that an 
individual acts for certain motivations rather than for other reasons also is indicative of 
their character. Consider that if Bogart’s monthly motivation for sending flowers to Izzy 
is for reasons of love, then these motivations are reflective of Bogart having good 
character and being the kind of person one admires. Alternatively, if his motivations for 
sending flowers are reasons of guilt over his monthly infidelity, then these motivations 
are reflective of Bogart having bad character and being the kind of person one despises. 
                                                




Whether in the evaluation of actions, people, or character, motivation is a significant 
consideration. 
In respect to students and cognitive enhancers, motivation is a consideration that 
impacts the evaluation of students using these enhancements. To illustrate, let’s re-
examine Oliver and Edith’s cases. Oliver’s motivation for using cognitive enhancers is to 
make up an assignment because of improper study habits. Typically, this is not a good 
reason and does not reflect well on Oliver’s character. Even if the use of cognitive 
enhancers in academia is wrong based on an all-things-considered judgment, one can still 
hold that Oliver’s motivations reflect poorly on his character.  
Now contrast Oliver’s motivation with Edith’s motivation: Edith uses the cognitive 
enhancer so she can devote all of her spare time to learning philosophy. Generally 
speaking, one would consider this a good reason, an indicator that Edith has good 
character. Again, even if the use of cognitive enhancers in academia is wrong based on an 
all-things-considered judgment, one can still hold that Edith’s motivation reflects a good 
attitude and character. Motivations are a significant consideration because they 
differentiate Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers from Oliver’s, and even if Edith’s 
motivation may not justify her use of cognitive enhancers, they do indicate that she has 
good character, even if minimally. Any approach attempting to advance the discussion of 
enhancement in academia must account not only for considerations of rules and 
consequences but also for motivations.  
That academia’s current institutional rules do not decisively determine the 
permissibility of student use of cognitive enhancers and that arguments about whether the 
use of cognitive enhancers is cheating are inconclusive prevent the discussion of 
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enhancement in academia from advancing. That the discussion has not advanced beyond 
the question of cheating is a reason why there are few systematic approaches that provide 
a framework to elucidate permissibility and stipulate what academia’s institutional rules 
should be for governing student use of cognitive enhancers. In addition, any approach 
attempting to advance issues of enhancement in academia faces the task of appropriately 
balancing the value of academia and enhancement with the considerations of rules, 
consequences, and motivations. 
In the following chapter, I offer an approach for advancing the discussion of 
enhancement in academia that provides a framework for elucidating student use of 
cognitive enhancers and stipulates institutional rules for governing these enhancements in 
academia. This approach towards enhancement in academia is from the perspective of the 
ideals of human excellence or virtues. This virtues-based approach contends that one kind 
of student to want in academia is the virtuous student or, at minimum, one possessing 
certain virtues. A virtuous student may choose to use cognitive enhancers for reasons of 
self-improvement, and that cognitive enhancers is permissible under certain conditions.  
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Chapter 3 Ideals of Human Excellence 
To begin, put aside⎯for the moment⎯issues pertaining to enhancement in academia, 
permissibility, and institutional rules.24 Instead, begin by asking, “What kinds of students 
do we want in our academic institutions?” One plausible answer concerns the ideals of 
human excellence or virtues. One kind of student we want in our academic institutions is 
a student who is virtuous or, at least minimally, possesses certain virtues. In the following 
paragraphs, I offer an account of virtue that serves as an outline for which my account of 
virtuous students fills in the details.25  
Conceptually, virtues are the properties of a person that make their possessor an ideal 
of human excellence (Aristotle 1984; R. M. Adams 2006; J. D. Wallace 1978; Tzun 
1963; Zagzebski 1999). Broadly speaking, these virtues are character traits, emotional 
tendencies, or dispositions to think, feel, and act in certain ways. The motivational 
structures (character traits or emotional tendencies) are stable and enduring, and the 
dispositions (thoughts, feeling, and actions) are regular and reliable.26 A virtue requires a 
strong connection between a person’s motivational structures and dispositions. A person 
with the virtue of compassion has a character trait to comfort those in need and is 
successful in providing such comfort. This person consistently thinks, feels, and acts in 
ways to comfort other people; a single compassionate action does not mean a person has 
                                                
24 Elements of this chapter were published as “Ideals of Student Excellence and Enhancement” in 
Neuroethics (Enck 2012).  
25 My account shares and draws upon many common features in an Aristotelian conception of virtue. Yet 
strictly speaking my account is not an Aristotelian conception of virtue, as evident in the reliance on 
Confucian and Buddhist conceptions of virtues later in the chapter.  
26 I use the terms motivational structures, character traits, and emotional tendencies interchangeably. The 
reason for the varying use is that while all refer to a conception of stable and enduring properties of 
persons, in some cases one term better fits the context in which I am describing a virtue. For example, in a 
broad overview, motivational structure often works best, whereas in a situational context character trait or 




the virtue of compassion. Although one may have several reasons for consistently acting 
compassionately, to have the virtue of compassion requires that at least one of the reasons 
for acting compassionately is to provide sympathy or alleviate suffering. One cannot 
attribute the virtue of compassion to someone who does not reliably think, feel, and act to 
provide comfort or to someone who lacks the sufficient motivation of sympathy (or of 
alleviation of suffering) for their actions.   
The connection between motivational structures and dispositions in virtues 
necessitates that the exercise of virtue is through practical reasoning: the process of 
reasoning involved with deliberating upon and then undertaking certain acts (Annas 
2006; J. R. Wallace 2009). A virtuous person, or one possessing certain virtues, has 
attained practical wisdom. As I use it, practical wisdom is the ability to consider the 
relevant information presented in a given situation and then to exercise discretionary 
judgment to act accordingly in that situation. The Confucian philosopher Xunzi 
characterizes a virtuous person’s [or gentleman or sage in his terms] practical wisdom in 
a similar way.  
[H]e cannot be subverted by power or the love of profit; he cannot be 
swayed by the masses; he cannot be moved by the world. He follows this 
one thing in life; he follows it in death. This is what is called constancy of 
virtue. He who is such constancy of virtue can order himself, and having 
ordered himself, he can then respond to others. He can order himself and 
respond to others—this is what is called the complete man. It is the 
characteristic of heaven to manifest brightness, of earth to manifest 
breadth, and of the gentlemen to value completeness. (Tzun, Encouraging 
Learning 1963, 23) 
 
A virtuous person has practical wisdom for acting accordingly in a given situation and, 
possessing a strong connection between motivational structures and dispositions, does so 
for the right reason. That a virtuous person acts accordingly for the right reasons is a 
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reflection on their character.  It is a virtuous person’s actions that are reflective of 
excellence. As Aristotle notes, “we must next discuss choice; for it is thought to be most 
closely bound up with excellence and to discriminate characters than actions do,” but it is 
this excellence of character that is of most importance (NE 3.2 1111b5-6).  
One reason to want virtuous students in academia is that it is of great importance in 
our lives that a person’s actions and motivations are strongly and appropriately 
connected. We place great value on having good character. When raising children, 
parents not only want them to think, act, and feel in certain ways but, importantly, to do 
so for the right reasons as a matter of character. This isn’t surprising since we value (and 
want) physicians and soldiers to think, act, and feel in ways strongly connected to 
compassion or honor. One would want students in academia whose character is such that 
they think, act, and feel in certain ways for the right reasons.  
Consider the cases of Vincent and Mark, two students in a course on Buddhism. 
Vincent wants to understand Buddhism’s tenets of Four Noble Truths and anattā (the 
concept of no-self) because these tenets challenge Vincent’s belief system. For Vincent, 
learning about a multiplicity of viewpoints provides a wider and deeper range of options 
for assessing his own life. Mark also wants to understand Buddhism’s tenets of Four 
Noble Truths and anattā but not because these views challenge his belief system or 
because they permit a wider and deeper range of options for self-assessment. Instead, 
Mark simply to pass the course with a good grade. In this case, although we would 
typically regard both Vincent and Mark’s dispositions as being permissible, one prefers a 
student with Vincent’s motivation because the desire to understand a challenging belief 
system is indicative of character. Therefore, when considering the kind of student we 
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want in academia, the motivations students have for their academic projects connote their 
character. Our belief in the importance of character is a reason for wanting students in 
academia to be virtuous or to possess certain virtues.   
One might object and argue that although he lacks a good motivation for his 
dispositions, indicating a poor attitude and character, Mark is not doing anything 
impermissible. This certainly is true, but a student who lacks the proper motivation is not 
the kind of student we want in academia. One wants students to think, act, and feel in 
certain ways and to have good reasons for doing so. Given a choice about the kind of 
students preferred in academia, it seems plausible that we want students who are virtuous 
or, at least minimally, possess certain virtues.  
3.1 Virtues of Students 
With respect to virtuous students, at a minimum one would want these students to 
possess the virtues of seeking understanding and seeking accurate beliefs. Seeking 
understanding is a structuring virtue: a character trait that organizes and configures one’s 
activities (Adams 2006). In seeking understanding, a student has the motivational 
structure to organize and configure his dispositions to seek greater comprehension of the 
human experience. This virtue motivates a student to structure activities so that he can 
draw upon and make connections about accurate beliefs between diverse academic 
domains and disciplines. One of the goals of academia is to expose students to the various 
disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities to develop their intellectual capacities, so 




 It is reasonable to want students to possess this character trait. Considering the goals 
of academia and, more broadly, the kind of creatures humans are—social animals 
possessing advanced cognitive capacities—seeking understanding is an ideal of human 
excellence. Assume that Edith has this virtue and is also taking the course in Buddhism. 
She is motivated to comprehend Buddhism and has the dispositions to connect 
Buddhism’s conception of loving-kindness to her own and other’s experiences in life. As 
a matter of character, Edith’s character trait is not only that of an ideal student but is also 
an ideal of human excellence.  
A second virtue is that of seeking accurate beliefs, beliefs that correctly 
represent/depict the world/reality. A student with this virtue has the character trait to 
pursue accurate beliefs actively. Seeking accurate beliefs usually is considered a good 
thing: scientists, police detectives, physicists, and historians are nearly universally 
commended for seeking accurate beliefs. So it seems quite natural to think that one would 
also want students, as a matter of character, to seek accurate beliefs because they are not 
only a mark of excellence in thought but also conducive to the goals of academia.  
Still, one may object that seeking accurate beliefs is not of such significance to be 
considered an ideal of human excellence: a person who reads an entire phonebook or 
counts every blade of grass in their yard is seeking beliefs that correctly represent/depict 
the world/reality. Yet one is hesitant to claim that this person’s practice of seeking 
accurate beliefs is a display of human excellence.  
However, this objection overlooks two important considerations. First, although 
reading phonebooks or counting blades of grass are instances of seeking accurate beliefs, 
they do not seem to be related to an ideal of human excellence. By examining each 
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instance’s aims or ends, we easily distinguish instances of seeking accurate beliefs to 
achieve human excellence from ones that do not. The aim or end of an instance of 
seeking accurate beliefs is directed or guided by the particular domain it resides in. In the 
cases of students possessing this virtue, the aims or ends of seeking accurate beliefs are 
directed by academia. That we value education for its own sake—because it makes a 
student better even if it doesn’t result in new goods, services, or scientific discoveries— 
suggests that there are some instances of seeking accurate beliefs that academia would 
exclude. An individual may value reading phonebooks or counting blades of grass, but it 
is not clear that the information and facts gleaned from these instances of seeking 
accurate beliefs are something academia would value. In respect to the goal of academia, 
reading phonebooks and counting blades of grass are not the kinds of activities promoted 
in academia because it is not clear that they provide instrumental benefits, are good to a 
student’s well-being, or are something to be valued for their own sake.   
The second consideration that this objection overlooks is that in academia there is a 
value in getting things right, that a person having accurate beliefs is both instrumentally 
beneficial for helping people navigate the world and valuable as accurate beliefs for their 
own sake.  
To explicate, I need to make a quick illustrative detour. In the United States, there is 
an ongoing argument concerning the teaching of evolution as part of the high school 
science curriculum. Some citizens want creationism to be included and taught alongside 
evolution in high school science.27 There are many reasons for being against the inclusion 
of creationism in a high school science class, but one reason it is problematic is because it 
                                                
27 One might argue that “intelligent design” is not creationism. The burden for this argument is in showing 
how claiming a divine force intelligently designed or guided our evolution differs from arguing that a deity 
created the universe. Intelligent design is simply creationism by another name. 
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is an inaccurate belief. In a rough and broad sense, creationism does not provide students 
with accurate beliefs about the world they inhabit. One need not object to creationism’s 
religious overtones, only to the inaccuracy of creationism’s belief system. Consider that 
our intuitions about inaccuracy would be the same if instead of creationism, there was a 
moment to teach a theory of phlogiston or a “paleo-contact” theory of human 
development in our high school science curriculum.28 29  Our intuitions indicate that we 
value persons having accurate beliefs as being instrumentally beneficial for their own 
sakes. Therefore, returning to the question of whether seeking accurate beliefs is a virtue, 
if one thinks that it is good for persons to have accurate beliefs, then it is reasonable also 
to think that it is good, as a matter of character, for a student actively to seek out accurate 
beliefs in their lives.  
I should note that this is not to claim that all of a person’s beliefs need to be accurate 
or that holding an inaccurate belief is always bad—self-deception often has its benefits 
(“this is a good dissertation”)—but in respect to getting things right, we value seeking 
accurate beliefs for its own sake.  
That we value seeking accurate beliefs as a virtue for students relates to the goal of 
academia. Students are to be exposed to different and varying disciplines in the sciences, 
arts, and humanities to facilitate their development of intellectual capacities. The 
information provided to them from the sciences, arts, and humanities progressively gets 
more challenging and in-depth. A student with the virtue of seeking accurate beliefs is 
likely to participant actively in her education. The student with this virtue is also going to 
                                                
28 Thomas Kuhn uses the theory of phlogiston and its eventual replacement by oxygen as a central example 
in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1970). 
29 The “paleo-contact” theory of human development, also known as “Ancient Aliens,” was popularized by 
Erich von Däniken in the book Chariots of the Gods? but has long since been discredited by science 
(Schick and Vaughn, 2011). 
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be diligent in assessing the accuracy of her beliefs while seeking to find more accurate 
beliefs. So one wants students in academia to possess this virtue.  
Therefore, if one kind of student we want in academia is a student who is virtuous, 
then it is reasonable that these virtuous students, at a minimum, possess the virtues of 
seeking understanding and accurate beliefs.  
3.2 Virtuous Students and Enhancement 
Returning to the issue of student use of cognitive enhancers, one can ask whether a 
virtuous student would use cognitive enhancers or not.30 I argue that for reasons of self-
improvement, a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive enhancers. In considering 
whether to do so, a virtuous student, having practical wisdom, would properly account for 
the relevant information and considerations in a given situation. In a given situation, there 
might be relevant considerations pertaining to rules in academia (were these cognitive 
enhancers obtained legally or not?), consequences of using these psychotropic 
pharmaceuticals (health benefits versus risks), and motivations. It seems likely that in 
many situations, a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive enhancers for self-
improvement.  
In general, the augmentation of one’s capacities of focus and concentration to higher 
functioning levels is an improvement. Typically, enhancements result in 10 to 20 percent 
improvement in a given task (Sandberg 2011, 79). For virtuous students, this 10 to 20 
percent improvement is significant because with their capacities of focus and 
concentration operating at higher functioning levels, these students could more efficiently 
and effectively work on academic activities. By focusing and concentrating for greater 
                                                
30 For brevity, I will use the term virtuous student to refer to “virtuous students or, at least minimally, 
students possessing certain virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs” when possible.  
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periods of time and by efficiently and effectively working on their academic activities 
(arts, sciences, and humanities), a virtuous student would be able to seek understanding 
and further pursue beliefs that accurately represent reality. That an enhanced virtuous 
student is seeking understanding and accurate beliefs could (possibly) lead to new 
scientific discoveries and the creation of better goods and services. More importantly, 
even if they do not result in new scientific discoveries and the creation of better goods 
and services, an enhanced virtuous student seeking understanding and accurate beliefs is 
better for his own well-being. Thus for these reasons of self-improvement, a virtuous 
student may choose to use cognitive enhancers. 
Consider Edith, a virtuous student. Edith wants to take as many classes as possible on 
a wide variety of topics. Her course workload is large, and she also has a part-time job. 
Edith wants to make the most of her academic career, and for these reasons of self-
improvement she uses cognitive enhancers. These cognitive enhancers improve her 
capacities of focus and concentration to higher functioning levels, resulting in her being 
able to work efficiently and effectively through her course workload. This is important 
because her part-time job limits the amount of time she is able to study. The use of 
cognitive enhancers also allows Edith to pursue, improve, and develop her overall 
intellectual capacities, further allowing her to appreciate and connect with her own and 
other’s life experiences. So Edith may choose to use cognitive enhancers in academia for 
reasons of self-improvement.  
I contend that one kind of student we want in academia is a virtuous students or, at 
least minimally, one possessing the virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs, 
and that this type of student may choose to use cognitive enhancers for reasons of self-
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improvement. This account of the virtuous student and cognitive enhancers has three 
advantages. First, the issue of enhancement is conceived in respect to the kind of students 
we want in academia. Second, the virtuous student’s use of cognitive enhancers is for 
reasons of self-improvement, which is consistent with both common-sense intuitions 
concerning education and differing normative theories on the importance of intellectual 
development. Third, this account of the virtuous student and cognitive enhancers is 
consistent with considering advancements in cognitive enhancement as having the 
potential to impact the world profoundly. 
The first advantage of my account of the virtuous student and cognitive enhancers is 
that it conceives of the issue of enhancement in regard to the kind of students we want in 
academia by connecting the proper use of enhancements to the student’s motivation. The 
kind of student we want in academia is one who, as a matter of character, acts for the 
right reasons, and this extends to the use of enhancements. The virtuous student is not 
using these cognitive enhancers solely to amplify productivity in academic activities. 
While a student using cognitive enhancers for reasons of amplifying productivity would 
likely result in the creation of more new goods, services, and scientific discoveries, we 
don’t value students going through academia solely for the commercial benefits that may 
be produced from academic activities. Exposing students to the arts, sciences, and 
humanities is good for its own sake regardless of whether doing so leads to the creation 
or bettering of goods, services, or scientific discoveries. That a virtuous student’s use of 
cognitive enhancement is for reasons of self-improvement—to seek understanding and 
accurate beliefs—is consistent with our argument that academia is valuable for its own 
sake. By connecting the use of enhancements with motivations, this account of the 
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virtuous student and cognitive enhancers approaches issues of enhancement in academia 
from the perspective of the kind of student we want in academia.    
The second advantage of this account of virtuous students and cognitive enhancers is 
that it is consistent with our common-sense intuitions concerning education as well as 
with differing normative theories that hold that the improvement or development of 
intellectual capacities is of significant value. Consider that in the United States, citizens 
are all legally required to undergo a minimal level of some form of education because of 
the value we place on developing intellectual capacities. Beyond this minimal level of 
education, it is common to praise and facilitate those who continue to improve or develop 
their intellectual capacities. Persons are praised for going back to school to finish a 
degree, for participating in intellectual events or conferences, or for attending a book club 
meeting. Moreover, public libraries and educational opportunities are provided and 
subsidized by communities to facilitate the improvement or development of citizens’ 
intellectual capacities, showing that this is a prominent and shared value of community 
members.   
The importance of intellectual self-improvement or the development of intellect is a 
shared point among normative theories. Many differing normative theories contend that a 
person does have an imperfect duty to improve or develop intellectual capacities.  In the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that a person has an imperfect duty for the 
improvement or development of one’s “natural powers” of reason, logic, memory, or 
imagination; certain consequentialist theories such as welfarist accounts of 
consequentialism could be construed as arguing such an imperfect duty (Kahane and 
Savulescu 2009; Crisp 2006; 6:445; 6:390). Although Kant and consequentialist theories 
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differ in their conceptions of imperfect duties (for consequentialists there is wide latitude 
of situations and actions for a person to fulfill this duty, whereas for Kant—at least in the 
Metaphysics of Morals—a wide and imperfect duty for intellectual development is not 
morally required but is meritorious), there is agreement that improving or developing 
one’s intellectual capacities is a good thing to do.31 Therefore, an advantage of my 
argument that a virtuous person may choose to use cognitive enhancers for reasons of 
self-improvement of intellectual capacities is that it is consistent with common-sense 
intuitions and differing normative theories.  
Finally, this account of the virtuous student and cognitive enhancers is consistent with 
the view that advancements in cognitive enhancement have the potential to impact the 
world profoundly. An indication of the magnitude of this impact is the amount of funding 
the United States military provides for studying and researching advancements in the 
neuroscience of cognitive enhancement. At first it might seem odd to consider U.S. 
military funding as an indication of the potential that advances in cognitive enhancement 
could have. However, considering that military funding has played a central, often 
substantial, role in many if not all of our technological advances in the last 100 years 
(space exploration, aviation, medicine, computer science, and the Internet), this 
connection is clearly founded (Jacobsen 2011).  In 2011, the military’s Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (commonly referred to as DARPA) spent $240 
million on neuroscience research for cognitive enhancement (much of it likely going to 
their “Continuous Assisted Performance” program), while the U.S. Army spent $55 
million, the Navy $34 million, and the Air Force $24 million on similar studies and 
                                                
31 The preceding account of imperfect and perfect duties draws upon both Michael Stocker and Thomas 
Hill, Jr.’s work on of Mill and Kant’s conceptions of perfect and imperfect duties in the Metaphysics of 
Morals (Stocker 1967; Hill Forthcoming). 
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research programs for cognitive enhancement (Moreno 2004) (Tennison and Moreno 
2012).  
In Human Enhancement, Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu provide a quote from a 
2008 U.S. military proposal that summarizes the potential the military sees in cognitive 
enhancement: 
The world contains approximately 4.2 billion people over the age of 
twenty. Even a small enhancement of cognitive capacities in these 
individuals would probably have an impact on the world economy rivaling 
that of the Internet. (Savulescu and Bostrom 2011, 20)  
 
Whether advances in cognitive enhancement come to the level of fruition that the US 
military predicts is an open question. Yet from the amount of funding the military spends 
annually, it is reasonable to think that advances in cognitive enhancement have the 
potential to impact the world profoundly. This account of the virtuous student and 
cognitive enhancers is consistent with such a view and, importantly, provides a 
framework linking this potential to the kind of character we want students in academia to 
possess.     
3.3 Cognitive Enhancers Cheapen the Experience of Academia  
An objection against this account of virtuous students and their use of cognitive 
enhancers for self-improvement is that the use of cognitive enhancers cheapens the 
experience of academia. Because cognitive enhancers allow a student’s intellectual 
capacities to function at higher levels, these students—even if virtuous—are bypassing or 
“shortcutting” the academic workload, thus cheapening a student’s experience of 
academia (President's Council On Bioethics 2003; Sandel 2007). An analogy to this is a 
mountain climber who reaches a difficult summit but instead of climbing, he or she 
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reaches the summit by helicopter.32 The mountain climber does reach the summit (a goal 
of mountain climbing), but by using a helicopter, the climber cheapens his or her 
experience of reaching the summit. The use of a helicopter disconnects the climber from 
the experience of reaching the summit: the climber didn’t overcome great odds, work 
diligently, and experience the highs (and lows) of mountain climbing. Similarly, a student 
using cognitive enhancers cheapens the experience of academia because he or she 
bypasses the highs and lows of an academic workload because their intellectual capacities 
function at higher levels. A student who does not experience the low of grappling with a 
difficult subject or the high of completing an assignment on a difficult subject cheapens 
his or her experience of academia. Thus, for this objection it need not matter that the 
student is virtuous, only that he or she is missing the important, material experiences of 
academia.  
However, this objection is misguided because it rests on the presupposition that using 
cognitive enhancers directly augments a person’s cognition. Cognition is the complex 
interaction between a multiplicity of mental functions and neurological processes. In 
respect to overall cognition, the use of cognitive enhancers—by affecting 
neurotransmitters in the cortical and sub-cortical systems—augments the capacities of 
focus and concentration (Smith and Farah 2011; O’Reilly 2010). Yet cognitive enhancers 
do not bypass or “shortcut” the workload or the experience of academia. A student using 
cognitive enhancers still has to do the same amount of academic work, but in augmenting 
                                                
32 Maartje Shermer doesn’t think that this analogy works as an argument against cognitive enhancers, but 
uses this example for the purposes of illustrating how cognitive enhancers could (possibly) be considered as 
cheapening a person’s pursuit, achievement, or experience of an academic ideal. The President’s Council 
on Bioethics has presented similar arguments about enhancements, although not construed in terms of 
“cheapening experience” but rather in respect to the authenticity of a person’s decisions. Specifically the 
issue is whether the use of Prozac as an enhancement could negatively infringe on the authenticity of a 




his or her capacities of focus and concentration, they are simply using these capacities 
more efficiently and effectively.  
Achievement in academia ultimately rests upon the student. Whether using cognitive 
enhancers or not, a student still has to make a decision actually to do the work. It is true 
that cognitive enhancers do directly affect a student in ways that a laptop or quiet 
apartments do not, yet the decision to do the academic work is the antecedent condition 
for academic success. Simply using cognitive enhancers or any enhancement does not 
guarantee academic success (e.g., just as one can have the fastest, most advanced laptop 
but use it primarily for watching TV, one can also use cognitive enhancers not to study 
but as an energy boost for playing video games or late night socializing). A student who 
uses cognitive enhancers must still make the decision to work; thus, this student will still 
have to work through an academic workload, experiencing certain highs and lows, and 
thus have a full—not cheapened—experience of academia. Furthermore, that the student 
is virtuous means that their reasons for using cognitive enhancers are not as an attempt to 
bypass or shortcut the academic experience but for reasons of self-improvement.  
3.4 Permissibility  
I have argued rather broadly that virtuous students may choose to use cognitive 
enhancers for reasons of self-improvement. This section returns to the question of 
permissibility. If a virtuous student, or one possessing the virtues of seeking 
understanding and accurate beliefs, chooses to use cognitive enhancers, does that make 
the use of cognitive enhancers in academia permissible? I think that in fact it does make 
the use cognitive enhancers permissible.  
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Before explicating this claim, its negative aspects need to be clarified. This claim is 
not that a virtuous student would always choose to use cognitive enhancers, but that the 
situations and reasons a virtuous student would consider to justify the use of cognitive 
enhancers are rather limited. In academia, a virtuous student has the practical wisdom to 
judge the situations and the reasons for when to use or not use cognitive enhancers. There 
are many rules, consequences, and motivations that a virtuous student would judge as 
reasons against using cognitive enhancers.  
Imagine that Edith is preparing to write her final paper for the Wittgenstein course. 
There are many rules, consequences, and motivations that Edith would judge as reasons 
against using cognitive enhancers. She may choose not to use cognitive enhancers if these 
enhancements were illegally obtained from acquaintances, family members, other 
students, or an Internet order. The potential harmful side effects, the withdrawal 
symptoms, and the lack of long-term, empirical medical evidence concerning the health 
risks might be reasons Edith chooses not to use cognitive enhancers. Alternatively, it 
could turn out that the use of cognitive enhancers is likely to result in little or no 
enhancement for her. Finally, Edith may choose not to use cognitive enhancers if she 
lacks good motivations for using them. As a virtuous student, Edith would not think of 
using cognitive enhancers to rectify irresponsible study habits, to competitively beat other 
students like Oliver and Teresa, or to overcome the ennui of academic activity. Since 
these students have traits that make them an ideal of human excellence, they find it 
imperative to possess a sufficiently good reason for using cognitive enhancers.   
 In her consideration of her motivation, Edith, who has practical wisdom, accurately 
accounts for her strengths and weaknesses when deciding on an action. She acts 
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accordingly in situations because she has properly assessed her abilities as a 
consideration. In The Art of War, Sun Tzu states the importance of understanding not 
only your own but also your enemy’s strengths and weakness before acting:   
Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never 
be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your 
chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and 
of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril. If you know 
yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a 
defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in 
every battle. (Tzu 1963, 84) 
 
One need not engage in war or battle to understand that many situations end poorly 
because people often inaccurately account for their strengths and weaknesses as 
considerations when acting. This inaccurate accounting is a distinctive feature of practical 
reasoning gone astray and a common reason for poor performance in an academic 
activity. Students often fail courses because they overestimate their skill sets or, more 
likely, do not recognize that some of their skill sets such as arithmetic, reading 
comprehension, or writing are weak.  
However, a virtuous student does recognize that she possesses weaknesses as well as 
strengths. By identifying and acknowledging weaknesses, the virtuous student can 
properly account for them as a consideration and act accordingly. For example, Edith 
may realize that while taking cognitive enhancers will augment her capacities of focus 
and concentration, this augmentation will not improve her writing skills. Thus Edith does 
not take a cognitive enhancer while writing her final paper because she has accurately 
accounted for her strengths and weaknesses and realized that what she needs is help to 




Related to accurately accounting for one’s strengths and weaknesses is the 
consideration of self-acceptance. By acceptance of the self, I mean that a person has 
come to an understanding and acceptance of their ability; it is an acknowledgment and 
recognition of one’s abilities and character. In a selection from the Tao Te Ching, the 
Confucian philosopher Lao Tzu describes this kind of self-acceptance.  
Fame or integrity: which is more important? Money or happiness: which is 
more valuable? Success or failure: which is more destructive? If you look 
to others for fulfillment, you will never truly be fulfilled. If your happiness 
depends on money, you will never be happy with yourself. Be content 
with what you have; rejoice in the way things are. When you realize there 
is nothing lacking, the whole world belongs to you. (Tsu 1988, 44) 
 
A person with self-acceptance navigates through the circumstances and situations of life 
but is content with who they are as a person. In other words, he is not tempted by success, 
a moment, or even enhancement to act out of character. A virtuous student, in having 
practical wisdom, possesses self-acceptance.  
Self-acceptance is important because even virtuous students may find themselves in 
circumstances in which performing well at an academic activity would seem to require 
that they act in ways that reflect poorly on their character. Imagine that Edith, being 
virtuous and possessing self-acceptance, is struggling through a statistics course. In a 
short time period, she has to finish a difficult final project. In addition, this final project is 
weighted such that the faster she turns in her project, the more points she will receive. 
Edith has two options: (i) she can take a cognitive enhancer and augment her capacities 
of focus and concentration so that it is possible to work through all the algorithms to 
finish her final project as fast as possible, ensuring a higher grade; or (ii) she does not 
take a cognitive enhancer and attempts to work through and understand the material, 
meaning it will take longer to finish and, as a result, lower her grade.   
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In this example, the circumstance that Edith does not excel in this activity does not 
mean that she will act inappropriately. A virtuous student is not always an “A student” or 
excellent at every academic activity, but their actions always are indicative of good 
character. A remark attributed to the great martial artist Rickson Gracie summaries this 
point: “Sometimes, you don’t have to win. You cannot win. But that has nothing to do 
with losing.”  
What is important about virtuous students and self-acceptance is that it allows for a 
virtuous student always to act in a manner that reflects excellence of character. In this 
case, if Edith has self-acceptance, then she chooses not to take a cognitive enhancer, 
which results in a lower grade but allows her to learn the material. Edith’s decision not to 
use a cognitive enhancer is one that reflects admirably on her character. In particular, her 
action is illustrative of the kind of character one wants a student in academia to possess. 
Aristotle notes: 
If activities are, as we said, what determines the character of life, no 
blessed [virtuous] man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts 
that are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, we 
think, bears all the chances of life and becomingly and always makes the 
best of circumstances, as a good general makes the best military use of the 
army at his command and a shoemaker makes the best shoes out of hides 
that are given to him; and so with all other craftsman. And if this is the 
case, the happy man can never be miserable —though he will not reach 
blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam. (NE 1.10 
1101b33- 1101 a71) 
 
In academia, one would prefer a student with lower academic achievement but good 
character to a student with poor character but good academic achievement. That a 
virtuous student has self-acceptance allows them to understand that what is of most 
importance is not merely doing well on an exam or achieving a certain grade but striving 
to learn in a way consistent with possessing good character.  
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Since the situations in and reasons for which a virtuous student would choose to use 
cognitive enhancers are rather limited, my argument is not that a virtuous student always 
chooses enhancement. Nevertheless, because a virtuous student chooses to use cognitive 
enhancers after assessing the relevant information and considerations in a situation and 
for reasons of self-improvement, then the use of cognitive enhancers is permissible under 
certain conditions in academia. This permissibility rests upon the central tenet of my 
virtuous student account: the connection between motivational structures and dispositions 
necessitates that a virtuous student has a sufficiently appropriate reason for acting. One 
would not be troubled (or at least be troubled less) by a virtuous student’s use of 
cognitive enhancers because, generally speaking, they have good reasons for using these 
enhancements. Thus, the permissibility of using cognitive enhancers depends upon 
students’ motivations. Put another way, a student’s reasons determines the permissibility 
of using cognitive enhancers.  
To illustrate how a student’s reasons for using cognitive enhancers determines 
whether their use is permissible, let’s reevaluate Oliver and Edith’s cases. In Oliver’s 
case, his reason for choosing to use cognitive enhancers is to make up an assignment 
because of improper study habits. This does not seem to be a good reason for a student to 
use cognitive enhancers. Because Oliver’s reason for acting, his motivation, does not 
reflect well on his character and is not indicative of human excellence, it is possible to 
consider his use of cognitive enhancers as impermissible. Now consider Edith’s case: her 
reasons for using cognitive enhancers are to gain a better understanding of Wittgenstein 
and for her love of philosophy. Wanting to better comprehend the material and achieve 
intellectual development does seem to be a good reason for a student to use cognitive 
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enhancers. Edith’s reasons for using cognitive enhancers reflect good character and, 
importantly, are indicative of human excellences.  
This evaluation of Oliver and Edith’s motivations is done rather broadly. Yet the 
point is to illustrate that if the permissibility of using cognitive enhancers is dependent on 
a student’s motivations, then certain motivations do justify student use of cognitive 
enhancers whereas others do not. This account of virtuous students and cognitive 
enhancers has done two things: first, it provides the general framework of the ideals of 
human excellence for use in examining issues of enhancement in academia, which begins 
with the kind of students one wants in academia. The permissibility of students using 
cognitive enhancement then rests not only on considerations of rules and consequences 
but also on motivations. Second, the motivations of virtuous students do justify the use of 
cognitive enhancers as being permissible in academia. The implication from this account 
of virtuous students and cognitive enhancers is that in academia, the use of cognitive 
enhancers is permissible under the condition that students have a proper motivation for 
using them.  
That a virtuous student (or person) likely has never existed and that most of us clearly 
lack virtue implies if that a virtues-based approach is to advance the discussion of 
enhancement in academia, then it is necessary for it to formulate institutional rules to 
govern student use of cognitive enhancers. However, this virtues-based approach faces 
two related concerns about formulating institutional rules. The first concern is whether a 
virtues-based approach can formulate institutional rules for governing student use of 
cognitive enhancers when permissibility depends on a student’s motivation. Assuming 
that a virtues-based approach could formulate institutional rules, the second concern is in 
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relation to the strength of these rules. Institutional rules are not meant for governing the 
virtuous but rather for governing those who lack virtues; that is, everyone else.  
3.5 Ideal Conception of Academia and Institutional Rules 
To answer these concerns sufficiently, I provide an ideal conception of academia. 
This conception stipulates certain idealized conditions pertaining to academia and 
students (Rawls 1999; Simmons 2010). In this ideal conception, I formulate institutional 
rules to govern the use of cognitive enhancers and address these two concerns. 
Elucidating a virtues-based approach from within an idealized framework yields a 
theoretical view that I use toward enhancement in academia under non-ideal conditions in 
subsequent chapters. For the remainder of this chapter, the work is in ideal theory and 
within an ideal conception of academia.  
The ideal conception I provide works within the following stipulated framework. 
First, in this ideal conception, the goal, aims, and assessment of academia are as follows. 
The goal of academia is to expose students to the sciences, arts, and humanities. 
Activities in academia are structured by two aims: progressively providing students with 
information of greater depth and improving their skill sets. Students’ academic activities 
are assessed by an accepted standard in a competitive environment. Second, academia on 
the whole is modeled on contemporary academic institutions in the United States, and the 
assumption is that these exist under reasonable and fair social conditions. Third, 
academia has made its institutional rules and rationales for these rules public. Finally, 
students in this ideal conception of academia are compliant with the goal, aims, 
assessment, and competitive environment of academia; additionally, these students have 
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the requisite intellectual capacities and moral psychology. While not vicious, these 
students do lack virtues.  
3.6 Ideal Conceptions of Academia  
With the framework stipulated, I now put forward two differing interpretations of an 
ideal conception of academia: the first interprets the goal of academia in respect to 
knowledge, whereas the second interprets the goal in respect to understanding. In the first 
interpretation, students in academia are exposed to different and varying academic 
disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities to develop their intellectual capacities and 
to obtain knowledge. As I use it, knowledge refers to the collection of information and 
facts acquired through education. In the second interpretation, students are exposed to 
different and varying academic disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities to 
develop their intellectual capacities and to attain understanding. Minimally, 
understanding is an ability to draw upon and connect information and facts from diverse 
domains and apply this information and facts to one’s own experiences. 
The first interpretation has two advantages; first, one need not include the virtue of 
seeking understanding as a minimal virtue for students to possess. Although it certainly 
would be a good virtue for students to possess, the virtue of seeking understanding is 
rather demanding since it requires not only having knowledge but also exercising a 
sophisticated capacity with this knowledge. If the goal of academia is to expose students 
to different and varying academic disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities so that 
they will develop intellectual capacities and obtain a collection of information and facts, 
it is simply easier to claim that a student only needs the virtue of seeking accurate beliefs. 
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The second advantage is in respect to enhancement: that cognitive enhancers only 
augment the capacities of focus and concentration and cognition is directly conducive to 
the goal of academia. These enhancements augment the capacities related to the 
collection of information and facts, making it more likely a student will obtain 
knowledge.  
The first interpretation of the goal of academia is a reasonable ideal conception of 
academia, but despite the advantages provided by this interpretation, I am going to use 
the second interpretation. Although an aspect of developing a student’s intellectual 
capacities is obtaining knowledge, academia is oriented for students to achieve or at least 
strive to achieve for more than obtaining knowledge. We want students to draw upon, 
make connections between, and then apply the information and facts given in academia to 
their lives.  
While explicating this conception of understanding, I argue in the following section 
why one should think of the goal of academia in respect to understanding rather than to 
knowledge.  
3.6.1 Ideal Conceptions of Academia: Understanding Rather than Knowledge  
To demonstrate why I think one should interpret the goal of academia in respect to 
understanding rather than to obtaining knowledge, consider the neurological 
condition/disorder of prosopagnosia (National Institute of Neurological Disorders and 
Stroke 2007). Agnosias are neurological conditions in which a person has difficulty with 
recognizing or is unable to recognize certain objects, shapes, smells or persons, but 
without memory loss or impairment to their specific ability (National Institute of 
Neurological Disorders and Stroke 2007). Prosopagnosias are one type of agnosia in 
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which an individual has no impairment of their visual abilities or their memory but has 
difficulty recognizing, or is unable to recognize, faces—often the faces of persons close 
to them such as spouses, parents, or their children (Levy 2007). For example, a patient 
with prosopagnosia may see that an individual is a woman wearing a green dress who is 
5’4” and blue eyes, an aquiline nose, and brown hair. This patient’s memory is not 
impaired, and he knows that he is married to a 5’4”woman with blue eyes, an aquiline 
nose, and brown hair. Yet it is not until this individual speaks to the patient with 
prosopagnosia that he is able to recognize the individual as his wife.  
Prosopagnosia may seem like an odd example, but it differentiates my conception 
of understanding versus obtaining knowledge. This patient has the relevant information 
and facts and for all intents and purposes, he has knowledge about his wife. However, 
what the patient is unable to do or lacks the ability to do is to connect and apply this 
knowledge to his experiences. In respect to my research project, the point of using 
prosopagnosia is that this patient seems to have knowledge but lacks understanding. 
What the disorder of prosopagnosias makes clear is that while a person possessing 
information and facts is important, something that is often overlooked is the significance 
of being able to draw upon, make connections with, and apply this knowledge to one’s 
life.  
With respect to an ideal conception of academia, it is reasonable to expect that its 
goal should be interpreted in respect to understanding. We want students in academia to 
be exposed to different and varying academic disciplines in the sciences, arts, and 
humanities to develop their intellectual capacities and to draw upon, make connections 
with, and apply the information and facts from these different and varying academic 
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disciplines to their lives. That academia is valuable instrumentally and for its own sake is 
consistent with its goal of attaining understanding. Consider the following illustration: 
Teresa is a student in academia who is taking a course in human physiology. She just 
finished her midterms, which covered the topics of nutrition and the human immune 
system. After a day of midterm exams, Teresa goes to her local grocery store to shop for 
food. While shopping, she passes a stand selling Airborne™. This product states that 
because it contains large amounts of vitamin C, it can prevent a person from getting a 
common cold. Drawing upon, connecting with, and applying the information and facts 
from her human physiology course, Teresa knows that although vitamin C may mildly 
ameliorate the duration or intensity of a common cold, it has not clinically been proven to 
prevent an individual from getting a common cold (Doheny 2008) 33 Teresa decides not 
to buy this product.  
This example may strike some as pedestrian, but consider what Teresa did. She drew 
upon, connected, and then applied information and facts she learned in academia to her 
own life experience. This behavior is why we value academia for students. One might 
think that this example merely shows some sort of consumer transaction and does not 
accurately represent the value in academia. However, if the situation and product were 
something else, such as Teresa deciding whether to buy shark cartilage as a treatment for 
cancer or deciding whether or not to use a vaccine on her newborn infant, then the level 
of importance certainly increases. Yet the value of Teresa drawing upon, making 
connections, and then applying information and facts she learned in academia to her own 
                                                
33 Misleading claims is not something unique to Airborne™. Other products such as Pfizer’s vitamin line 
Centrum™ has faced similar concerns and criticism about its “colon health” or “energy boost,” and the 




life experience would not change. Teresa attaining understanding is both instrumentally 
beneficial and good for its own sake. Therefore, it is reasonable that the goal of an ideal 
conception of academia should be to expose students to different and varying academic 
disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities to develop their intellectual capacities and 
to attain understanding.   
3.6.2 Two Worries About Understanding   
There are two worries that understanding, as I conceive of it, must navigate. The first 
is that this conception of understanding seems to suggest that the value of understanding 
is only in application. Alternatively, the second worry is that by encapsulating other 
values of understanding besides applicable ones, this conception of understanding 
becomes too broad and runs the risk of being too vague to adequately interpret the goal of 
academia. I address both of these worries and in doing so provide greater detail to this 
conception of understanding.  
 The first worry is that while this conception of understanding is broadly accurate, it 
may focus too heavily on understanding as mere ability or application. If understanding is 
thought of strictly as ability or if it focuses too much on application, then this conception 
of understanding treads dangerously close to being merely instrumentally valuable.34 The 
problem (similar to the argument for those who think the use of cognitive enhancers is 
not cheating) is that we clearly don’t value understanding solely for its instrumental 
purposes. The value of understanding is not as subsequent ability or in its application, but 
as something good for its own sake. Like education, understanding is good for its own 
sake because it makes a student a better person, regardless of other uses. One might point 
                                                
34 Jon Garthoff brought this concern to my attention.  
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to Teresa’s case as illustrating only the instrumental value of understanding. In her case, 
understanding is only valuable because she applied it to the situation and avoided buying 
sham products, not because it was good for its own sake. If understanding is then only 
instrumentally valuable and the goal of academia is interpreted in respect to attaining it, 
the worry is that this conception of understanding ultimately misrepresents the value of 
academia in this ideal conception.  
At least to me, it is not clear why thinking of understanding as a kind of ability or 
focusing on its application to a student’s experience implies (or is dangerously close to 
implying) that it is only instrumentally valuable. This worry seems to imply that if the 
value of something is as a kind of ability or application, then its value is solely 
instrumental. Yet this seems incorrect: there are some abilities that are still abilities 
valuable for their own sake, even if we focus on them with regard to their application or 
practical use.  
Consider psychopathy, a mental condition or disorder in which a person lacks a 
cognitive-affective ability for empathy or remorse and is identified by callous and 
exploitive behavior (L. J. Cohen 2011; Schouten and Silver 2012). A person with 
psychopathy knows a wide range of information and facts concerning other persons, 
including that other persons have emotions, can feel pain and pleasure, and have goals 
different from their own. Yet a psychopath lacks the cognitive ability to connect this 
information and facts about other persons and apply them to their own actions effectively. 
Psychopaths are often charming and endearing but simply lack the ability to connect with 
other persons in such a way that allows them to think of other persons as having any 
value besides being objects for the psychopath’s own use. In the case of psychopaths, it is 
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instrumentally bad that he or she lacks the cognitive-affective ability to connect with 
others, but it is also bad for its own sake for persons who are psychopaths that they lack 
this ability. Put otherwise, one thinks that being a psychopath is bad not only because it 
likely leads to callous and exploitive behavior but also for its own sake because this 
person lacks a pivotal component of the human experience: connecting with others is a 
constitutive element of what it means to be human.  
Similarly, although I often talk about understanding as a kind of ability or valuable in 
application in broadly instrumental or situational terms, understanding is still something 
that we value for its own sake. A student who attains understanding is better off as a 
person even if they do not use that understanding for instrumental benefit. Analogous to 
this is the case of a person who obtains an educational degree that does not provide any 
instrumental or economic benefits, such as philosophy or art history. Although most 
people would think that a student studying these has made a poor life choice in terms of 
career objectives, these same people likely would not say that it wasn’t at least good for 
its own sake for a student to receive that degree. Whether this student ever gets a job or 
advances the discipline of art history or philosophy, attaining the degree was good for 
them to do. In the same way, although this conception of understanding is most often 
couched in terms of instrumental benefits, it is still good for its own sake. 
To make it a reasonable interpretation of the goal of an ideal conception of academia, 
a point I concede to this worry is that this conception of understanding needs to be filled 
out further to answer why understanding is valuable for its own sake. To do so, I must 
navigate the second worry, that in endeavoring to encapsulate fully the value of 
understanding in academia, I run the risk of making understanding so broad that it 
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becomes too vague. Consider what happens if one thinks of understanding solely as 
comprehension of the human experience or fostering connections with others but not 
within the context of some kind of ability or application. It seems true that these are good 
things but they offer little clarity as to why the goal of academia should be interpreted in 
this way.  
In respect to this worry, I contend that conceiving of understanding as ability or 
application does not exclude incorporating more value-laden conceptions such as 
comprehending the human experience and fostering connections with others. In fact, 
having the ability to draw upon, make connections with, and apply information and facts 
to one’s own experience is at least one way to attempt to comprehend the human 
experience. Moreover, that one connects information and facts and then applies them to 
one’s life experience does seem to foster connection with others.  
Therefore, if this conception of understanding navigates these two worries, it seems 
reasonable and consistent with our values to interpret the goal of academia in respect to 
understanding and not knowledge in this ideal conception. Even though explicating a 
conception of understanding is difficult and my conception falls short of encapsulating all 
the senses and values of understanding, one can still hold that it is what we want students 
in academia to strive to attain.  
3.7 Ideal Conception of Academia As Understanding and Virtues 
In this ideal conception of academia, students are exposed to different and varying 
academic disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities to develop their intellectual 
capacities and to attain understanding. Although there are no virtuous students, the kinds 
of students to want are virtuous students or, minimally, those who possess the virtues of 
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seeking understanding and seeking accurate beliefs. These virtues are consistent with the 
aims that structure academic activities: first, progressively providing students with 
information of greater depth; second, working to improve students’ skill sets such as 
reading comprehension, arithmetic, writing, and critical thinking; and third, making them 
consistent with assessment against a set standard. 
 In this ideal conception of academia, although not vicious, students lack virtue. Since 
these students lack virtue, this virtues-based approach must formulate an institutional rule 
to govern student use of cognitive enhancers.  
In the following, I formulate a virtues-based institutional rule and address two 
previously raised concerns about (i) an institutional rule for governing student use of 
cognitive enhancers when permissibility depends on a student’s motivation, and (ii) the 
strength of this institutional rule in governing students who lack virtues. 
3.8 Virtue-Based Institutional Rule 
 This virtues-based approach generates the following institutional rule. 
Students are permitted to use cognitive enhancers if their reasons for using 
them are reflective of ideals of human excellence.  
 
I contend that this virtues-based institutional rule functions to govern student use of 
cognitive enhancers in two ways. First, it functions to govern student use of cognitive 
enhancers by indicating permitted and prohibited uses of cognitive enhancers. Second, it 
provides guidance for students who lack virtues.  
In detail, the first way this rule functions to govern student use of cognitive enhancers 
is by indicating which uses of these enhancements are permitted and prohibited. The 
permissibility of using cognitive enhancers is determined by a student’s motivation 
relative to the ideals of human excellence. The following examples broadly illustrate 
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permitted and prohibited uses of cognitive enhancers. A student would be prohibited 
from using a cognitive enhancer if the reason is to make up for irresponsible study habits, 
to competitively beat other students, or to work through a boring academic activity. 
These reasons are not reflective of ideals of human excellence. A student would be 
permitted to use a cognitive enhancer if the motivation is for self-improvement, seeking 
understanding, or seeking accurate beliefs.  
 An initial worry might be that this virtues-based institutional rule is too vague. 
Yet it seems that persons are often and without controversy governed by vague rules. 
Consider children and certain rules in kindergarten. In a kindergarten class, there might 
be a rule that states, “Students should be nice to other students.” This rule is vague, but is 
it so vague as to be unable to govern students? I think not, in part because this rule does 
indicate the condition for determining a permissible act: being nice. To determine 
whether an act is nice or not, a student has to consider whether an act is pleasant or polite. 
It is true that children at this age may not fully comprehend all the aspects of what it 
means to be nice because there might be some acts they cannot determine as being nice, 
or the children incorrectly believes certain acts such as pulling hair to be nice when they 
are not. Still, this rule indicates the condition of being nice as determining a permissible 
act. It seems rather uncontroversial that part of a child’s development in kindergarten is 
for him to strive to determine what constitutes a nice act. That the rule is vague does not 
seem to be a problem. 
Similarly, while this virtues-based institutional rule is vague, it does indicate the 
condition for determining permissibility: motivations that are reflective of ideals of 
excellence. In particular, this rule stipulates that the condition determining the 
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permissible use of cognitive enhancers is motivation relating to self-improvement, or the 
virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs. In this ideal conception of 
academia, the goal is the development of a student’s intellectual capacities and the 
attainment of understanding; thus the goal suggests that a student should at least strive to 
establish what it means to act for reasons reflective of the ideals of human excellence.  
Still, one might wonder how a student thinking about the ideals of human excellence 
helps to determine what is a permissible use of cognitive enhancers. In fact, what this 
student is looking for is whether a certain use of a cognitive enhancer is permissible or 
not. Consider that in a meta-analysis of thirteen studies surveying students on their use of 
cognitive enhancers, the most commonly selected reason for using cognitive enhancers 
concerned the improvement of “concentration” or “attention,” “academic assignments,”  
“grades,” and “intellectual performance” (Smith and Farah 2011). Are these motivations 
to be taken as reflective of the ideals of human excellence? If a student uses cognitive 
enhancers for such reasons, is it permissible?    
The virtues-based institutional rule handles this concern because this rule functions to 
govern student use of cognitive enhancers by providing guidance for students who lack 
virtues. It is clear that a virtuous student (or person) even in this ideal conception of 
academia does not exist; yet it does not follow that a student who lacks virtues cannot 
rely on this virtues-based institutional rule to help them resolve a situation. That a 
virtuous student chooses to use cognitive enhancers for reasons indicative of human 
excellence, in turn, provides guidance for students who lack virtue for the use of 
enhancements by providing them with an ethical outlook.35 An ethical outlook is not a 
                                                
35 Timothy Chappell also invokes the notion of an ethical outlook, but while our notions are roughly 
similar, he employs the notion of ethical outlook as a critique of contemporary academic moral theory, 
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decision-making procedure but a mental first-person perspective that an individual uses 
in attempting to conceive of a resolution to a particular situation.  
For a moment, put aside this ideal conception of academia and consider the many 
occasions in which people in non-ideal situations invoke conceptions of virtuous persons 
to help determine a resolution. A physician may ask, “What would a virtuous physician 
do?” a soldier, “What would a virtuous warrior do?” and a teacher, “What would a 
virtuous teacher do?” Although a virtuous person likely has never existed and because 
most of us clearly lack virtue, contemplating a virtuous agent is to deliberate on finding a 
solution from a different perspective. The Stoic Epictetus suggests adopting such an 
ethical outlook as strategy to prepare one’s self for situations of great importance: 
When you are about to meet somebody, in particular when it is one of 
those men who are held in very high esteem, propose to yourself the 
question, ‘What would Socrates or Zeno have done under these 
circumstances?’ and you will not be at a loss to make proper use of the 
occasion. (Epictetus 1952–56, sec. 33.12–13) 
 
By situating one’s mental perspective to that of a virtuous person, as John McDowell 
contends, “A conception of right conduct is grasped, as it were, from the inside out” 
(McDowell 1997).36 In a given situation, by asking, “What would a virtuous person do?” 
a person attempts to determine a solution from the perspective of someone whose actions 
and motivations in a situation are reflective of human excellence as a matter of character. 
In invoking the conception of a virtuous person, a resolution to a particular situation is 
gained because a person recognizes that a virtuous physician’s character is beneficence, a 
virtuous soldier’s character is honor, and a virtuous teacher’s character is fairness. In 
                                                                                                                                            
whereas my notion of ethical outlook is used solely to facilitate the project of providing a virtues-based 
approach to issues of enhancement in academia (Chappell 2009).  
36 For McDowell, adopting this ethical outlook is the necessary approach one takes in answering the 
question of how one should live (McDowell 1997). 
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everyday life, people use a conception of a virtuous person as an ethical outlook for 
determining a solution to a particular situation. This ethical outlook is unique in that 
whatever the resolution may be, a person’s actions and motivations are to be in harmony 
and reflective of a certain kind of character.    
Returning to the ideal conception of academia and a student who lacks virtues, 
reflection on the virtuous student guides one toward a solution in a particular situation 
concerning the use of enhancements that is indicative of the attitudes and character of the 
kind of student one would want in academia. This virtues-based institutional rule first 
emphasizes that a student’s dispositions may need to be aligned with the proper 
motivational structures. Second, it provides an ethical outlook to use for determining 
permissible uses of cognitive enhancers for a student who lacks virtues.  
To illustrate, imagine that Oliver, a student who lacks virtues, has to write a term 
paper on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and is considering using cognitive 
enhancers. Wanting to use cognitive enhancers, Oliver takes his motivations to be 
improvement of “concentration” or “attention,” “academic assignments,” “grades,” and 
“intellectual performance.” Yet Oliver is uncertain whether these motivations as currently 
stated would make his use of cognitive enhancers permissible. The motivations of 
“improve concentration” or “academic assignments” do not provide that much 
illumination in respect to determining permissibility.  
To figure out permissibility, Oliver adopts the ethical outlook of a virtuous student 
who, at a minimum, possesses the virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs. 
From this mental perspective Oliver judges the relevant information in his particular 
situation: rules, consequences, and motivations. In respect to rules, Oliver considers 
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whether there are any rules that prohibit his use of the cognitive enhancer, such as 
whether these cognitive enhancers were procured illegally. Next Oliver considers the 
consequences of using cognitive enhancers. What is the ratio of reward to risk? Is the 
paper worth potential short–term health risks, such as headaches and jitteriness, or for 
long-term risks, such as withdrawal? As a virtuous student would, Oliver would also 
consider whether there are other options besides using cognitive enhancers, such as going 
to a quieter place or starting the assignment early and working on it progressively. 
 Although Oliver’s motivations are currently indeterminate for establishing 
permissibility, it would take very little probing on his part to find out. Do his motivations 
reflect the ideals of human excellence such as self-improvement, seeking understanding, 
or accurate beliefs? Do they reflect well on his character as a person? Would a virtuous 
student have these as motivations, or would a virtuous person think these are good 
reasons? Oliver would also consider whether he is being realistic about the strengths and 
weaknesses of his academic skill set. Would using cognitive enhancers help to improve 
his writing or just ignore a more fundamental problem about his writing ability?  
 From the ethical outlook of a virtuous student, Oliver works through a process of 
practical reasoning to determine whether his use of a cognitive enhancer is permissible. 
In adopting this ethical outlook, it is likely to think that Oliver would at a minimum 
conclude that the use of cognitive enhancers for reasons pertaining to lack of study 
habits, merely getting ahead of classmates, or completing a tiresome academic activity 
does not reflect well on his character.  
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3.8.1 Limitations of a Virtues-based Institutional Rule’s Ethical Outlook 
By providing an ethical outlook, this virtues-based institutional rule does guide 
students who lack virtues in respect to the proper use of cognitive enhancers. However, as 
the following questions illustrate, there are reasonable limitations and constraints 
regarding the guidance provided by the ethical outlook of a virtuous student. First, when 
deciding whether to use a cognitive enhancer, must students who lack virtues always 
adopt the ethical outlook of a virtuous student? No. In many cases, a student, even one 
who lacks virtues, can decide if her motivation for using a cognitive enhancer is 
reflective of ideals of human excellence. It is only when students are confronted with a 
situation in which they are unsure of motivations and permissibility that they adopt this 
ethical outlook. Second, when a student who lacks virtues adopts this virtuous student 
ethical outlook, will he or she always be guided to the “correct” answer? On one hand, if 
the “correct” answer is taken in the broad sense of a student who lacks virtues and is 
guided to use cognitive enhancers for reasons reflective of the ideals of human nature, 
then yes, it does. On the other hand, if the “correct” answer is taken in the narrow sense 
of providing an answer to every particular situation and circumstance, then no, it does 
not. Adopting a virtuous student ethical outlook does not mean that a student who lacks 
virtues always will be guided to the correct answer or best course of action. 
3.8.2 Difficulty of Arriving at Correct Answers 
It is important to note that demanding a virtuous student ethical outlook to arrive 
always at the correct answer or course of action in this narrow sense is unreasonable and 
excessively demanding. The flaw is not with a virtuous student ethical outlook or for that 
matter with a decision-making procedure; instead the flaw is in thinking that any ethical 
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outlook or decision-making procedure could always arrive at a correct answer. That life 
provides many different, complicated, and difficult situations suggests it is unreasonable 
and excessively demanding to think an ethical outlook or decision-making procedure 
could answer them all.  
For example, consider the difficulty that any ethical outlook or decision-making 
procedure has in arriving at the correct answer or best course of action in providing 
sympathy to grieving persons. We have all either given (or been on the receiving end) of 
awkward hugs, conducted irrelevant conversations about the weather, or provided a 
grieving person with excessive amounts of food. Whether one adopts the ethical outlook 
of a virtuous person or the decision-making procedures based on maximizing happiness 
or acting out of respect for persons does not guide one to a single correct answer or 
course of action. Moreover, regardless of the level of subtlety and delicacy involved, 
there are situations in which no action can ever be successful in providing comfort to 
grieving persons.  
From what I can draw upon from working as a clinical ethicist, the clearest examples 
are situations involving telling parents that sustained treatment of their child is no longer 
medically appropriate (or consoling them after their child has passed away). My point is 
not that these situations are a reason for rejecting an ethical outlook or even a decision-
making procedure. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that there are reasonable 
limitations and constraints on always arriving at a correct answer. One is misguided to 
think that any ethical outlook or decision-making procedure can always arrive at correct 
answer in this narrow sense.  
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3.8.3 The Necessity of Mistakes  
Another reason that demanding that a virtuous student ethical outlook always arrives 
at a correct answer is misguided is that it overlooks the importance of students making 
mistakes in academia. For a student to develop their intellectual capacities and attain 
understanding requires making mistakes. Students make academic mistakes, such as 
getting an answer wrong on a test. These academic mistakes are facilitated by the two 
aims and assessment of students. When a student makes an academic mistake, it is a 
teacher’s responsibility not only to point out the correct answer but also to explain why it 
is the correct answer. In pointing out the student’s error and providing an explanation of 
why, the teacher facilitates the development of a student’s intellectual capacities and 
hopefully moves them closer to attaining understanding.   
Of equal if not greater importance is that students will make ethical mistakes in 
academia such as violating an institutional rule. Academia is prepared for such mistakes 
because it has processes and procedures such as judicial affairs and boards whose 
responsibility is to provide appropriate punishment for students and to explain the 
importance of an institutional rule. Academia is not only prepared but expects students to 
make these ethical mistakes because it is an element of student development. Although 
many students are caught plagiarizing every year, most academic institutions do not expel 
students for their first offense. Academia expects a certain level of plagiarism among 
students because of poor judgment on a student’s part. For a student caught plagiarizing, 
the process and procedures of going through judicial affairs allows for a student to be 
punished (such as by being failed in the class or exam) in a manner that explains the 
importance of proper citation and the value of respecting others’ work. Whether it is 
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academic or ethical, a student who never makes a mistake is a student who never can 
develop his intellectual capacities or attain understanding.  
Significant value is attributed, rightly so, on a person erring and having the prudence 
to admit it. Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s Hagakure shows the significance of admitting one’s 
shortcomings by a story concerning a debate about the potential promotion of a man on a 
royal council: 
At the time when there was a council concerning the promotion of a 
certain man, the council members were at the point of deciding that 
promotion was useless because of the fact that the man had previously 
been involved in a drunken brawl. But someone said, “If we were to cast 
aside every man who had made a mistake once, useful men could probably 
not be come by. A man who makes a mistake once will be considerably 
more prudent and useful because of his repentance. I feet that he should be 
promoted.” Someone else then asked, “Will you guarantee him?” The man 
replied, “Of course I will.” The others asked, “By what will you guarantee 
him?” And he replied, “I can guarantee him by the fact that he is a man 
who has erred once. A man who has never once erred is dangerous.” This 
said, the man was promoted. (Tsunetomo 2002, 14) 
 
It is both instrumentally benefical and good for its own sake that a person (or student) 
makes a mistake and learns from it. It is unreasonable in regard to the goal of academia to 
demand that a virtuous student ethical outlook always arrive at the correct answer or 
course of action in this narrow sense because students would be unable to develop their 
intellectual capacities or attain understanding. By acknowledging reasonable limitations 
and constraints on ethical outlooks or even on decision-making procedures, this virtues-
based institutional rule does provide guidance for students who lack virtues in respect to 
the proper use of cognitive enhancers.  
Therefore, in an ideal conception of academia, this virtues-based approach formulates 
an institutional rule that governs student use of cognitive enhancers, with a student’s 
motivation being the condition that determines permissibility. Moreover, this virtues-
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based institutional rule’s reliance on an account of virtuous students as an ethical outlook 
does provide strong guidance for students who lack virtues.  
Nevertheless, there are two problems that this virtues-based approach and 
institutional rule must face. First, even in this ideal conception of academia, it seems 
unlikely that all students who lack virtues would follow this institutional rule. While 
students in this ideal conception are compliant with the goal, aims, assessment, and 
competitive environment of academia, it is inevitable and sensible to think that although 
many students will follow this rule, some will not. In these instances, students’ 
motivations for using cognitive enhancers would not be reflective of the ideals of human 
excellence. The problem is that if some students in an ideal conception of academia will 
not follow a virtues-based institutional rule, does that suggest that a virtues-based 
approach toward issues of enhancement in academia will inevitably fail? 
The second problem is that even if this virtues-based institutional rule were to be 
successfully implemented, does this virtues approach substantially advance issues of 
enhancement in academia beyond questions of permissibility? The virtues-based 
approach argues that cognitive enhancers are permissible but that these enhancements do 
not directly augment cognition or the attaining of understanding; it seems unreasonable to 
think that this entails both ideal and non-ideal theory reconceptualization of issues of 
enhancement in academia. These two problems suggest that a virtues-based approach to 
issues of enhancement in academia will at worst fail or at best fail to advance the 
discussion of enhancement in academia in an interesting way.   
Although these are legitimate problems for any approach attempting to provide a 
general framework for advancing issues of enhancement in academia, I do not think they 
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apply to this virtues-based approach. There is another way in which a virtues-based 
institutional rule can govern student use of cognitive enhancers; it can structure and 
develop the motivations of students in academia. As I argue in the following, if a virtues-
based institutional rule structures and develops the motivations of students in this ideal 
conception, then it shapes the ethos of students. The ethos of students comprises the 
attitudes and sentiments they hold in light of academia’s institutional rules and informal 
pressures.37 I contend that with this virtues-based approach’s institutional rule, even if 
some students do not follow it, it does more than establish permissibility: it shapes the 
ethos of students who lack the virtues found in the virtuous student and thus advances the 
discussion of enhancement in academia. 
3.9 Structuring and Developing Students’ Motivations 
 
 To understand how a virtues-based approach’s institutional rule can shape the ethos of 
students, I briefly return to two elements introduced in the first chapter of this research 
project: the embedded cognition hypothesis and features of institutional rules. First, the 
embedded cognition hypothesis holds that while cognition is located within our cranium, 
our environment is also integral to human cognition. As Andy Clark writes:  
The central idea is that understanding what is distinctive about human 
thought and reason may turn out to depend on a much broader focus than 
that to which cognitive science has become most accustomed: a focus that 
includes not just body, brain, and the natural world, but the technological 
props, aids and scaffolding (pens, paper, PC’s, institutions…) which our 
biological brains learn, mature and operate. (Clark 2001, 15)  
 
That the environment is integral to human cognition is clear. Yet if pens and laptops are 
external props that can support and assist human cognition, it then also seems reasonable, 
                                                




as Clark mentions, to think that institutions support and assist our cognition.38  While this 
research project is not about human cognition or cognitive science, what I take from the 
embedded cognitive hypothesis is that institutions are not only integral to the processes of 
cognition but also integral to the way persons think. Put otherwise, institutions are 
integral in shaping the attitudes and sentiments of persons. Henceforth my focus is on 
how academia shapes the attitudes and sentiments of students concerning the use of 
cognitive enhancers. 
One way academia shapes the ethos of students is through its institutional rules. In the 
first chapter, I broadly stipulated the features of institutional rules as the regulations or 
protocols that govern students’ actions by stipulating or directly or indirectly indicating 
which actions are permitted and prohibited. These features of institutional rules are action 
guiding: student’s actions are directed in respect to these rules. In guiding the actions of 
persons, institutional rules can structure and develop motivations in two ways: as creating 
expectations of a pattern of behavior or as an internalized institutional rule. 
In these two ways, academia’s institutional rules structure and develop the 
motivations of students, which in turn shape the ethos of students. Consider how 
institutional rules governing the use of cell phones shapes the ethos of students in 
academia. Most students share the attitude and sentiment that absent mitigating reasons, 
using a cell phone during class is improper.39 Anyone who has worked recently with 
students in academia might disagree. Yet even during a lecture it is rare that a student 
                                                
38 To be clear, Clark and other embedded (or extended) cognition theorists are working within the realm of 
cognitive science: explaining the process and ways in which human cognition works. While my research 
project does take environmental scaffolding (external props) as integral to human cognition, my research 
project is not one of cognitive science (Clark 2001; Levy 2007). 
39 Notice that even if this is the ethos of students regarding cell phones, it does not mean that students are 
always forbidden from using cell phones during class or that there is never a reason for a student to use a 
cell phone under this rule.   
 
 99 
answers or makes a phone call during class. Most often, students use their cell phones for 
text messaging. For the sake of argument, let’s say that text messaging does fall within 
the purview of this rule. In fact, the majority of students are not texting during class, and 
those who do often attempt to conceal (even if poorly) their texting. Students who are 
texting attempt to conceal it because the ethos of students regarding texting during class 
is not positive. Thus academia’s institutional rule prohibiting the use of cell phones 
during class does shape the attitude and sentiment of students.  
The question of importance then is whether a virtues-based institutional rule can 
shape the ethos of students who lack virtue with respect to using cognitive enhancers. In 
the following, I elucidate the two ways institutional rules can structure and develop 
motivations and then how these rules would shape the ethos of students regarding the use 
of cognitive enhancers.  
3.9.1 Virtues-Based Rule and Expectations of Behavior  
The first and most common way is by creating expectations of a pattern of behavior. 
In that students have expectations of a certain pattern of behavior, institutional rules 
direct student interactions. To illustrate, if there is an institutional rule for driving on the 
right side of the road, a person has the expectation that under normal conditions, other 
drivers will drive on the right side of the road.40 One’s expectation that other persons will 
drive on the right is a reason for one to drive on the right. According to economists Avner 
Grief and Christopher Kingston, these institutional rules create expectations of behavior 
and motivations, thereby reinforcing this rule (Grief and Kingston 2011).  
                                                
40 This example is used both in Avner Greif and Christopher Kingston’s work on economic modeling of 




In academia, institutional rules provide expectations of a pattern of behavior and, in 
directing student interactions, structure and develop a student’s motivations. In academia, 
a rule prohibiting a student from using a cell phone during class time structures students’ 
motivations. The students’ motivation is that this institutional rule is a reason for not 
using their cell phone, and other students do not use their cell phones in class either, so 
one can attribute this rule as their motivation to also avoid using a cell phone in class.41 
Moreover, for some students, this institutional rule structures and develops a second-
order motivation: civility.42  It is a social courtesy, an institutional rule of etiquette, to the 
professor who is lecturing and to other students who are listening to the lecture for one 
not to use a cell phone in class. In providing expectations of a pattern of behavior and 
directing interactions with other students, institutional rules structure and develop the 
motivations of students.43      
This virtues-based institutional rule governing student use of cognitive enhancers 
holds that students are permitted to use cognitive enhancers if their reasons for doing so 
reflect ideals of human excellence. This rule shapes the ethos of students in the following 
ways. First, by indicating permitted and prohibited uses of cognitive enhancers, this rule 
is action guiding and directs students’ interactions, which sets an expectation for a pattern 
of behavior. It becomes expected that at least one reason students have for using 
cognitive enhancers and a reason one attributes, even if incorrectly, to other students for 
using cognitive enhancers reflects the ideals of human excellence. The expectation is that 
                                                
41 While it might turn out this is not the student’s reason for not using their cell phone, attributing this 
institutional rule as one their motivation does not seem to be unreasonable. 
42 Civility was considered to be the most important mark of a society by Samurai culture and its code of 
honor (Tsunetomo 2002). 
43 Avner Grief and Christopher Kingston focus on this aspect of institutional rules and motivations by 
studying and creating an economic model of institutions called “institutions-as-equilibria” (Grief and 
Kingston 2011).  
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student use of cognitive enhancers is motivated by ideals of self-improvement, seeking 
understanding, or seeking accurate beliefs. Moreover, by making motivation the 
condition of permissibility, this virtues-based institutional rule also can be seen as 
shaping the ethos of students by endorsing a hierarchy of motivations. Via the 
permissibility condition, this virtues-based institutional rule develops, cultivates, and 
endorses certain motivations such as self-improvement, seeking understanding, and 
seeking accurate beliefs while discouraging other motivations such as getting high, 
finishing a boring academic activity, or making up for poor study habits.   
 When students’ behaviors follow an expected pattern and their motivations are 
developed, cultivated, and endorsed in reference to the ideals of human excellence, their 
attitudes and sentiments are more firmly shaped regarding the use of cognitive enhancers. 
The attitude and sentiments of students would regard proper use of cognitive enhancers 
(for reasons of the ideals of human excellence) as being good or admirable, whereas 
improper use of cognitive enhancers (such as making-up for poor study habits) would be 
regarded with distain. The ethos of students is shaped to regard the use of cognitive 
enhancers as an action that is indicative of a student’s character. In general, students 
would view students who broke a virtues-based institutional rule with contempt.  
In viewing such a student with disdain and thinking that it reflects poorly on their 
character, the ethos of students regarding the improper use of a cognitive enhancer is in 
many ways analogous to the ethos of students regarding inappropriate language in class. 
Students view other students who consistently use inappropriate language during class 
with disdain and often think it reflects poorly on that student’s character. It need not 
matter that inappropriate language is a prerequisite for student life outside the classroom. 
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Within the context of academic activities, there is an expected pattern of behavior that 
structures and develops students’ motivations, and the attitude and sentiments of students 
is such that the use of inappropriate language is discouraged.  
3.9.2 Internalized Virtues-Based Institutional Rule  
The second way institutional rules can structure and develop the motivations of 
students is when these rules are internalized, meaning that a rule becomes an element of a 
student’s psychology. The kind of institutional rules that structure and develop the deep 
(second-order) motivations of students are, as I refer to them, internalized institutional 
rules. An example is the honor code for cadets at the United States Military Academy at 
West Point. The honor code states, “A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those 
who do." This institutional rule not only stipulates which acts committed by students are 
impermissible (lying, cheating, stealing, or toleration of these acts) but also structures and 
develops a cadet’s motivations; honor is a reason for acting accordingly. An honor code 
such as West Point’s is an internalized institutional rule that sets the range of permissible 
actions.  
As I use the term, honor is to respect or highly regard something or someone. Taken 
in this way, to honor a person or institution is to respect it and, alternatively, people and 
institutions also honor a person by respecting this individual (Appiah 2010). The 
conditions that govern honor are stipulated by an honor code:  
An honor code says how people of certain identities can gain the right to 
respect, how they can lose it, and how having and losing honor changes 
the way they should be treated. (Appiah 2010, 175)   
 
In academia, honoring students means to hold them in high respect or esteem. One 
function of honor codes is that they indicate the conditions such as certain scholarly, 
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artistic, or athletic achievements under which students may be honored (Appiah 2010). 
For example, being placed on the honor roll or having designations of summa cum laude 
or magna cum laude conferred upon graduation means that a student has met certain 
conditions and thus academia is honoring them.  
The second function of honor codes is that they indicate the conditions under which 
students may lose the respect of academia or other students. If a student fails to maintain 
a minimal level of proficiency in academic performance such as failing too many courses 
or having a low GPA, or if a student engages in certain actions while in academia such as 
cheating or being deceitful, this student is not shown respect. For Cadets at West Point, 
lying, cheating, stealing, or toleration of these actions are the conditions for loss of 
respect and expulsion from the academic institution.  
By indicating the conditions for gaining or losing respect, honor codes are 
institutional rules that govern and guide students’ actions. Honor codes then not only 
govern and guide the behavior of students by setting the conditions for gaining or losing 
respect, but they also structure and develop a motivation for following these codes. 44 
Honor can become a motivation for students. Gaining the respect of an academic 
institution, a professor, or peers can become a reason to act in certain circumstances such 
as working twice as long on an assignment, pulling an all-nighter studying, or seeking 
peer review of an assignment. 
Honor is also a reason for acting because certain actions such as working twice as 
hard or seeking peer review reflect well on students’ characters. If developed properly, 
honor is not only a reason for acting but can become a stable character trait for regular 
                                                
44 It should be noted that not all institutional rules are of the kind that can be internalized. It is not clear that 




and reliable multi-track thoughts, feeling, and acts. For example, if cadets at West Point 
internalize an honor code, living honorably becomes a way of life as a matter of 
character. 
Returning to enhancement in academia, in an ideal conception of academia, the ethos 
of students can be shaped if this virtues-based institutional rule (student use of cognitive 
enhancers is only permitted for reasons reflective of the ideals of human excellence) is 
internalized. This rule stipulates which uses of cognitive enhancers are permitted and 
prohibited. If students internalize this rule, it directly structures and develops their 
motivations: the ideals of human excellence are always the reasons for using cognitive 
enhancers. By internalizing this rule, seeking understanding and accurate beliefs are not 
simply reasons for using cognitive enhancers. When developed properly over an 
academic career, they become stable character traits for regularly and reliably thinking, 
feeling, and acting in certain ways. Thus this virtues-based institutional rule directly 
facilitates the development of the virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs in 
students who lack them.  
This virtues-based institutional rule shapes the ethos of students to consider that, as a 
matter of character, the use of cognitive enhancers should always reflect the ideals of 
human excellence. It is only for reasons of self-improvement or the virtues of seeking 
understanding and accurate beliefs that one should use cognitive enhancers. For an 
internalized virtues-based rule, unlike a virtues-based rule that creates an expectation for 
student behavior, the emphasis is on the use of cognitive enhancers as one clear 
indication of a student’s character, to a much higher degree. This ethos of students would 
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hold the improper use of cognitive enhancers as an indication that the student does not 
possess the kind of character one wants from students in academia.   
To illustrate, reconsider Oliver and Edith’s cases. Oliver’s motivation for using 
cognitive enhancers is to make up an assignment because of improper study habits. This 
reason for using cognitive enhancers is impermissible and reflects poorly on Oliver’s 
character. Edith’s motivation for using cognitive enhancers is to seek understanding. This 
reason makes her use of cognitive enhancers permissible and indicates good character. In 
this ideal conception of academia, under an internalized virtues-based institutional rule, 
both a particular academic institution and the ethos of students within it would regard 
Edith as the right kind of student and Oliver as the wrong kind of student to have in 
academia.  
Initially, one might think that the ethos resulting from this internalized virtues-based 
rule is rather severe, but consider that this ethos is similar to the attitude and sentiments 
students have about the use of hate speech in academia.45 In general, students regard 
those students who use hate speech not only as having poor character but also as the kind 
of student one does not want in academia. The ethos of students is shaped by an 
internalized virtues-based institutional rule that likewise considers those students who use 
cognitive enhancers for reasons other than the ideals of human excellence as the wrong 
kind of student for academia.  
An internalized virtues-based institutional rule for governing student use of cognitive 
enhancers facilitates the development of certain virtues and shapes the ethos of students 
who lack these virtues so that the proper use of cognitive enhancers is always a matter of 
character. This internalized virtues-based institutional rule shapes the ethos of students 
                                                
45 By hate speech, I mean speech that is used merely to injure or provoke.  
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who lack virtues into mirroring the attitude and sentiments that virtuous students have 
regarding the use of cognitive enhancers.   
Whether a virtues-based rule is taken as an institutional rule that creates expectations 
for patterns of student behavior or as an institutional rule to be internalized by students, 
students’ motivations are structured and developed. This virtues-based rule shapes 
attitudes and sentiments of students such that the use of cognitive enhancers is seen as a 
reflection of their character. Therefore, a virtues-based institutional rule that permits 
students to use cognitive enhancers if their reasons for doing so are reflective of the 
ideals of human excellence would change student use of cognitive enhancers in 
academia. By re-conceptualizing the use of enhancement in academia as an issue of 
student character, this virtues-based institutional rule advances issues of enhancement in 
academia.46  
3.10 Three Concerns About Shaping the Ethos of Students 
In previous sections, I answered the question of whether a virtues-based institutional 
rule can shape the ethos of students who lack virtue in respect to using cognitive 
enhancers for the right reasons. I argued that whether taken as an institutional rule that 
creates an expected pattern of behavior or as an internalized institutional rule, a virtues-
based institutional rule does shape the ethos of students. However, there are three 
immediate concerns that both explications of this virtues-based rule are likely to 
encounter. First, I argued that the ethos of students is to be shaped in regards to a virtues-
based institutional rule. At a minimum, this means that the ethos of students is shaped in 
respect to the virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs; yet one might worry 
                                                
46 Concerns about this project’s notion of character will be addressed in the following chapter.  
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about whether or not these virtues are of such significant value that we want academia (or 
for that matter any institution) to shape the ethos of students in regards to them. Second, 
it is reasonable to hold that an ideal conception of academia has the goal of developing 
students’ intellectual capacities and attaining understanding. Moreover, it is reasonable 
that academia’s institutional rules—as regulations or protocols governing students’ 
actions—structure and develop the motivations of students and shape the ethos of 
students. The problem is that this virtues-based institutional rule is not just shaping the 
ethos of students; it is actively attempting to facilitate the development of virtues in 
students. In striving to help students attain understanding, it is unfair to task academia 
further with the responsibility of developing virtues in students who lack them. Finally, 
there might be a worry that this virtues-based approach makes an implicit normative 
claim that students who lack virtues not only have to follow this virtues-based 
institutional rule but also in some sense have an obligation to develop these virtues.  
Each of these concerns addresses a different facet of this virtues-based institutional 
rule or the context in which the rule is taken.  I conclude the chapter by addressing these 
concerns, further clarifying this virtues-based approach. 
3.10.1 Are the Virtues that Significant?  
To address the concern of whether these virtues are of such significant value that one 
would want to shape the ethos of students in respect to them, I temporarily move outside 
of ideal theory. To demonstrate the significant value of these virtues, I argue that one 
would want everyone, not solely students in academia, to possess these virtues. That 
these virtues are valuable enough to want all persons to possess them is a substantial 
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indication of their value and thus why we should shape the ethos of students toward these 
virtues.   
In respect to the virtue of seeking understanding, first consider the importance of 
having a motivation to seek greater comprehension of the human experience in a person’s 
life. An illustrative example is the role that seeking greater comprehension of the human 
experience has in medical ethics consultations. In many medical centers, if patients, their 
families, or hospital staff members are troubled by a particular treatment plan, they have 
the right to call an ethics consultation. In these consultations, a clinically trained ethicist 
or consultation team is called to examine, assess, and provide a recommendation for 
resolving the problem (Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade 2010). What distinguishes an ethics 
consultation from other consultations in the medical system (legal, medical, or 
psychological) is that these situations are often about values (Beauchamp and Childress 
2009). However, in many cases it is not actually a dispute about value but rather a lack of 
comprehension.  
One impetus behind the implementation of these clinical ethics consultations is the 
motivation to seek greater comprehension of the human experience. In doing so, one is 
able to foster connections between persons. For example, a physician might recommend a 
palliative treatment for a cancer patient, but the patient may choose to reject this 
treatment plan. Initially, it might appear that there is a conflict between the physician’s 
duty of beneficence and the patient’s autonomy. One of the first things that an ethics 
consultant attempts to resolve is to ensure that both parties understand the relevant 
information. In this example, the patient rejects palliative care for fear of addiction. A 
resolution may occur when the patient is provided with information and comes to 
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understand that the use of opioids during palliative treatment poses little risk of addiction 
(Enck 2002; Seppala and Rose 2010; Dresser and Frader 2009). Another resolution might 
be to provide information to the medical professional: as long as the patient is competent 
and possesses decision-making capacities, he always has the right to refuse treatment 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2009).47 It seems that even if providing this information does 
end the conflict, it was good to do because it provided patients and medical professionals 
with relevant information and fostered a connection.  
Possessing the motivation to seek greater comprehension of the human experience is 
significant for persons because it can lead to resolutions of conflicts as well as foster a 
connection with other persons. Martha Nussbaum contends that the comprehension of the 
human experience fosters a connection with other persons by allowing for a respectful 
dialogue to begin (Nussbaum 1997). Jonathan Glover contends that a pivotal factor in 
many historical atrocities was a general lack of comprehension (taken as moral 
imagination) of other persons (Glover 2001). 
Moreover, it is not simply the motivation of seeking greater comprehension of the 
human experience and the connection it fosters with others that makes this virtue 
something that all persons should possess. It is of significant value that a person is able to 
draw upon, make connections, and apply information to their lives. Consider that all too 
often, people do not draw upon, connect, or apply information in their lives enough. For 
example, eating more than the daily recommended caloric amount can often lead to 
obesity, and many items on a fast-food restaurant menu greatly exceed the daily-
recommended caloric intake for the average person (Schlosser 2001). According to the 
                                                
47 Competency is a legal term, not a medical term. Only a judge can decide on competency, but medical 
professionals can decide on a patient’s decision-making capacities.   
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2009 to 2010 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 37.7% of adults in the 
United States are obese (National Center for Health Statistics 2012). Some of the health 
conditions directly related to obesity are heart disease, stroke, type-2 diabetes, and certain 
types of cancers (National Heart Lung and Blood Institute 1998). In 2008 alone, the cost 
of medical treatments relating to obesity and its related conditions was estimated at $147 
billion (Finkelstein, et al. 2009). Yet despite the prevalence of information and facts 
about fast food, caloric intake, obesity, and obesity-related health conditions, 17% of 
adults eat at a fast-food restaurant two to three times a week (Alfano 2009). It seems that 
people commonly do not draw upon, connect, and apply this information to their lives. It 
would be better, both instrumentally and for its own sake, if more people sought 
understanding. Thus seeking understanding is not only a virtue for students to possess in 
an ideal conception of academia, but it is also a virtue that one would want all persons to 
possess.       
The significance of wanting all persons to possess certain virtues extends to the virtue 
of seeking accurate beliefs. We would want all persons to seek beliefs that accurately 
represent the world because finding accurate beliefs is a vital component in the 
accumulation of knowledge. Consider that knowledge, whether provided in academia or 
elsewhere, is consistently accumulated and passed on to future generations. The passing 
on of knowledge to future generations is imperative to our development. As Neil Levy 
points out, “If each generation had to start afresh, we would not still be in the Dark Ages; 
we could never get near advanced as the Dark Ages” (Levy 2007, 43). I would add that 
without consistently assessing our knowledge, even if a generation was able to 
accumulate enough knowledge to be in the Dark Ages, it is likely that much of its 
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information and facts would be greatly flawed. Knowledge is not static but needs to be 
continuously developed, accumulated, and assessed. If a person has the motivation and 
dispositions to seek accurate beliefs, they likely are going to assess and evaluate not only 
the information and facts presented to them as canon but also their own beliefs and belief 
systems. That a person has the virtue of seeking accurate beliefs is instrumentally good 
for its own sake because persons are less likely to pass on inaccurate beliefs (for example, 
the beliefs that a human being can be the property of others, that skin color is a relevant 
distinction between human beings, or that women possess inferior cognitive capacities in 
comparison to men). These beliefs and the systems they belonged to have, over time, 
been assessed by persons (and students) who sought out ones that more correctly depicted 
the world. It is significant to think life is better off with accurate beliefs and, as such, it is 
not only students in academia we want to possess the virtue of seeking accurate beliefs, 
but all persons.  
Therefore, virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs are significant 
enough to want everyone to possess them, and this is a substantial reason for shaping the 
ethos of students in academia in regard to them. Moreover, because cognitive enhancers 
have the potential to impact the world and academia profoundly (for the focus of this 
research project), this potential is a reason to want these virtues to shape the ethos of 
students regarding their use.  
One possible way to mitigate the negative effects that advances in cognitive 
enhancers might generate is to emphasize the link that students who use these 
enhancements have with the ideals of human excellence as a reflection on a student’s 
character. If the general attitudes and sentiments of students are that improper use of 
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cognitive enhancers reflects poorly on their character, these attitudes are a mechanism to 
safeguard against the abuse of cognitive enhancers.     
3.10.2 Is it Academia’s Responsibility to Facilitate the Development of Virtues?  
The second concern about this virtues-based institutional rule is that it is not simply 
shaping students’ ethos but that it is actively attempting to develop virtues in students 
who lack them. The concern is not that these virtues or the development of these virtues 
in students is bad; rather it is that the development of virtues is too burdensome of a 
responsibility for academia. Even in an ideal conception of academia as striving to attain 
understanding, academia has many responsibilities, and the task of developing virtues in 
students who lack them is simply too much.  
I grant that holding academia responsible for the development of virtues is too much 
of a burden. The development of a virtue ultimately is dependent upon an individual 
student, and no amount of structuring or social pressure can force a student to develop a 
virtue if he or she does not want to.48 Still, even if academia is not responsible for the 
development of virtues in students who lack them, it doesn’t follow that academia has no 
role in the development of virtues. Institutions have an active role in developing virtues 
in persons, as evidenced by Julia Annas, who refers to this as the embedded context of 
virtues: virtues are developed and exercised in “a particular family, city, religion, and 
country” (Annas 2011, 52). To varying degrees, the environment, community, and 
institution all have an active role in the development of an individual’s virtues. Does this 
mean that students living in ideal circumstances will always develop virtues? No, because 
even when living in ideal circumstances, the development of virtues depends upon that 
                                                
48 Slightly amending a common adage captures this sentiment clearly: “You can lead a student to virtue, but 
you can’t make them possess it.”  
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individual, and for a multiplicity of reasons, it might not happen. Conversely, does this 
mean that individuals living in adverse conditions such as extreme poverty are unlikely to 
develop virtues? Yes, but as Julia Annas points out, 
[I]t is important, though, not to confuse the fact we do not expect virtue 
here [persons living in extreme poverty], which is reasonable, with the 
different thought that these people are incapable of virtue. (Annas, 2011, 
31) 
 
Although an individual’s environment, community, and institution are not sufficient 
conditions for developing a virtue, they do have a role in developing virtues in an 
individual.  
According to philosophers ranging from Aristotle to the Confucian philosopher 
Xunzi, education traditionally has been viewed as having the most active role in the 
development of virtues. In fact, Xunzi argued that it is the role of education that is 
fundamental in developing an individual (a gentleman or sage to Xunzi) into the 
standards of human excellence (Schofer 1993, 123; Tzun 1963a; Tzun 1963b). Human 
nature, according to Xunzi, is inherently bad because our innate “natural” characteristics 
lead us to strife and disorder, and it is only through education, which he refers to as 
“learning,” that humans develop better characteristics: “Man’s nature is [bad]49; goodness 
is the result of conscious activity” (Tzun 1963d; Robins 2009).50 Conscious activity is 
when “the mind conceives of a thought and the body puts it into action.” Yet for Xunzi, it 
is not mere reflection: “I once tried spending a day in thought but I found it of less value 
than a moment of study.” Instead, conscious activity is “when thoughts have been 
accumulated sufficiently, the body is well trained, and then action is carried to 
                                                
49 Burton Waton’s translation is that “Man’s nature is evil.” However, many scholars believe that such a 
translation, while not entirely inaccurate, presupposes a dichotomy between good and evil that 
misrepresents Xunzi’s philosophical thought and Confucian ethical theory in general.    
50 (CF: Tzun 1963a; 1963b; 1963c; 1963d; Schofer 1993)  
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completion” (Tzun 1963c, 139-140; Tzun 1963a, 16). Thus conscious activity refers not 
only to an individual’s motivational structures and dispositions, but it is also considered a 
means to development these capacities.51  
It is the role of education to develop these capacities through conscious activity. 
Education for Xunzi includes:  
[T]he studying of texts, practicing ritual, being conscious of good and 
associating with good and learned people, and concentrating on the 
qualities of a Confucian sage. (Schofer 1993, 118) 
 
In Encouraging Learning, the metaphors of straightening wood or sharpening metal 
illustrate the active role education has in developing an individual into standards of 
excellence: 
The gentlemen says: learning should never cease. … A piece of wood as 
straight as a plumb line may be bent into a circle as true as any drawn with 
a compass and, even after the wood has dried, it will not straighten out 
again. The bending process has made it that way. Thus, if wood is pressed 
against a straightening board, it can be made straight; if metal is put to the 
grindstone, it can be sharpened; and if the gentlemen studies widely and 
each day examines himself, his wisdom will become clear and his conduct 
without fault. (Tzun, Encouraging Learning 1963, 15) 
 
For Xunzi, education not only actively develops a person’s capacities but also puts people 
in the proper environment by surrounding them with others whose ethos reflects the 
importance of education. The reason is that the ethos of those in education is crucial in 
the development of human excellence:  
[A student] no matter how fine his nature or how keen his mind, must seek 
                                                
51 Xunzi provides his complex notion of conscious activity in detail in the following passage: “When the 
emotions are aroused and the mind makes a choice among them, this is called thought. When the mind 
conceives of a thought and the body puts it into action, this is called conscious activity. When thoughts 
have been accumulated sufficiently, the body is well trained, and then action is carried to completion, this 
is also called conscious activity. When one acts from considerations of profit, it is called business. When 
one acts from considerations of duty it is called [moral] conduct. The faculty which allows man to have 
understanding is knowledge. Understanding which is practically applicability is also called knowledge. The 
understanding, which makes man capable of something, is an ability. Capability which has practiced 
application is also called an ability” (Tzun 1963c, 139-140). 
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a worthy teacher to study under and good companions to associate with. 
(Tzun, Man's Nature is Evil 1963, 170) 
 
In many respects, Xunzi’s account of education mirrors this virtues-based approach 
and the claims of a virtues-based institutional rule shaping the ethos of students. Xunzi’s 
position provides a reasonable basis for holding that academia does have an active role in 
the development of virtues in students who lack virtues. Since academia has such an 
active role in the development of virtues in students, then at a minimum, it seems 
reasonable that academia can also facilitate the development of virtues in students who 
lack them.  
One way for academia to facilitate the development of virtues regarding the use of 
cognitive enhancers is by instituting a virtues-based rule. A virtues-based rule entails that 
when students have the chance to use a cognitive enhancer, they will exercise their 
practical reasoning; if they follow this virtues-based rule, they will act for reasons within 
the ideals of human excellence. This in turn works not only to shape the ethos of students 
regarding the use of cognitive enhancers but also to facilitate the development of virtues 
in that student.   
One might wonder if instituting a virtues-based institutional rule really does facilitate 
the development of virtues in students who lack them. If the development and exercise of 
a virtue are through practical reasons, then it is reasonable to think that it would. 
Consider that the developmental process of virtue is often analogized with the 
development of a skill (Annas 2011). The skill analogy posits that developing a virtue 
requires training, practice, and time, similar to a skill. This skill analogy not only mirrors 
developmental notions in both Aristotle and Xunzi’s conception of virtues, but it also 
suggests that the development of virtue can occur in academia parallel to the 
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development of a student’s skill set of reading comprehension, arithmetic, writing, and 
critical thinking. For academia to achieve, or at least strive to achieve, its goal is to 
structure academic activities so that they progressively provide students with information 
of greater depth and progressively attempt to improve this skill set in students. The 
development and refinement of this skill set does not occur overnight or in a single 
moment of inspiration, but over a process. For example, a student learns to be a writer by 
writing, and if this student does it well, then over time he or she becomes a good writer. 
Similarly, throughout a student’s academic career, if he or she continually faces 
opportunities for using cognitive enhancers, and this student exercises practical reasoning 
by following a virtues-based institutional rule, then this is a method of facilitating the 
development of certain virtues. Or if the virtues-based rule is an internalized institutional 
rule, then academia facilitates the development of virtues by making the use of cognitive 
enhancers for reasons pertaining to the ideals of human excellence a way of life for a 
student. In both cases, instituting a virtues-based rule in academia, at minimum, 
facilitates the development of virtues in students who lack them.  
In this ideal conception of academia, it seems clear that even if academia does not 
have a responsibility to develop virtues in students who lack them, it still plays an active 
role in the development of virtues. That academia has such an active role in the 
development of virtues suggests that, at a minimum, it can facilitate the development of 
virtues in students who lack them.   
3.10.3 Students and the Development of Virtues  
The final concern is about the relationship between students and the development of 
these virtues in this virtues-based approach. The value of the ideals of human excellence 
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or virtues is essential to a virtues-based approach and virtues-based institutional rule. 
Herein lies the concern: Does a student who lacks virtues have an obligation to develop 
these virtues?  Consider that the conception of virtues I offered contends that virtues are 
instrumentally beneficial, good for their own sakes, properties that make their possessor 
an ideal of human excellence, and properties a student should aspire to attain. This 
virtues-based institutional rule stipulates that the only permissible use of cognitive 
enhancers is for reasons reflective of these ideals of human excellence. Because of the 
value of the virtues and their role as the focal point from which permissibility is 
determined by this virtues-based institutional rule, it is reasonable to infer that a student 
who lacks virtues may have an obligation to develop these virtues.   
 Although a reasonable inference, the concern is that this virtues-based approach 
cannot claim that a student who lacks virtues has a moral obligation, in the sense of being 
morally required, to develop these virtues. To argue that a student has a moral obligation 
to develop these virtues, I would need to have provided a fuller ethical account in respect 
to conceptions of the right and the good as well a theory of right action.52 However, this 
virtues-based approach has avoided providing a fuller ethical theory and a theory of right 
action; thus it cannot claim that a student who lacks these virtues is morally required to 
develop these virtues. 
As articulated, concern about this virtues-based approach not providing a fuller 
ethical theory or theory of right action is in fact consistent with the claims of this virtues-
based approach toward enhancement in academia. First, in respect to the ideals of human 
excellence, it is reasonable to think that there are both moral and non-moral human 
                                                
52 A theory of right action concerns what determines or what properties make an action morally right or 
wrong (Copp 2006). 
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excellences. I acknowledge that the difference between the moral and non-moral 
properties of human excellences is not categorical but continuous and assume a clearer 
division between moral and non-moral human excellences than likely exists. 
Nevertheless, it is still reasonable that seeking understanding and seeking accurate beliefs 
can be taken as non-moral marks of human excellence. This virtues-based approach is 
not, then, claiming that a student is morally obligated or that to be morally good, a 
student has to develop these virtues, only that the virtues of seeking understanding and 
seeking accurate beliefs are non-moral ideals of human excellence.   
 Second, this virtues-based approach is not offering a theory of right action. In respect 
to the use of cognitive enhancers in academia, because current institutional rules do not 
decisively determine the permissibility of using these enhancements, this virtues-based 
approach asked whether a virtuous student, or one possessing the virtues of seeking 
understanding and accurate beliefs, choosing to use cognitive enhancers makes the use of 
cognitive enhancers in academia permissible. I argued that it does, but it is not the 
virtuous student’s possession of these virtues that makes it permissible; rather it is the 
virtuous student’s motivations that make it permissible. The scope of this claim is on the 
condition of permissible student use of cognitive enhancers, not on virtues or motivation 
as determining or being properties that make actions morally right or wrong.  
Although this virtues-based approach is not a full ethical theory and does not provide 
a theory of right action, it is reasonable to wonder whether a student who lacks virtues 
has any sort of obligation to develop these virtues. Although this approach holds the 
virtues of students as being instrumentally beneficial, good for their own sakes, properties 
that make their possessor an ideal of human excellence, and properties a student should 
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aspire to attain, students do not have an obligation to develop them. However, while this 
approach does not articulate a student as having an obligation to develop these virtues, it 
is still sensible to hold that a student who lacks virtues should develop these virtues.  
 If we think seeking understanding and seeking accurate beliefs are properties of 
human excellence and that these properties are conducive for students to attain 
understanding, then a student who lacks them should develop them. The necessity of the 
claim that a student who lacks virtues should develop them is in relation to the ideals of 
human excellence and the goal of academia. If we think that seeking understanding and 
seeking accurate beliefs are properties of excellence for humans and that the goal of 
academia is instrumentally beneficial and good for its own sake, then it is conducive for 
persons to seek it. Considering the kind of creatures humans are—social animals that 
possess an advanced rational capacity—then seeking understanding and seeking accurate 
beliefs allow a student to be better able to understand, navigate, and appreciate the world, 
life’s experiences, and their interactions with others, and it is conducive to the goal of 
academia. These are strong reasons for students to develop these virtues. While this 
virtues-based approach cannot say that a student who lacks virtues has an obligation, it is 
still possible for this virtues-based approach to hold that a student who lacks virtues 
should them, in the sense that it is an ideal human excellence and conducive to the goal of 
academia.  
Nevertheless, the contention that a student who lacks virtues should work to develop 
them is restricted and constrained in two ways. First, the scope of my claim is extremely 
narrow, restricted to students in an academic institution and not extended further. Second, 
according to this virtues-based approach, a student who lacks virtues has done nothing 
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incorrect or wrong if he or she does not attempt to develop these virtues. To understand 
how this virtues-based approach can hold that a student who lacks virtues has done 
nothing incorrect or wrong by not attempting to develop these virtues yet still thinks a 
student should develop them, consider an analogous case from Buddhism. In Buddhism, 
two major doctrines are the Four Noble and the Noble Eightfold Path (Bryom 1976).53 
The first and fourth of the Four Noble Truths hold that (i) life is suffering and (ii) the 
path to the cessation of suffering is the Noble Eightfold Path.54 If a person wants to end 
suffering, then it is necessary for them to follow the Noble Eightfold Path; yet a person is 
not required to do so or wrong if he or she does not follow the eightfold path. Instead, this 
person has not taken the first step toward the cessation of suffering.  
Similarly, seeking understanding and accurate beliefs are properties of human 
excellence and conducive for students in academia. The development of these virtues is 
something that a student who lacks virtues should seek to do. Yet students who lack 
virtues have not done anything incorrect or wrong if they do not attempt to develop these 
virtues. Instead, they have not taken the steps to develop properties that are ideals of 
human excellence and conducive to the goal of academia. Although these students might 
not be successful, according to this virtues-based approach, they have done nothing 
wrong. 
 Although this final concern is accurate in that this virtues-based approach cannot 
claim that a student has an obligation to develop these virtues, it is reasonable that this 
                                                
53 The Four Noble Truths: 1. Life means suffering. 2. The origin of suffering is attachment. 3. The cessation 
of suffering is attainable. 4. The path to the cessation of suffering. The Noble Eightfold Path: 1. Right View 
2. Right Intention 3. Right Speech 4. Right Action  5. Right Livelihood 6. Right Effort 7. Right 
Mindfulness 8. Right Concentration 
54 As a theory of conduct, the Noble Eightfold Path encompasses principles for guidance in respect to 
wisdom (taken as proper understanding of the cause of suffering), ethical conduct, and mental development 
(proper orientation of one’s mental outlook).  
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virtues-based approach can at least claim, albeit in a restricted and constrained sense, that 
students who lack virtues should develop them because they are ideals of human 
excellence and conducive for students in academia to possess. 
In responding to this final concern about this virtues-based approach’s claims 
concerning the relationship between the virtues and students, as well as the 
accompanying concerns of this virtues-based approach not being a full ethical theory or 
providing a theory of right action, I have shown that this virtues-based approach scope is 
focused on enhancement in academia and makes rather modest claims. There still may be 
a concern that approaching enhancement in academia from a virtues-based approach is 
still too radical. However, consider another approach taken in regard to enhancement, 
Julian Savulescu, Anders Sandberg, and Guy Kahane’s welfarist approach (Savulescu, 
Sandberg and Kahane 2011; Kahane and Savulescu 2009). In this approach, issues of 
human enhancement are best understood in respect to human well-being. 
Welfarist definition of human enhancement: Any change in the biology or 
psychology of a person which increases the chances of leading a good life 
in the relevant set of circumstances. (Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane 
2011, 16) 
 
For the welfarist approach, it is permissible for persons to use enhancements for reasons 
of maximizing their well-being, allowing them to live a good life. Relying on Rawls and 
Buchanan’s notion of “all-purposes goods,” this welfarist approach claims that there are 
traits of persons that are valuable regardless of the kind of life a person wants to live. 
Intellectual capacities are one such all-purpose good (Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane 
2011, 11).55 In respect to issues of enhancement in academia, a welfarist approach would 
                                                
55 The works that Julian Savulescu, Anders Sandberg, and Guy Kahane’s relied on for positional goods 
were those ofAllen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler, and John Rawls (Allen 
Buchanan, et al 2000; Rawls 1999). 
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hold that it is good for student well-being to have their cognitive capacities enhanced 
because even moderately augmenting a student’s intellectual capacities may help the 
student to live a good life. 
Yet this welfarist approach would also agree that other issues such as health risks, 
particular academic institutions, impact on student attitudes, and other relevant 
considerations all need to be factored in. In this respect, both the welfarist approach and 
the virtues-based approach I have offered are similar in that student use of cognitive 
enhancers requires all considerations to be accounted for and, often enough, there are 
strong reasons against certain students using cognitive enhancers. The difference between 
this welfarist approach and the presented virtues-based approach is that the welfarist 
approach takes consequences as the main consideration for determining permissibility, 
whereas this virtue-based approach does not. My point is not that a virtues-based 
approach is superior to Savulescu, Sandberg, and Kahane’s welfarist approach or that 
their approach is wrong, but rather that their approach and this virtues-based approach 
can be understood as illuminating different aspects and ways of grasping a normative 
account of enhancement. It might turn out, and this virtues-based approach would then 
agree, that if the use of enhancements always leads to people living a better life, then we 
should always use enhancements. Alternatively, it might turn out (and Savulescu, 
Sandberg, and Kahane’s welfarist approach would likely agree) that if the use of 
enhancements always leads people to develop terrible dispositions or character, then we 
shouldn’t use these enhancements.56 Therefore, although this virtues-based approach and 
                                                
56 Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that rather than focusing on cognitive enhancement, 
the focus of the future development of enhancement technology should be on moral enhancement 
technologies. These moral enhancement technologies focus on augmenting the moral character of 
humanity. However, many, most notably John Harris, disagree with Persson and Savulescu’s position. I 
 
 123 
the welfarist approached do differ, a virtues-based approach is no more radical than a 
welfarist position because both are attempting to illuminate different aspects and ways of 
understanding an account of enhancement. 
In this chapter, this virtues-based approach has attempted to put forward a framework 
for the permissibility of student use of cognitive enhancers in academia as well as to 
formulate institutional rules for governing student use of cognitive enhancers in 
academia. This virtues-based approach makes an effort at appropriately balancing the 
value of academia and cognitive enhancers in respect to considerations of rules, 
consequences, and motivations. The approach does advance the discussion of 
enhancement in academia by focusing issues of enhancements in academia on the 
motivations and character of students in academia.  
Moreover, I argued that the goal of academia should be interpreted in respect to 
understanding and that a virtues-based approach can formulate strong institutional rules 
for governing student use of cognitive enhancers in academia. This virtues-based rule can 
be instituted in two ways that shape the ethos of students in respect to the use of cognitive 
enhancers in academia. Used either way, this rule shapes the ethos of students regarding 
the use of cognitive enhancers such that students regard the use of cognitive enhancers in 
the same manner that virtuous students do.  
   One might contend that even if this virtues-based approach were to work in ideal 
theory, the fact that certain idealized conditions no longer hold suggests that the approach 
fails under non-ideal conditions. I think, however, that the challenges are incorrect. In 
fact, the advantage of a virtues-based approach is that while the virtues are something to 
                                                                                                                                            
agree with Harris’ argument that Persson and Savulescu fail to consider that education is the greatest moral 
enhancement for humanity (Persson and Savulescu 2008;  Harris 2011).  
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aspire to, they are also practical. According to Xunzi, a mark of good theory is its ability 
to be implemented into our practices: 
One may sit down and propound such a theory, but [if] he cannot stand up 
and put it into practice, nor can he extend it over a wide area with any 
success. How, then, can it be anything but erroneous? (Tzun Man's Nature 
is Evil 1963, 163) 
 
In the following chapter, this research project moves from ideal into non-ideal theory and 
provides further details on a virtues-based institutional rule being implemented in 




Chapter 4 Ideals of Human Excellence in a Non-ideal World 
4.1 Non-ideal Conditions 
This research project now moves from ideal into non-ideal theory. The virtues-based 
institutional rule formulated and defended in the previous chapter was within a 
conception of academia existing under idealized conditions. By moving into the realm of 
non-ideal theory, the focus shifts to this rule being implemented in a conception of 
academia that exists under “less than happy” conditions (Rawls 1999, 216).  
A non-ideal conception of academia exists under the following non-ideal conditions. 
First, while this conception of academia is still modeled on existing institutions in the 
United States, these academic institutions operate under social conditions that are not 
always fair and reasonable. One of these non-ideal social conditions is that for many 
people, the goal of academia is not to attain understanding but for commercial or 
economic placement of students. Second, in these academic institutions, students do not 
possess ideal psychological dispositions but rather a range of psychological 
dispositions57—from never virtuous to occasionally vicious—so that students are not 
always compliant with institutional rules.  
The first aim of this chapter is to examine the implementation of this virtues-based 
institutional rule in a non-ideal conception of academic institutions and students. Even 
under non-ideal conditions, this virtues-based institutional rule could govern and guide 
student use of cognitive enhancers in a way that relies on considerations of motivations 
and character. Offering a way for motivation and character of students to be relevant 
                                                
57 I use the term “psychological dispositions” as an attempt to indicate that these students do not possess 
virtues or even character traits.  
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considerations in non-ideal environment results in shaping how students think about the 
use of enhancements; this is a reason for administrators, faculty, and staff working in 
academia to consider implementing this virtues-based rule in current academic 
institutions. Moreover, this virtues-based approach and institutional rule not only is able 
to handle misconceptions resulting from the medicalization of cognitive enhancers and to 
shape the way students think about the use of enhancements, but they also resist 
oversimplification of the issues and considerations regarding enhancement in academia.  
Before beginning, I need to stipulate what this chapter’s aims are not. First, this 
chapter is not arguing that this virtues-based institutional rule is the only or most feasible 
institutional rule to implement for governing student use of cognitive enhancers. Relying 
on the ideals of human excellence does not yield a single determinate answer for issues of 
enhancement in academia. Nevertheless, I suggest that the complexity of issues in 
enhancement in academia is such that we need to resist oversimplification. In the end, 
that the ideals of human excellence do not yield a single determinate answer is an 
advantage of a virtues-based approach and institutional rule. It is not just that academic 
institutions, administrators, faculty, and staff would want students to use enhancements in 
the permitted ways; they would want students to have the right reasons for using them.  
Second, while a central focus of this chapter is the character of students, this research 
project is not attempting to settle the psychological and philosophical questions regarding 
the existence of character and character traits. For this virtues-based institutional rule, a 
conception of character helps to explain the reasons why students act in certain ways in 
particular situations. While I think that character and character traits do exist, the 
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conception of character offered in this chapter is not an argument for conclusively 
establishing their existence.  
 This chapter brings to a close the examination of this virtues-based approach and 
institutional rule in ideal and non-ideal theory. This research project clearly allows for 
motivation and character to be relevant considerations that can govern student use of 
cognitive enhancers. Implementing this virtues-based institutional rule likely will change 
the way that students think about the use of enhancements. It offers a sensible and mature 
approach to issues of enhancement in academia.  
 To achieve these aims and bring this research project to a conclusion, the following 
section begins with an examination of the general perception that most people have as 
being the goal of academia.  
4.2 The Goal of Academia 
Many people in the United States do not consider the goal of academia to be attaining 
understanding. Instead, the general perception among people is that the goal of academia 
is commercial or economic in nature; specifically, the goal is to expose students to the 
arts, sciences, and humanities to develop their intellectual capacities to secure future 
employment.   
There are several reasons this perception of the goal of academia is so prominent.  
First, the environment in most contemporary academic institutions is thoroughly 
competitive. This competitive environment is for students and faculty. The structure of 
undergraduate and graduate education is competitive: students in undergraduate courses 
are assessed against an accepted standard and against other students; graduate students 
are assessed against an accepted standard and other graduate students, and they must also 
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compete for funding and mentorship from faculty. The hiring and work structure of 
faculty in academia is also competitively structured: positions are divided into tenure and 
non-tenure tracks. This competitive structure reinforces, even if indirectly, the opinion 
among many students and people outside of academia that the goal of academia is not 
really about attaining understanding but is a competitive endeavor about securing future 
employment.58    
   Moreover, academia has policies that encourage the perception that commercial or 
economic considerations are prioritized in academia. These policies include but are not 
limited to the promotion and emphasis on research and grant programs that are most 
economically beneficial for the institution; the creation of ties with corporations and 
businesses through fellowships and internships; and most explicitly, the selling of 
merchandise, licensing, and television rights for an academic institution’s athletic 
programs. Policies that emphasize commercial and economic considerations are found 
even in departments in the arts and humanities, not just in athletics and the sciences. 
Consider that a department that does not develop or retain a certain number of majors or 
                                                
58 It is easy to illustrate the failures in academia that are a result of this competitive structure by examining 
academic philosophy. To get tenure, an individual first must have a tenure-track position and second needs 
time for research to produce a certain amount of quality publications. For this individual in a tenure-track 
position to do their research, this person cannot be teaching a full load of classes. An academic institution 
then hires lecturers (non-tenure-track teaching positions) or uses graduate students to teach undergraduate 
courses. Most lecturer positions are low paying and not tenure track. Many lecturers also want to get 
tenure-track positions and, on top of teaching undergraduate courses, are attempting to do their own 
research to secure a tenure-track position. If a graduate student is teaching either to keep their funding or to 
get a future job, they must also engage in their own research, which means that at a certain point, many 
graduate students must decide to focus on teaching or researching.  
    Now consider all this from the perspective of undergraduate students. Most undergraduate students only 
encounter tenured faculty for one or two classes late into their academia career. The majority of 
undergraduate students’ education in philosophy is learned from lecturers and graduate students. Most 
tenured faculty, lecturers, and graduate students in philosophy have never had any formal training in the art 
and methods of teaching. Moreover, in academic philosophy there is a prevailing interest in not teaching 
philosophy to undergraduate students but rather to “engage and grapple with theoretical problems at a 
higher level that might have no practical implications.” Although not all faculty, lecturers, graduate 
students, and departments in philosophy hold this view, most do.  
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number of Ph.D. students in a program faces severe budgetary constraints for future 
development. Striving to retain a certain number of majors and, specifically, Ph.D. 
students leads departments to recruit students despite a complete lack of future 
employment. Consider the state of affairs in philosophy and the subsequent recruitment 
of Ph.D. students. Philosophy is in the midst of its worst job market in the last fifty years. 
Many research-one philosophy departments openly recruit students into Ph.D. programs 
even though students’ chances of getting a job are minuscule.59 
For all of these reasons and likely more, the perception that the non-ideal goal of 
academia is commercial or economic in nature has proliferated. Whether accurate or not, 
the perception works against implementing this virtues-based institutional rule because in 
some instances, following this rule conflicts with this goal. If the goal of academia is for 
commercial or economic placement, then there are motivations for using cognitive 
enhancers such as to competitively beat other students, which would be consistent with 
this goal but would not be permitted under a virtues-based institutional rule. A virtues-
based institutional rule, then, does not allow competitively beating other students as a 
permissible reason for using cognitive enhancers.  
To respond, consider that institutions can have multiple goals.  Take, for example, the 
National Football League (NFL). The NFL can have goals commercial or economic in 
nature, such as being a profitable business, as well as an ideal of human excellence, the 
athletic excellence of the game of football. The NFL certainly meets its commercial or 
economic goal of being a profitable business since the average NFL football team is 
worth $1.4 billion dollars (Badenhausen 2011). Yet the NFL strives to achieve an ideal 
                                                
59 This is particularly disturbing because the number of Ph.D.s on welfare has increased substantially, but 
acceptance into Ph.D. programs has not declined (Patton 2012). 
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goal of human excellence in the game of football. The NFL achieves, or at least strives to 
achieve, this goal by implementing certain guidelines, rules, and codes for both the on- 
and off-field conduct of its players, coaches, and owners.60 Even if these guidelines, 
rules, and codes inhibit some profit, they work to preserve the ideal of excellence in the 
game of football. The NFL is illustrative of an institution that has both economic and 
ideals of human excellence goals.  
It is reasonable to take academia as another institution that has the goals of 
commercial or economic placement of students and ideals of human excellence. 
Academic institutions do exist under non-ideal conditions and, by virtue of the market 
system, it is sensible that commercial or economic placement of students is one goal. Yet 
it is not clear as to how the goal of attaining understanding is inconsistent with the goal of 
commercial or economic placement of students. Understanding is an ideal of human 
excellence that students should seek to attain, but understanding as an element in one’s 
intellectual capacities is also important in a commercial or economic system. As Anders 
Sandberg and Julian Savulescu argue,  
Cognition [taken as intellectual capacities] is both a consumption good–it 
is often desirable and happiness promoting to have well-functioning 
cognitions–and a capital good that reduces risks, increases earning 
capacity, and forms a key part of human capital. (Sandberg and Savulescu 
2011, 96) 
 
Developing one’s intellectual capacities to attain understanding rather than simply obtain 
knowledge is valued not only for its own sake but also for instrumental benefits like 
securing future employment. Simply knowing information and facts but not connecting, 
drawing upon, and applying these facts results in people who have a mental outlook 
                                                
60 For example, players cannot use banned substances or modify their equipment; team owners are 
prohibited from spending unlimited amounts of money on recruiting players; and trades between teams are 
only valid when done within a sanctioned time period and under certain financial limits. 
 
 131 
similar to that of a psychopath. The goal of developing students’ intellectual capacities 
and attaining the ability to connect, draw upon, and apply information and facts to one’s 
experience is a goal of academia that would also be consistent with the goal of 
commercial or economic placement of students. Thus academia can be understood as 
having these two goals.   
While these are the two goals of academia, it is reasonable to think that attaining 
understanding is the primary goal and commercial or economic placement of students is 
the secondary goal. Generally speaking, while commercial or economic placement of 
students is an important goal, having the ability to connect, draw upon, and apply 
information and facts to one’s experience is a particular characteristic to want in 
employees. A remark attributed to Warren Buffet illustrates this: 
Somebody once said that in looking for people to hire, you look for three 
qualities: integrity, intelligence, and energy. And if they don't have the 
first, the other two will kill you. You think about it; it's true. If you hire 
somebody without the first, you really want them to be dumb and lazy. 
 
Understanding as an ability is not only important to have in an employee, but it also 
plays a key role in other elements of a commercial or economic system. There is some 
empirical evidence in social psychology that persons involved in commercial or 
economic transactions are often not content if these transactions are not fair to other 
parties involved, even while financially beneficial to themselves. In addition, economic 
studies have shown that an increase in income does not correlate to an increase in 
happiness (Tabibnia, Satpute and Lieberman 2008; Easterlin 1974; Easterlin 1994). So in 
general, even if one goal of academia is commercial or economic placement of students, 
it is likely more important that academia assists in achieving, or striving to achieve, the 
second goal of attaining understanding.  
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With regard to student use of cognitive enhancers, there are reasons for thinking that 
the primary goal of academia should be attaining understanding because it offers an in-
principle limitation on the use of enhancements in a way that the goal of commercial or 
economic placement of students does not. Consider that by virtue of pharmacology, the 
use of cognitive enhancers does not directly enable a student to attain understanding. This 
suggests an in-principle limitation on students using them. Although the use of cognitive 
enhancers has been shown to augment moderately an individual’s capacities of focus and 
concentration, these enhancers cannot, at least by themselves, enable a student to achieve 
or attain understanding. Moreover, student use of cognitive enhancers has not been 
shown to provide long-term improvement in academic activities (Smith and Farah 2011; 
Enck, Bossaer and Enck Forthcoming 2013).  
If commercial or economic placement of students was taken to be the primary goal of 
academia, then the use of cognitive enhancers might not be considered an educational 
tool or prop assisting or supporting in the development of understanding; instead, 
cognitive enhancers might be considered as a tool or prop assisting or supporting 
productivity. The key feature of cognitive enhancers might not be that they can 
moderately enhance the capacities of concentration and focus but that these 
enhancements provide alertness and wakefulness to those who are sleep deprived. When 
a person is sleep deprived their performance drops; typically, an individual’s ability to 
perform certain tasks decreases 30 to 45 percent after the first night of sleep deprivation 
and 50 to70 percent after a second night of sleep deprivation (Angus and Heslegrave 
1985). With the goal of academia taken to be commercial or economic placement of 
students, cognitive enhancers are likely to be considered as tools or props for assisting a 
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student in gaining future employment because they provide elevated levels of alertness 
and wakefulness.  
However, taking this as the primary goal of academia faces two problems. Similar to 
the common misconception that cognitive enhancers always directly augment cognition, 
the first problem is that alertness and wakefulness are not the same as being productive. 
While cognitive enhancers can assist students with being alert and awake, this does not 
mean that the student is engaged in academic activities rather than socializing, partying, 
or playing video games. Moreover, it does not mean that because a student is alert, 
awake, and focused on an academic activity that the student definitely comprehends that 
academic activity.   
The second problem is that cognitive enhancers are a schedule II drug. The risks 
involved with using these cognitive enhancers range from emotional and aggressive 
behavior, anxiety, and insomnia to depression, addiction, and withdrawal (Seppala and 
Rose 2010). If the use of cognitive enhancers is to assist and improve a student’s level of 
alertness and wakefulness, then there are pharmacological agents or mechanisms 
available that are far less risky.  
Understanding is an essential characteristic for persons to have in a market system, 
and attaining understanding has an in-principle limitation on student use of cognitive 
enhancers. These are reasons for holding that even under non-ideal conditions, the 
primary goal of academia should be attaining understanding and the secondary goal 
should be commercial or economic placement of students.  
Taking attaining understanding as the primary goal of academia works to orient 
institutional rules for governing student use of cognitive enhancers and orienting students 
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themselves toward the proper goal of academia. If attaining understanding is the primary 
goal of academia, then no conflict would occur if students were to follow this virtues-
based institutional rule.  
In addition, while an academic institution does not have a responsibility to ensure that 
students actually attain understanding, an academic institution does have the 
responsibility to implement institutional rules that facilitate students in striving toward 
this goal. Taking the primary goal of academia as attaining understanding is more likely 
to result in cognitive enhancers being considered as an educational prop or tool. If this is 
the case, then it is important that when students use these cognitive enhancers as 
educational props or tools, they are using them for the right reasons. This virtues-based 
institutional rule is at least one institutional rule that not only facilitates academia’s goal 
of attaining understanding but also works toward ensuring students use these cognitive 
enhancers for the right reasons.  
However, even if attaining understanding is the primary goal of academia and a 
virtues-based institutional rule does facilitate that cognitive enhancers are used for the 
right reasons, students are not idealized, virtuous students. In the current concept of 
academia, students do not possess the psychological dispositions of ideal, virtuous 
students and, in many cases, they are not always compliant with institutional rules. In the 
following section, I consider the challenge posed to this virtues-based institutional rule by 
non-ideal students. 
4.2.1 The Challenge of Non-ideal Students  
The challenge for this virtues-based institutional rule is that students do not possess 
the psychological dispositions of an ideal, virtuous student, and they are not always 
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compliant with institutional rules. That students in this concept of academia are not ideal 
may suggest to some that it is implausible for this virtues-based institutional rule to be 
implemented in non-ideal theory. This further implies that because this virtues-based 
institutional rule cannot be implemented in non-ideal theory, it is not likely to be any help 
to academic institutions, administrators, faculty, and staff currently working in academia.   
To begin, it is reasonable to grant that a virtuous student has never existed and that 
students in academia in non-ideal theory could never be virtuous. Moreover, it is also 
reasonable to acknowledge that whether a person exists in non-ideal theory or in the 
actual world, no person is ever an ideal of human excellence or virtuous. Yet the fact that 
students in this conception of academia do not possess the psychological dispositions of 
an ideal, virtuous student and that they are not always compliant with institutional rules 
are the reasons for academia to implement this virtues-based institutional rule. This 
virtues-based institutional rule has three elements—ideals of human excellence, 
motivation, and character— that would be particularly useful in governing and guiding 
non-ideal students. In the following sections, I examine each of these elements, beginning 
with the ideals of human excellence, in respect to non-ideal students.  
4.2.2 Ideals of Human Excellence for Students 
By stipulating that the permissible use of a cognitive enhancer is for reasons of 
seeking understanding or seeking accurate beliefs, this virtues-based institutional rule 
provides students with ideals of human excellence to aspire to and strive towards. 
Students should aspire towards attaining the virtues of seeking understanding and 
accurate beliefs because they are ideals of human excellence. It does not follow that if 
students are unable to attain these virtues, then these ideals of human excellence are any 
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less aspirational. First, since students do not possess the psychological dispositions of an 
ideal, virtuous student and are not always compliant with institutional rules, the 
importance of the ideals of human excellence is that they designate what an ideal, 
virtuous student would be like, such as, at a minimum, possessing the virtues of seeking 
understanding and seeking accurate beliefs. By designating the virtues of an ideal, 
virtuous student, this virtues-based institutional rule provides a goal or model for non-
ideal students to aspire towards.  
The importance of having an ideal person as a goal or model to aspire towards is 
illustrated by Abraham Lincoln’s response to the question of whether it was better to 
consider George Washington as perfect or fallible: 
Let us believe, as in the day of our youth, that Washington was spotless: it 
makes human nature better to believe that one human being was perfect: 
that human perfection is possible. (Whitney 1892, 45-46) 
 
The value of students aspiring towards these ideals of human excellence is not only that 
these virtues are instrumentally beneficial and good for their own sakes, but that by 
undertaking the process of developing these virtues, students will find them good and 
instrumentally beneficial even if they cannot fully attain these virtues. Students, in fact all 
people, fall short of perfection; yet students need ideals of excellence to aspire and strive 
towards, even if they cannot be attained.  
A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even 
glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always 
landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better 
country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias. (Wilde 2007, 247) 
 
That these non-ideal students lack the psychological dispositions of an ideal, virtuous 
student and are not always compliant with institutional rules can be considered reasons to 
implement this rule in non-ideal academic institutions. Although it is unlikely for these 
 
 137 
non-ideal students to attain these ideals of human excellence or virtues, this does not 
mean that these ideals of human excellence are not aspirational or not worth striving 
toward. 
4.2.3 Motivations of Non-Ideal Students 
Another reason for academia to use this virtues-based institutional rule is that it offers 
a standard for using cognitive enhancers. Generally speaking, good reasons for using 
cognitive enhancers are for self-improvement, seeking understanding, or seeking accurate 
beliefs. These reasons are not only conducive to the goal of academia, but they are also 
comparably better reasons for a student to use cognitive enhancers than for reasons of 
competitively beating other students, completing a boring activity, or obtaining a certain 
grade on a particular assignment. Since students do not possess ideal psychological 
dispositions and are not always compliant with institutional rules, these students are not 
likely to use cognitive enhancers for good reasons. This virtues-based institutional rule 
brings to the student’s attention that there are good reasons for using cognitive enhancers 
and offers a standard of good reasons for these students to rely on. Moreover, even if this 
standard for using cognitive enhancers, composed of reasons reflective of the ideals of 
human excellence, does not help a student decide whether his or her motivation is 
permissible, this virtues-based institutional rule provides the ethical outlook of a virtuous 
student as a guide to a non-ideal student.  
One might think that adopting the ethical outlook of a virtuous student cannot be 
helpful to these students since they do not possess ideal psychological dispositions. Yet 
the students’ lack of ideal psychological dispositions would be a reason for advocating an 
institutional rule that promotes adopting an ethical outlook. This ethical outlook attempts 
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to find resolutions to a dilemma of whether or not to use a cognitive enhancer by 
considering the question of permissibility directly and in respect to the acts and 
motivations of an ideal, virtuous student in that situation. To think either that adapting 
this ethical outlook couldn’t help a student because this student does not have an ideal 
psychological disposition or that this ethical outlook is silly because a virtuous student 
wouldn’t be in this position misunderstands what this ethical outlook attempts to provide 
to students. As Rachana Kamtekar points out:  
Critics who complain that this is useless advice because Socrates or Zeno 
wouldn’t be in these circumstances or because if one could figure out what 
Socrates or Zeno would do, then one wouldn’t need to think of their 
response at all are missing the point. Socrates and Zeno also find 
themselves in difficult situations (in love with Alcibiades, shipwrecked), 
and thinking of Socrates or Zeno or whoever else can put one in mind of 
possibilities for action that wouldn’t otherwise have occurred to one. 
(Kamtekar 2004, 487) 
 
The ethical outlook of a virtuous student allows for non-ideal students to find a solution 
to whether or not to use a cognitive enhancer from a perspective they likely would not 
have considered before.  
By offering a standard of good reasons against which to use cognitive enhancers as 
well an ethical outlook for helping students to clarify their reasons for using cognitive 
enhancers, this virtues-based institutional rule assists non-ideal students to possess, or at 
least to know, the right reasons for using cognitive enhancers.  
4.2.4 Character of Non-Ideal Students 
According to this virtues-based institutional rule, choosing to use cognitive enhancers 
for reasons pertaining to the ideals of human excellence rather than for other reasons is 
reflective of a student having good character. In respect to the use of cognitive enhancers, 
this rule provides a way for non-ideal students to understand that the use of enhancements 
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reflects on their character. By linking the use of cognitive enhancers to a student’s 
character, this virtues-based institutional rule holds that a student’s reason for choosing to 
use an enhancement illuminates the sort of character they possess. That these students’ 
psychological dispositions are not ideal means that if this virtues-based institutional rule 
is implemented, then these students could eventually come to understand that although 
certain acts may be beneficial in the moment, these acts can damage their character in the 
long term.  
This virtues-based institutional rule’s three elements—the ideals of human 
excellence, motivation, and character—function in a manner that makes this rule prudent 
to implement in a conception of academia where students are not ideal. Now consider 
that if this virtues-based institutional rule that creates an expected pattern of behavior 
were implemented, then it would likely shape the ethos of non-ideal students. 
If this virtues-based institutional rule was implemented as an institutional rule that 
creates an expected pattern of behavior, then this rule not only provides a standard for 
these non-ideal students to use cognitive enhancers but also provides an expectation that 
at least one reason that students have for using cognitive enhancers is reflective of the 
ideals of human excellence. Moreover, the expectation is that the use of cognitive 
enhancers by other students is also motivated by reasons of self-improvement, seeking 
understanding, or seeking accurate beliefs. This virtues-based institutional rule is likely to 
result in being taken as a group norm with the establishment of carry-over behavior for 
students. According to Daniel Feldman, carry-over behavior results from the 
establishment of a formal or informal group norm:  
Such carry-over of individual behaviors from past situations can increase 
the predictability of group members’ behavior in new settings and 
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facilitate the task accomplishment. For instance, students and professors 
bring with them fairly constant sets of expectations from class to class. As 
a result, students do not have to relearn continually their roles from class 
to class; they know for instance, if they come in late to take a seat quietly 
at the back of the room without being told. Professors also do not have to 
relearn continually their roles, they know for instance not to mumble, 
scribble in small print on the blackboard, or to be vague when making 
course assignments. (Feldman 1984, 52) 
 
This virtues-based institutional rule provides carry-over behavior for students. In thus 
providing an expected pattern of behavior and motivations structured and developed by 
the ideals of human excellence, the rule likely would change even non-ideal students’ 
ethos regarding the proper use of cognitive enhancers. The ethos of these non-ideal 
students would, in time, come to regard a student who uses cognitive enhancers for 
reasons not reflective of the ideals of human excellence with disdain and as having poor 
character.  These non-ideal students would also come to regard a student who uses 
cognitive enhancers for reasons that are reflective of the ideals of human excellence as 
reflective of good character and as the kind of student wanted by other students and 
academic institutions.  
If this virtues-based institutional rule were an internalized institutional rule, while 
these students may not initially possess the psychological dispositions of an ideal student 
and may not always comply with institutional rules, they could change over the course of 
an academic career. These non-ideal students come to appreciate the importance of 
seeking understanding and seeking accurate beliefs as the necessary reasons to have when 
using a cognitive enhancer. Moreover, this virtues-based institutional rule shapes the 
ethos of all non-ideal students so that there is not only an expectation for student behavior 
but also an emphasis on the use of cognitive enhancers as being indicative of a student’s 
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character. The ethos of these students would regard the improper use of cognitive 
enhancers by another student as evidence of the type of character ill-suited for academia.   
However, there will be three challenges in implementing this virtues-based 
institutional rule in the non-ideal conception of academia. First, this rule may shape the 
ethos of students by developing and structuring the motivations of students, but it relies 
too heavily on the notion that students will refrain or restrain themselves from using 
cognitive enhancers for certain reasons because of how it would reflect on their character. 
Character is something students accumulate through their actions, but it is not something 
that regulates their actions.  Second, a student’s motivation—the condition that 
determines whether their use of cognitive enhancers is permissible — is not readily 
accessible or easily identifiable to academic institutions, administrators, faculty, and staff. 
This means that a student’s motivation cannot be a relevant consideration and also cannot 
be the condition that determines permissibility. Finally, even if motivations and character 
are considered as relevant considerations for assessing student use of cognitive 
enhancers, there is no manner in which academic institutions, administrators, faculty, and 
staff could enforce this virtues-based institutional rule.  
I address these challenges and, in doing so, offer more details on this virtues-based 
institutional rule working in a non-ideal conception of academia and in currently existing 
academic institutions.  
4.3 Character and Students   
According to this virtues-based institutional rule, the use of a cognitive enhancer is an 
action that reflects on the character of a student. This virtues-based institutional rule 
relies on a conception of character that is an active element of a student’s practical 
 
 142 
reasoning. Yet conceptually, character is something that accumulates over the course of a 
person’s life, or in this case a student’s academic career, via her actions, but it is not 
something that refrains, restrains, or motivates a student to act in certain ways.  
To respond, I think it is possible to consider a student’s character as having more of 
an active role in a person’s practical reasoning than one would typically think because 
character is often a reason for acting. To begin, let’s investigate character and reason-
responsiveness. Conceptually, character is the representation of a person’s non-mortal 
worth. A person’s character is not only an individual composite of all her properties and 
qualities, it is also something that is constituted by an individual’s previous choices, 
attitudes, behaviors, and values.61 This suggests that at a certain point, an individual takes 
an active role regarding certain choices, attitudes, behaviors, and values. Under normal 
conditions, it makes no sense to hold that a person did not have an active role in the sort 
of character he possesses.  
Now it might turn out that a person is not completely responsible (possibly legally or 
morally) for their character. For example, an individual growing up in abhorrent 
conditions involving extreme child abuse is a consideration that mitigates her 
responsibility for the sort of person she has become. Yet even in these cases where an 
individual is not responsible for the sort of person he is, it does not necessarily mean that 
this individual was completely passive or inactive in his choices, attitudes, behaviors, and 
values. A person does have an active role, even if minimally, in the formation of his 
character. 
                                                
61 That a person’s character is constituted by their choices, behaviors, and values is why this conception is 
analogous to the philosophical notion of “self,” which furthermore spans across issues of self-conception, 
autonomy, agency, and practical identity (Bratman 2000; Korsgaard 2009; Velleman 1997). 
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Next, as I have assumed throughout this research project, it is plausible to hold that 
persons are reason-responsive, meaning that a person is responsive to a broad range of 
rational consideration (McKenna 2009).62  In respect to practical reasoning, a person 
deliberates on undertaking certain acts, is responsive to a broad range of rational 
considerations, and then undertakes a certain act. If a person has an active role regarding 
her character and is reason-responsive, then it is sensible to think that persons often do 
act for reasons of character. In other words, character can be at least one kind of rational 
consideration in a person’s practical reasoning.  
A person might refrain from or do certain acts because of how these acts affect their 
character. Consider that it is for reasons of character that a person refrains from acting in 
certain ways such as laughing at someone’s tragedy or spitting on the grave of an enemy, 
even though these are permissible. To laugh at tragedy or spit on the grave of an enemy is 
an act that reflects poorly on an individual’s character and, in turn, this is a reason against 
doing it. Alternatively, it is for reasons of character why a person does act in certain ways 
such as helping an elderly person across the street or being magnanimous to one’s enemy, 
even though these are not required. To display compassion and magnanimity reflects well 
on a person’s character and is a reason for doing it.  
All things considered, a person’s character is something of value. A person with poor 
character is often not only despised or pitied but also not considered to be the sort of 
person who possesses the attitudes, behaviors, and values that an individual should want. 
                                                
62 Reason-responsiveness is typically considered in respect to the metaphysical debate concerning free will 
and determinism and relates to one account of compatiblism put forward by John Martin Fischer and Mark 
Ravizza. This conception of reason-responsiveness focuses on the metaphysics of a responsibility and 
control even under deterministic conditions. While this project’s use of reason-responsiveness could be 
taken as a subspecies of this conception of reason-responsiveness, because my project’s focus is not on 
metaphysics, all that is necessary for a person to be reason-responsive is simply to be responsive to a broad 
range of rational considerations (Fischer and Ravizza 1998; McKenna 2009). 
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Conversely, a person with good character is admired and possesses the sort of attitudes, 
behaviors, and values that an individual should want.  
That a person values good character, or at least does not want to have poor character, 
makes it plausible that character can be thought of as regulating, even if in a limited way, 
a person’s acts and behavior in a particular circumstance. However, some may consider 
this conception of character as deviating too far from the notion of character as being a 
representation of a person’s non-mortal worth. To alleviate this apprehension, I 
acknowledge that ascription of good character cannot be accurately done from 
observation of a single act. Just as in the case of virtues, a single act does not clearly 
indicate whether a person has a good or bad character. So there needs to be caution about 
acribing character to persons because of their act or particular action.63 Yet while people 
often do incorrectly ascribe character from a single act, this does not mean or provide 
conclusive evidence persons are not active about their choices, attitudes, behaviors, and 
values or have reasons relating to their character for acting in certain situations.  
If we return to examining a virtues-based institutional rule in academia, it becomes 
clear how this institutional rule relies on character to refrain, restrain, or motivate a 
student to use cognitive enhancers in the proper way. The use of cognitive enhancers for 
reasons that are not reflective of the ideals of human excellence reflects poorly on 
character, providing a reason for students to refrain from using cognitive enhancers in 
this way. Because using cognitive enhancers for reasons reflective of the ideals of human 
excellence is indicative of a student having a good character, it is a reason for a student to 
                                                
63 Incorrectly ascribing character to persons is a key element to the situationalists, such as Gilbert Harman 
and John Doris, who hold that such things as character and character traits do not exist (Harman 2000; 
Doris 2002; Doris 1998). 
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use cognitive enhancers in this way. Character in this limited way can sensibly be 
understood as regulating the acts of students.  
4.4 Motivations as Relevant Consideration and Permissibility Condition 
The second challenge is that because a student’s motivation is not readily accessible 
or easily identifiable, this virtues-based institutional rule’s reliance on motivation is a 
problem. Academic institutions, administrators, faculty, and staff cannot look at a 
student’s assignment and ascertain if a student used a cognitive enhancer while working 
on it. Even if it was known that a student used a cognitive enhancer, it is difficult to 
determine motivations. For example, a student could tell administrators, faculty, and staff 
that the cognitive enhancers were used for reasons reflective of the ideals of human 
excellence, but that student could simply be deceptive about his actual motivations. 
Alternatively, a student could tell administrators, faculty, and staff that he used cognitive 
enhancers for reasons reflective of the ideals of human excellence when the student could 
be genuinely and unintentionally unaware of his actual motivations. Therefore, by not 
being readily accessible or easily identifiable to academia, a student’s motivation cannot 
be a relevant consideration or the condition that determines a permissible use of a 
cognitive enhancer, and, therefore, this virtues-based institutional rule cannot work in 
non-ideal theory.  
To respond, one reasonable assumption is that students do have motivations for acting 
in general and do have motivations for using cognitive enhancers in particular. Because 
students have reasons for using cognitive enhancers, although they are not readily 
accessible or easily identifiable, it seems that motivations are still at least one 
consideration in an evaluation of a student’s use of enhancements. To understand the 
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extent of motivation’s role as a consideration, there needs to be an assessment of two 
questions: If a person’s motivation is not readily accessible or easily identifiable, can it 
be considered a relevant consideration? If a person’s motivation is not readily accessible 
or easily identifiable, can it determine the permissibility of an action?  
In respect to both questions, the answer is yes. Consider that although a person’s 
motivation is not readily accessible or easily identifiable, it is still a relevant 
consideration in the United States’ legal system.64 A person’s motivation is the 
consideration used to determine whether an individual is charged with first-degree 
murder instead of second-degree murder or is charged with felony drug possession 
instead of misdemeanor drug possession. The difference between being charged with 
first-degree murder and second-degree murder depends upon whether a person had the 
intent (motivation) to kill another person. For drug possession, the difference between 
being charged with a misdemeanor and felony depends upon whether a person had the 
intent (motivation) to sell or distribute illegal drugs. Therefore, although a person’s 
motivation might not be readily accessible or easily identifiable, that it is still considered 
relevant in the United States’ legal system, in the world as it currently exists, makes it 
plausible to be considered as relevant in the evaluation of a student’s use of cognitive 
enhancers.   
If student’s motivations can be taken as relevant considerations, it is reasonable that 
they can also be taken as determining the permissibility of their use of cognitive 
                                                
64 One might object and counter that it is “intent” and not “motivation” in that is used in the legal system. 
However, since motivation has been defined in this research project as being the reason a person did a 
particular act or behavior, then intent could be regarded as a type of motivation. This move is unlikely to 
please philosophers working in theory of action, but this not a major problem since (i) nothing in this 
research project’s account of action, reasons, and motivation suggests that it could not be altered into an 
account that focuses on action, reason, and intention, similar to T.M. Scanlon’s account presented in What 
We Owe to Each Other and (ii) this project focuses specifically on actions and motivations in the normative 
and not the metaphysical issue (Scanlon 1998, 17-77; Davidson 1963).  
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enhancers. Consider that motivations, while not readily accessible or easily identifiable, 
are often the consideration that determines the permissibility of palliative sedation and 
terminal sedation. Palliative sedation is when a physician uses sedation solely as 
treatment for managing a patient’s intractable symptoms (Cellarius 2008; Lynch 2003). 
Terminal sedation is a subspecies of palliative sedation and occurs in cases where the 
only treatment left available for physicians to manage a patient’s refractory symptoms is 
sedation and, as often was the case, life-sustaining treatment would be withdrawn or 
withheld (Enck 1991: 2002).   
Although palliative sedation and terminal sedation lead to the deep and continuous 
sedation of the patient and might be seen as infringing upon a patient’s autonomy or as 
hastening their death, in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and many other 
countries these treatments are legally sanctioned specifically on the grounds that it is the 
physician’s motivation for sedating the patient —palliative management of intractable 
symptoms— that determines the physician’s actions as being permissible (Quill, Dresser 
and Brock 1997).65 While a physician’s motivation is not readily accessible or easily 
identifiable, it still can determine the permissibility of an action. Therefore, because  
motivation is still the consideration that determines the permissibility of a physician’s 
action in the practice of medicine and of the degree of a charge in the United States’ legal 
system—in the world as it currently exists—this makes it plausible to consider a 
student’s motivation as determining the permissibility of using cognitive enhancers.   
                                                
65Empirical evidence does not conclusively show that opioids and sedation in fact speed up the dying 
process in terminal patients (Sykes and Thorns 2003) (Morita, Tei and Inoue 2001). Moreover, 20 percent 
of patients who receive palliative sedation at M.D. Anderson Cancer Center are eventually brought out of 
sedation and discharged.  
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In the case of implementing this virtues-based institutional rule in a non-ideal 
conception of academia, although a student’s motivation is not immediately available or 
straightforward to academic institutions, administrators, faculty, and staff, there are 
reasons for thinking that this virtues-based institutional could still work if implemented.  
4.5 Honor Code 
The final challenge is that even if motivations and character are relevant 
considerations in respect to student use of cognitive enhancers in non-ideal students and 
academic institutions, there is no manner in which academic institutions, administrators, 
faculty, and staff could enforce this virtues-based institutional rule. I concede that 
enforcement of the rule is problematic; however, the view that because it relies on 
motivation and character, there is no manner for enforcing the rule is not completely 
accurate. In fact, currently existing academic institutions do use institutional rules that 
focus on the motivations and character of students: honor codes.  
In the case of honor codes concerning cheating, it is honor as a motivation that could 
be a reason a student does not cheat. In many instances, students may refrain from 
cheating for reasons of honor. Although cheating on an exam may allow them to beat 
their follow students, many students will choose not to cheat because these actions reflect 
poorly on their character. To perform certain actions such as cheating reflects poorly on 
the character of that student.  
There is in fact empirical evidence to show that honor codes are an effective method 
for academic institutions to implement to reduce or prevent students from cheating. 
Research by Donald McCabe, Linda Trevino, and Kenneth Butterfield has shown that 
instances of students cheating in academia increased in a 30-year period from 1964 to 
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1994 (McCabe, Trevino and Butterfield 2001; McCabe, Butterfield and Trevino 2003).66 
Yet while there was an overall increase in cheating, McCabe, Trevino, and Butterfield’s 
research indicated that there is a considerable difference between the levels of cheating 
occurring at academic institutions with honor codes and those without honor codes: 
Clearly, code students [students at institutions with robust and endorsed 
codes] sense that they are part of a special community that demands 
compliance with standards in exchange for the many privileges associated 
with honor codes. (McCabe, Trevino and Butterfield 1999, 230) 
 
Students in academic institutions with honor codes felt that because they were given 
special privileges such as un-proctored exams, it was of particular importance to follow 
their institution’s honor codes. Not following the codes was taken to be disrespectful to 
the institution and an indication of poor character in the student. Evidence from another 
of McCabe, Trevino, and Butterfield’s studies indicated that academic institutions with a 
strong honor code shaped the attitudes and sentiments of students about the way they 
approached their professional environment after graduation (McCabe, Trevino and 
Butterfield 1996).  
As McCabe, Trevino, and Butterfield concluded: 
The primary implication of this work is that cheating can be most 
effectively addressed at the institutional level. On many campuses, the 
fundamental elements of an honor code may be a particularly useful tool 
for colleges and universities who seek to reduce cheating. (McCabe, 
Trevino and Butterfield 2001, 228) 
 
Honor codes are an institutional rule used in academic institutions existing under non-
ideal conditions to reduce or prevent student cheating, and they rely on motivations and 
character. That honor codes are being effectively implemented in current academic 
                                                
66 Cheating was broadly stipulated as plagiarism, falsifying a bibliography, and failing to cite properly.   
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institutions suggests that it is reasonable to think that this virtues-based institutional rule 
could also be implemented as a method for governing student use of cognitive enhancers.  
4.6 Virtues-based Institutional Rule as an Honor Code  
If this virtues-based institutional rule were implemented, it would stipulate the 
conditions under which a student’s use of cognitive enhancers results in their gaining or 
losing respect in an academic institution. Although respect and character are distinct 
conceptions, it is reasonable that to be worthy of respect in academia suggests that a 
student needs to be regarded as a certain kind of character, broadly construed as a good 
character or, put otherwise, as being the right sort of student. Under this virtues-based 
institutional rule, by using cognitive enhancers for reasons of self-improvement, seeking 
understanding, and accurate beliefs, a student accumulates good character—which in turn 
is a condition for being respected or held in high esteem.  
In greater detail, consider the roles that character and respect have in enforcing this 
institutional rule. The motivations of self-improvement, seeking understanding, and 
accurate beliefs are provided and emphasized as (i) the proper reasons for using cognitive 
enhancers and (ii) as reasons for using cognitive enhancers that reflect well on an 
individual’s character. A student’s use of a cogntive enhancer is linked to her character, 
and in turn, this provides a reason of character for the student to have the proper 
motivations when using enhancements. In addition, because good character is an 
antecedent condition for a student to gain respect is another reason for students to have 
the right reasons to use cognitive enhancers. 
Although honoring a student is most prominently illustrated when a student is 
respected or held in high esteem by academia, this virtues-based institutional rule sets the 
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conditions under which students can gain or lose respect. Respect is a powerful way to 
govern people’s conduct: 
We don’t give soldiers bonuses for bravery, we give them medals; and 
more important, we honor them. We give them the respect we know they 
deserve. (Appiah 2010, 193) 
 
The role of respect and the significance of being held in esteem by an institution not only 
are ways to govern the conduct of soldiers but also in this instance provide a way to 
govern and enforce student use of cognitive enhancers by specifying the stipulations for 
being eligible or worthy of respect. 
Therefore, similar to an honor code concerning cheating, this virtues-based 
institutional rule would rely on character and respect to govern student use of cognitive 
enhancers in academia. By providing the conditions for gaining, or at least not losing 
respect, in terms of students’ character, which in turn depends upon students having the 
motivations of self-improvement, seeking understanding, and accurate beliefs when using 
cognitive enhancers, this virtues-based institutional rule offers a method for enforcing the 
proper use of enhancements    
4.7 Accountability of Character 
If implemented in current academic institutions, this virtues-based institutional rule 
can immediately govern student use of cognitive enhancers in current academic 
institutions because it makes students accountable for their character. Although this 
project’s focus narrowly centers on the use of enhancements, real students have an active 
role in many of their choices, attitudes, behaviors, and values. This means they can 
determine the sort of character they want to have by their actions. It also means that if 
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students have, to some degree, an active role in their character development, then it is 
reasonable to evaluate a student’s character.  
Traditionally, character has always been greatly valued in academia. As a remark 
attributed to Dean of Vanderbilt University Madison Sarratt illustrates:  
Today I am going to give you two examinations, one in trigonometry and 
one in honesty. I hope you will pass them both, but if you must fail one, 
let it be trigonometry, for there are many good [people] in this world today 
who cannot pass an examination in trigonometry, but there are no good 
[people] in the world who cannot pass an examination in honesty. 
 
Sarratt’s view is that while failing a trigonometry exam might be bad for the student in 
the short term, cheating to pass the exam and displaying poor character is far worse.  
Not only is it important for students to display good character in academia, but 
students are also traditionally held accountable for their character. This accountability of 
character is because being a student is to occupy a certain identity or role. A person can 
have a multiplicity of identities or roles, from familial to social to professional. When a 
person enters into an academic institution for undergraduate education, this individual 
undergoes organization socialization, meaning that he or she takes on the identity or role 
of a student (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Feldman 1981). Occupying the identity or role 
not only means accepting certain values of an institution, such as the goals and aims of 
education, but also having particular responsibilities (Strike 1983). At least one 
responsibility of students is to display conduct reflective of good character.  
Moreover, many existing academic institutions have rules that hold students 
accountable for the character their actions reflect. To begin, consider student-athletes as a 
clear example. Not only are student-athletes expected to maintain a certain level of 
scholarly performance, but there are also clearly indicated rules about displaying good 
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character in their particular sport or in activities outside the confines of the academic 
institution.67 Students not participating in collegiate athletics are also held to rules 
concerning character. For example, there are regular occurrences—when students are 
confrontational with professors or other students, when they have extremely low GPAs, 
or when they are failing a number of courses —in which a student is put on probation, 
officially reprimanded, or expelled on the grounds that their conduct was not reflective of 
the proper character of students and was in violation of the institution’s policies.  
Even with institutional rules that do not directly relate to students’ character, there is 
an underlying notion of good character as being an implicit reason for this rule. For 
example, consider rules concerning plagiarism. That a student should not turn in another 
person’s work or ideas and claim it as his own does not, at least initially, seem to be a 
question of character. However, consider rules concerning plagiarism for those not in 
academia and those who are students. If an individual is not in academia and plagiarizes 
another person’s work or idea but does not publish it, seek profit, or violate copyright or 
trademark laws, it is difficult to punish this person with any legal sanctions. Outside 
academia, there are instances of plagiarism in which persons can legally be punished. At 
best one might take a person who plagiarizes in this way as having poor character, but it 
is difficult to hold them accountable for having poor character. In contrast, consider a 
student who plagiarizes. Specifically, I am thinking of instances in which a student uses 
another student’s work, not one that has been published or copyrighted. A student who 
                                                
67 NCAA Bylaw 2.4: The Principles of Sportsmanship and Ethical Conduct. For intercollegiate 
athletics to promote the character development of participants to enhance the integrity of higher 
education and to promote civility in society, student-athletes, coaches, and all others associated 
with these athletics programs and events should adhere to such fundamental values as respect, 
fairness, civility, honesty and responsibility. These values should be manifest not only in athletics 
participation but also in the broad spectrum of activities affecting the athletics program (National 
Collegiate Athletic Association 2009). 
 
 154 
plagiarizes and is caught is punished even if (i) this student was not going to publish or 
seek profit with this work and (ii) the student who was plagiarized allowed and gave 
permission for this to happen. A student is punished for plagiarism because of 
institutional rules prohibiting plagiarism, but at a more fundamental level, because 
plagiarism does not reflect well on a student’s character. In other words, plagiarism is not 
the kind of action that academia expects from students.   
Under this virtues-based institutional rule, students are held accountable by an 
academic institution and by their peers (or possibly even by themselves) for using 
cognitive enhancers in a manner that reflects well on their character. A student who uses 
a cognitive enhancer for reasons of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs reflects 
good character and, all things being equal, is likely going to be respected by the academic 
institution and her peers. Conversely, a student who uses cognitive enhancers for 
improper reasons reflects poor character and, all things being equal, is likely not going to 
be respected by the academic institution and her peers.  According to this virtues-based 
institutional rule, although it might be bad for a student to do poorly on an exam, it is 
worse for a student’s character to use cognitive enhancers for improper reasons because 
this reflects poorly on their character. It is important for students that they not only use 
cognitive enhancers for the right reasons but that uses of these enhancements do reflect 
on their character. This institutional rule governs student use of enhancements by holding 
them accountable for the character that certain uses of enhancements entail.  
4.8 Differences Between Honor Codes and Virtues-based Institutional Rule  
The case for this virtues-based institutional rule being implemented in existing 
academic institutions is that it provides a method of enforcing that students use cognitive 
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enhancers for the right reasons on the grounds that it is similar to an honor codes. 
However, it needs to be noted that there are two significant differences between honor 
codes and this virtues-based rule. First, they differ in regard to the actions they are meant 
to govern. Specifically, an honor code concerning cheating—taken as plagiarism, 
falsifying a bibliography, and failing to cite properly— governs actions that are clearly 
regarded as being prohibited by most reasonable people. Yet it is not clear that having an 
improper motivation for using a cognitive enhancer is an action that even most 
reasonable people take as something to prohibit. Even if cheating and the improper use of 
enhancements are taken as being prohibited actions, the reasons why do seem relevantly 
different. This is likely to impact the importance students regard there to be in following 
a virtues-based rule and also on administrators, faculty, and staff enforcing this rule.68 
Second, honor codes and this virtues-based rule differ in the clarity of the 
repercussions that violations will have on students. Consider this clarity simply in regard 
to a student’s esteem and character. Under normal conditions, a student with good 
character and esteem who is caught cheating loses esteem in their standing with the 
academic institution and their peers as well as generally being regarded as having poor 
character. Yet if a student were found to have violated this virtues-based rule, it is not at 
all clear how it would impact this student’s esteem or character. Moreover, in conjunction 
with the previous difference, there is an issue in assessing hard cases of virtues-based rule 
violations. For example, the student is held in high esteem and has good character but is 
simply experimenting with using enhancements, or this student only uses an enhancement 
improperly once, or this student is held in high esteem and has good character in all other 
                                                
68 In fact, that faculty often take an individualized or selective approach toward student cheating has been 




domains of academia except that he or she consistently uses cognitive enhancers 
improperly. As these instances show, a significant difference between honor codes and 
this virtues-based rule is the clarity of the repercussions for violations.  
These differences point to certain disadvantages in implementing a virtues-based 
institutional rule to govern and guide student use of cognitive enhancers. Certainly there 
are other institutional rules that are more feasible. An institutional rule that simply 
stipulates the use of a cognitive enhancer as being permitted or prohibited without relying 
on considerations of motivation and character (or even respect) is more feasible and 
provides a single determinate answer.  
It cannot be overlooked that a virtues-based institutional rule differs significantly 
from an honor code and that it is not the most feasible rule to implement in current 
academic institutions. Yet this virtues-based institutional rule still provides the following 
advantages: first, as I examine in the following section, it is able to handle concerns about 
the medicalization of cognitive enhancers in academia. Second, it offers a mature 
approach that develops the way students think about the use of enhancements in 
academia. Third, with it one resists oversimplifying issues of enhancement in academia. 
4.9 Medicalization of Cognitive Enhancers   
One concern about the use of enhancements in academia is medicalization, defined as 
“a process in which non-medical problems become defined and treated as medical 
problems, usually in terms of illness and spending” (Conrad, Mackie and Mehrotra 2010, 
1943). According to Peter Conrad (2007; 2010), medicalization is a social process, and in 
principle is neither good nor bad. Whether medicalization is judged as being good or bad 
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depends on many considerations such as consequences, rules, motivations, and relevant 
impact on economics and institutional practices.  
For Conrad, medicalization is bad when it is over-medicalization, meaning that 
individuals, communities, and government healthcare systems are burdened with costs for 
treating questionable medical conditions or disorders (Conrad 2007: Conrad, Mackie and 
Mehrotra 2010). An example of over-medicalization is categorizing pains associated with 
normal aging as being Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) instead of simply 
holding them to be normal pains that occur in the aging process.69 Patients seeking 
treatment for CRPS burden a healthcare system via processing, regulatory, and 
transaction costs.  
In the case of the medicalization of pharmaceuticals, Carl Elliot (2003) contends that 
medicalization is bad when using these enhancements leads to people making and 
maintaining choices that are inauthentic to their own values; for example, when a person 
relies on anti-depressants or an anti-anxiety pharmaceutical to be more outgoing or to 
endure a situation, even if this goes against their own values.70 Jonathan Lehrer recounts 
a story of a psychiatrist who was taken aback by a patient’s response when asked if the 
anti-depressants were working: 
 “Yes, they [anti-depressants] are working great … I feel so much better. 
But I’m still married to the same alcoholic son of a bitch. It’s just now 
he’s tolerable” (Lehrer 2010, 42).71  
 
                                                
69 I take this example from Erik Parens who, in turn, was suggested this example by an anonymous 
reviewer because it clearly is an instance of over-medicalization (Parens 2011). 
70 Although depression and anxiety disorders have some symptom overlap, they are not the same. A 
common problem for even advanced clinicians is making an accurate diagnosis. This is a matter of serious 
concern because anti-depressants and anti-anxiety pharmaceuticals, when prescribed for inaccurate 
diagnoses, often have the paradoxical effect on a patient (e.g., anti-depressants for anxiety often make a 
patient’s anxiety disorders worse and anti-anxiety pharmaceuticals for depression often make a patient’s 
depression worse).  
71 This quote is also used by Erik’s Parens ( 2011). 
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In this case, the patient is being inauthentic to her values by using these pharmaceuticals.  
Also, for many psychiatrists, medicalization is bad when normal emotional states 
such as shyness or sadness are regarded as being conditions or disorders that require 
medical treatment. One problem I encounter often is that when physicians give patients a 
diagnosis of cancer, they often immediately prescribe anti-depressants. Yet this blocks 
the grieving process since the patient is not depressed because they have depression; they 
are depressed because they cancer. By medicalizing sadness and preventing patients from 
going through the normal and natural grieving process, many patients are unprepared for 
the physical and emotional difficulties of chemotherapy or making end-of-life decisions.   
Nevertheless, there are reasons for thinking that under certain conditions, turning a 
non-medical problem into a medical problem is good. For example, turning childbirth 
into a medical condition has resulted in fewer risks and better outcomes for both mothers 
and newborns (Conrad, Mackie and Mehrotra 2010). For psychiatrists and psychologists, 
the reliance on pharmacology instead of psychotherapeutic treatments (“talking” or 
behavioral therapies) is not always wrong in-and-of-itself and often better helps patients. 
Erik Parens summarizes this view:72  
If a pharmacological and psychotherapeutic means can both achieve the 
same end —improving how one experiences herself and the world— then 
it is irrational and perhaps inhumane to prefer the more strenuous and 
expensive means. It’s irrational not to take a shortcut when improving 
human well-being is the destination. (Parens 2011, 5) 
 
For the moment, this research project remains neutral on whether the medicalization 
of cognitive enhancers is to be regarded, all things considered, as good or bad.73 While 
neutral on this question, because this virtues-based approach and institutional rule does 
                                                
72 This is not Erik Parens’ view. Like this research project, he holds a more moderated and nuanced view of 
regarding when medicalization is regarded as good or bad.  
73 I return to this concern in the final chapter.  
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make it more permissible for students to use cognitive enhancers in academia, the 
following sections focus on addressing concerns about the medicalization of cognitive 
enhancers in academia. 
A concern about the medicalization of cognitive enhancers in implementing this 
virtues-based approach and institutional rule is that it will likely result in three 
misconceptions. Addressing these misconceptions is important since they are likely to 
occur (whether the medicalization of cognitive enhancers in academia turns out to be 
good or bad). The first misconception is that the medicalization of cognitive enhancers 
will lead students to misunderstand the notion of proficient functioning of cognitive 
capacities. Students may come to think that unless their cognitive capacities of focus or 
concentration are functioning at above-proficient levels, they have a medical impairment. 
While this leads to many different problems, at least one problem is the inevitable burden 
there will be on the health system. It was estimated that in 2005, spending on behavioral 
disorder medication, the classification under which cognitive enhancers often fall, was 
$4657.5 million (Conrad, Mackie and Mehrotra 2010, 1946). Clearly not all of the 
$4657.5 million was on pharmaceuticals for enhancement, but it cannot be denied that 
spending on pharmaceuticals for enhancement did contribute to this amount. In 
comparison, in 2010, there were 1,529,560 new reported cancer cases and 569,490 people 
died from cancer in the United States (Jemal, et al. 2010) (Carter and Nguyen 2012). 
While cancer resulted in all of these deaths, the 2010 National Cancer Institute’s fiscal 
budget for cancer research was only $1.5 billon (National Institutes of Health and the 
Department of Health and Human Services 2012). One might wonder whether instead of 
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spending money on pharmaceuticals for enhancement, the money would have been better 
served going to cancer research.  
The second misconception is about the value of academia. The medicalization of 
cognitive enhancements leads to hyper-competitive students accepting misconceptions 
not only about the goals of academia—which this research project mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter—but also in respect to academic achievement.74 Medicalizing 
students’ use of cognitive enhancers is likely to contribute further to the misconception 
that the value of academia for the student is on academic achievement rather than on 
them attaining understanding. Put otherwise, for students, the misconception does not 
focus on their development of an ability to draw upon and connect information and facts 
from academia to apply to their own life experiences but rather on whether they got A’s 
in their course.  
 The third misconception, the most dangerous, is that the medicalization of cognitive 
enhancers is likely to lead to students believing, incorrectly, that these cognitive 
enhancers carry little to no risk to their health or well-being. This misconception is 
dangerous because cognitive enhancers are highly addictive pharmaceuticals. The rates at 
which students in academia are using them without medical supervision is increasing, and 
an honest assessment of our understanding of addiction, in both a medical and non-
medical sense, shows it to be rather basic. Only within the past ten years has our 
understanding of the neuroscience of the dopamine system’s involvement in decision-
making started to become clear. This dopamine system interacts with the reward center of 
the brain. Cognitive enhancers rely on and often rewire a person’s dopamine system, 
                                                
74 Michael Sandel touches on this hyper-competitive notion, holding that enhancements are often used to 
pursue a misguided notion of perfection (Sandel 2007).  
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which has implications—not yet fully understood by neuroscience or pharmacology—for 
the likelihood of addiction (Smith and Farah 2011).   
Also, it is necessary to be aware that the use of pharmaceuticals, even in situations 
where they are used exclusively as treatment, often exposes people to unpredicted—and 
surprisingly disturbing—risks. For example, 6 to 14 percent of patients receiving 
Dopamine Replacement Therapy (DRT) develop impulse control disorders such as 
pathological gambling, compulsive buying, and hypersexuality (Ambermoon, et al. 2010; 
Weintraub, et al. 2010; Carter, Ambermoon and Hall 2011). This risk was unknown for 
many years, but recently, the implications of this risk have been gaining attention, such as 
in the case of a prominent community member in Tasmania engaging in prostitution with 
underage girls only after starting DRT and when there was no previous criminal record or 
inappropriate interest in young girls (Porter 2011). In the case of cognitive enhancers, it is 
likely that long-term use of cognitive enhancers could result in side effects and health 
risks that are currently unknown. 
Whether or not the medicalization of cognitive enhancers is good, these three 
misconceptions pose significant concerns. For the sake of argument, let’s assume that 
these misconceptions are going to occur. I contend that this research project’s virtues-
based approach and institutional rule offer one way to handle these misconceptions.  
4.9.1 Virtues, Misconceptions, and the Medicalization of Cognitive Enhancers 
The virtues-based approach and institutional rule provides a moderated and nuanced 
way to handle the three misconceptions about the medicalization of cognitive enhancers. 
However, before describing this, it needs to be noted that distinguishing between medical 
and non-medical problems is not always an empirical, fact-based process. For a long 
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period of modern medicine, homosexuality was considered a psychiatric condition or 
disorder. It was not until a majority of psychiatrists voted that it was not a mental 
disorder that it was removed from the medical canon as a condition or disorder. In this 
case, a majority of psychiatrists agreed, and correctly so I believe, that being a 
homosexual was not a condition or disorder requiring medical treatment. Yet notice that 
while these psychiatrists’ votes were cast on the grounds of their professional experience, 
it is not as if this decision, for lack of a better term, was based on the empirical findings 
of the time. 
Also contributing to the problem of distinguishing sharply between medical and non-
medical problems is that societal values and advances in biomedical technologies and 
medical procedures often work in conjunction to dictate indirectly the circumstances in 
which a problem will be medicalized. The recent prominence of erectile dysfunction 
(ED) as a medical condition or disorder illustrates the complexity and ambiguity of 
societal values and biomedical technologies and medical procedures working indirectly to 
medicalize something. Unlike what was traditionally regarded as impotence for 
psychological reasons, ED occurs when a man is physiologically not able to develop or 
maintain an erection for sexual intercourse. It is clear that having the ability to develop or 
maintain an erection is rather important for society and for most men. There are many 
conditions under which ED is a medical condition or disorder, resulting from prostrate 
cancer or diabetes. However, considering human evolution, it is not at all evident that 
human males past their reproductive prime were physiologically meant to be able to 
develop and maintain an erection. ED was not a problem until society advanced to the 
point where men living beyond their reproductive prime became common. That there was 
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a pharmacological treatment for ED as well as value in still being able to have a sexual 
relationship even past a man’s reproductive prime led to the medicalization of ED.  
As the examples of homosexuality and ED demonstrate, there is immense difficulty 
in distinguishing medical from non-medical problems not only on empirical grounds but 
also because societal values and advances in biomedical technologies and medical 
procedures often indirectly (or directly) dictate what things are to be medicalized.  
In respect to the use of cognitive enhancers, it is also necessary to understand that as 
neuroscience research into the human brain progresses, it becomes clear that what is 
considered a normal range of proficient-functioning levels of cognitive capacities is 
always changing. Consider that while cognitive enhancers were created to treat ADHD 
and LD, it is only because reading, writing, and academics are highly valued by our 
society that we think of these as medical conditions or disorders. Some have argued that 
it is not so much that persons with ADHD and LD have medical conditions or disorders 
but that human neurology has simply not adapted to the need for these abilities to read 
and write (Stein 2008; Buchanan 2008). Human beings have only been reading for five 
thousand years; in terms of evolution, this is a relatively short period (Miller 2010).  
Therefore, distinguishing between medical and non-medical problems is not always an 
empirical, fact-based process, and societal values often indirectly (or directly) dictate 
what things are to be medicalized. Yet this does not mean that making a non-medical 
problem into a medical problem is something that, at least prima facie, should be 
rejected.  
Returning to this virtues-based approach and institutional rule, I show how it offers a 
moderated and nuanced way to handle the three misconceptions about the medicalization 
 
 164 
of cognitive enhancers. In regard to the first misconception, notice that a virtuous 
student’s impetuses for using cognitive enhancers do not center on having a deficiency or 
on considering that proficient functioning levels of cognitive capacities are deficiencies, 
but rather they focus on having the proper motivations in academia. Under this virtues-
based institutional rule, the reasons for students using cognitive enhancers are not 
focused on students’ cognitive capacities and whether they’re proficient or need to be 
enhanced. Instead, students’ reasons for using these enhancements are focused on the 
proper motivations and character for students in academia.  
Under normal conditions, the focus on proper motivation and character for students 
does not call for medical attention but instead calls for self-reflection. Under this virtues-
based approach and institutional rule, students should not immediately converge on their 
healthcare providers for pharmaceutical enhancement but rather reflect on their own 
motivation and character. Students begin first by asking themselves whether their 
motivations for using cognitive enhancers are for seeking understanding or accurate 
beliefs or self-improvement, and whether their current use of cognitive enhancers reflects 
good character. This virtues-based approach and institutional rule would cut down on 
students excessively seeking enhancements from healthcare providers, thereby lessening 
the burden on the healthcare system.75   
The second misconception is that medicalization of cognitive enhancers fosters a 
hyper-competitive notion of academic achievement. To see how this virtues-based 
approach and institutional rule handles this misconception, reconsider the goal of 
academia for this approach. The goal of academia under ideal and non-ideal conditions is 
                                                
75 One might think that this is unrealistic, but under the United Kingdom’s healthcare system, the use of 
anti-depressants is reserved only for patients with acute depression. All other cases involving depression 
first must undergo counseling and exercise therapy.  
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to attain understanding and not simply to obtain knowledge. The goal of academia is for 
students to strive toward developing an ability to connect, draw upon, and then apply 
relevant information and facts learned in academia to one’s life experience. This goal of 
academia goes a long way to addressing the misperception of academia being solely 
about academic achievement. If attaining understanding is the goal of academia and 
something students should strive to attain, then academic achievement is lessened in 
importance. This, in turn, does seem to be more consistent with the value of education as 
being instrumentally beneficial and good for its own sake.     
Also, this virtues-based approach indicates, even if in an indirect way, what students 
in academic institutions should be doing with the information and facts learned. Whether 
pursuing highly theoretical or practical, impactful work, the purpose of an education is to 
contribute to life experiences. It is likely that if institutional rules were prominently about 
the goal of academia and desired virtues of students—the virtues of seeking 
understanding and accurate beliefs—the rules would be of great benefit for students, 
administrators, staff, and faculty. Students would be able to understand clearly the value 
of education as something instrumental and good for its own sake, and those working in 
academia would be less likely to develop the typical apathy toward students. At a 
minimum, this virtuous approach and the virtues of students clearly indicate that the 
unexamined life is a missed opportunity.76  
                                                
76 This is the minimum understanding of the value of education for students according to this virtues-based 
approach and institutional rule. While I think this claim is correct, I am personally suspicious of persons 
who make claims about the value of the examined life. My suspicion is not because the claim about the 
unexamined life is incorrect; rather I have found those who often rely on this claim to be the most 
disingenuous of persons. I think but do not argue here that instead of focusing on examination of one’s life, 
those in education should instead emphasis a point Christopher Hitchens makes in phrasing Horace Mann’s 




The final misconception resulting from the medicalization of cognitive enhancers is 
that students believe using enhancements is risk free. This virtues-based approach and 
institutional rule takes a moderated approach in handling this misconception because the 
risks (both known and unknown) and benefits are not only regarded as relevant 
information in a given situation, but the risks and benefits are assessed in respect to the 
virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs. The use of cognitive enhancers 
under certain conditions poses a significant risk to some students’ health, so if they are to 
be used, then it is sensible that students have the proper motivation for using them. This 
is supported by this approach’s consistent view that pharmaceutical enhancements are 
not, by any stretch of the imagination, “smart pills.”  Still, when assessing the risks and 
benefits of student use of cognitive enhancers, one should not underestimate the benefits, 
even if moderate, that result from using these enhancements. Cognitive enhancers have 
been shown to help surgeons and other emergency department medical professionals 
maintain high levels of alertness and concentration in extreme circumstances for an 
extended period (Warren, et al. 2009; Carter, Ambermoon and Hall 2011).  
There is still the concern that amidst notions of balancing risk and benefits as 
considerations for using these enhancements, I have overlooked the potential—more 
accurately the probability—of addiction resulting from the medicalization of cognitive 
enhancers. I think that addiction is an important problem and a serious issue in respect to 
the use of cognitive enhancers. However, I refrain from making anything more than 
minimal claims about the risk of addiction and the medicalization of cognitive enhancers. 
There are reasons for thinking that, as they currently stand, medicine, neuroscience, and 
philosophy do not provide a clear, conceptual way to understand addiction in regard to 
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human neurology and responsibility. In the medical and neuroscience community, there 
is a tendency to consider addiction in respect to physiological causes, favoring 
neuroscience mechanistic explanations. Yet this is a problem because it removes or at 
least weakens the role that psychological causes have in cases of addiction. Weakness of 
will is still dependent on human agency, whether human agency is considered as being 
deliberative, conscious, automatic, or automastistic (Levy and Bayne 2004a; 2004b). 
Physiological causes do not always outweigh the fact that, by our nature, humans do act 
for reasons. Medical and neuroscience understandings of addiction need to better account 
for these reasons. Alternatively, for those in philosophy, there is often a tendency to favor 
a conceptual understanding of addiction in terms of psychological causes. This is also a 
problem because philosophical accounts of addiction and personal responsibility often 
understate the physiological effects of addiction on the human brain. For these reasons, I 
refrain from making anything more than minimal claims about the risk of addiction and 
the medicalization of cognitive enhancers.  
The risk of addiction is a concern for the medicalization of cognitive enhancers, but 
one feasible salutation is to implement educational programs and information for faculty, 
staff, and students about the risk of addiction when using cognitive enhancers. Also 
important is acknowledging that there should not be an overestimation or an 
underestimation of the risk of addiction. In this way, this virtues-based approach and 
institutional rule functions to provide equilibrium between the overestimation and 
underestimation of cognitive enhancers and addiction. A virtuous student would likely 
attempt to find what Buddhism regards as the “the middle path” and refers to as the 
“golden mean.” The use of cognitive enhancers requires a middle path between 
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overestimation and underestimation of the risks of addiction. While there are benefits to 
using cognitive enhancers, there are also risks, including addiction, and this virtues-based 
institutional rule attempts to provide a balance for student use of cognitive enhancers.  
Therefore, even if the medicalization of cognitive enhancers results in these three 
misconceptions for students, I contend that this virtues-based approach and institutional 
rule offer a moderated and nuanced way to handle them.  
4.10 Advancing Enhancement in Academia  
This research project now examines at least one way this virtues-based approach and 
institutional rule advances enhancement in academia: it offers a mature approach. For 
Kant, it was during the Enlightenment that humanity realized the role of reason as being 
able to serve as the guide for morality: 
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. 
Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the 
guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not 
lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without 
the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere 
aude! Have courage to use your own understanding! (Kant 2010) 
 
Maturity is having the resolution and courage to rely on reason rather than be guided by 
authority.  
This virtues-based approach and institutional rule is mature in that it asks for us to 
have the resolution and courage to rely on students to be able to decide the 
appropriateness of using cognitive enhancers in academia. However, unlike Kant, it does 
not hold that deciding the appropriateness of using cognitive enhancers in academia is a 
matter that can be completely left up to students’ discretionary judgment. Instead, it 
suggests that we need the resolution and courage to change academia’s institutional rules 
and policies for governing and guiding student use of enhancements in academia. We 
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need to change academia’s institutional rules and policies about enhancement in respect 
to the ideals of human excellence. In other words, instead of focusing on trying to 
determine decisively whether the use of enhancements is cheating or whether they are 
permitted or prohibited, this research project attempts to focus on developing the way 
students think about the use of enhancements in academia.  
Again, considering that the relationship between academia, institutional rules, and 
students is dynamic, a change in rules and policies has profound effects on students.77  
The manner in which students think about and use cognitive enhancers is at least partially 
shaped by academia’s institutional rules and policies. If students are not using cognitive 
enhancers in the proper circumstances or for the right reasons, then it is necessary to 
change these rules and policies to facilitate the way students think about enhancements.   
As presented in Chapter Three, institutions are integral to molding the ways students 
think. Institutional rules create an expectation of a pattern of behavior for students by 
structuring and developing students’ motivation, and this shapes the ethos of students. 
For academic institutions, implementing this virtues-based institutional rule is likely to 
have profound implications on the way students think about cognitive enhancers. It 
would likely shape students’ processes of reasoning about cognitive enhancers in two 
ways: First, this virtues-based rule makes motivations and character prominent rational 
considerations for students when reasoning about cognitive enhancers; second, this rule 
                                                
77 Consider the diverse claims and arguments made in this research project: (1) the goals of academia are 
developing students’ intellectual capacities to, first, attain understanding and, second, achieve commercial 
or economic placement; (2) academia’s institutional rules regulate which actions of students are permitted 
and prohibited; (3) academia’s institutional rules also structure and develop motivations by providing 
expectations of a pattern of behavior and directing interactions and/or being internalized and becoming an 
element of a student’s psychology; (4) even if academia does not have a responsibility to develop virtues in 
students, it still works to facilitate these virtues in students; (5) the environment is integral in supporting 
and assisting human cognition, and institutions are integral in supporting and assisting a person’s cognition 
and intellectual capacities and in shaping their attitudes and sentiments.  
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can create an automatic mental process even if students are only sub-optimally aware of 
motivation and character as considerations for evaluating the use of cognitive 
enhancers.78   
4.10.1 Shaping Students’ Reasoning: Rational Considerations  
This virtues-based institutional rule shapes students’ processes of reasoning about 
cognitive enhancers by making their motivations, such as seeking understanding and 
accurate beliefs, and character become prominent rational considerations for when they 
deliberate using cognitive enhancers. By prominent rational considerations, I mean that a 
student, at a minimum, regards using cognitive enhancers for reasons of seeking 
understanding and accurate beliefs or how the use of these enhancements reflects on his 
character as being significant in their process of reasoning.   
Institutions are integral to molding how students think. If implemented in an 
academic institution, this virtues-based institutional rule would emphasize motivations 
and character as prominent rational considerations because motivations determine the 
permissibility of using cognitive enhancers.  
That it is a student’s motivation that makes the use of cognitive enhancers permissible 
suggests that a reasonable student would have to at least regard motivations as being 
significant in the process of reasoning about enhancements. That motivations play a 
                                                
78 Before demonstrating how this virtues-based institutional rule could shape the way students think about 
cognitive enhancers, I need to make certain points of clarification to avoid confusion. Since this chapter is 
on this virtues-based institutional rule being implemented in non-ideal conditions, and the investigation is 
currently focused on how this rule develops students in existing academic institutions into the right sort of 
student by shaping the way they think about cognitive enhancers, I make the following modest clarifying 
points on practical reasoning. In the following section, the focus is on a student’s rational procedure for 
thinking about cognitive enhancers. For emphasis on this rational procedure, I often use “process of 
reasoning” instead of practical reasoning. However, even with the focus being on students’ processes of 
reasoning, it is not necessary that students be fully aware of this process (Streumer 2010).  
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significant role in deliberation further suggests that it is likely that a student will reflect 
upon her own motivations and assess whether they meet the permissibility condition.  
By allowing for the motivations of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs to be 
prominent rational considerations in a student’s process of reasoning about using 
cognitive enhancers, this virtues-based institutional rule is similar to Aristotle’s notion of 
virtues in practical reasoning (Kamtekar 2004). Practical reasoning is an active process in 
which virtues are a significant rational consideration. According to Aristotle, virtue is the 
mean between excess and deficiency and rationally determined by practical wisdom:  
Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative 
to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of 
practical wisdom would determine it. (NE 2.5 1106b36-1107a1) 
 
A virtue can be understood as a rational consideration that is active in the process of 
practical reasoning (Kamtekar 2004). For a person to become virtuous, virtues must be 
actively considered when reasoning in a particular situation. For example, for a person to 
have the virtue of compassion, the motivation of sympathy (or alleviation of suffering) 
must have a prominent role in his process of reasoning.  In a manner similar to Aristotle, 
this virtues-based institutional rule works to make these motivations, specifically seeking 
understanding and accurate beliefs, as rational considerations that a student must consider 
when deliberating on the use of enhancements.  
Under this virtues-based institutional rule, students, at least initially, would consider 
the motivations of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs as being prominent rational 
considerations in their process of reasoning about cognitive enhancers. This likely will 
result in students having to reflect on what their motivations actually are for using 
cognitive enhancers. As students progress through their academic career, they will likely 
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become more cognizant of their motivations for using cognitive enhancers and, in doing 
so, become aware of how this use is reflective of their character. This, in turn, allows for 
reasons of character to become prominent rational considerations for a student’s process 
of reasoning about the use of cognitive enhancers.   
Pausing for the moment, notice that under this virtues-based institutional rule, the 
claim is that motivations and character are likely to become prominent rational 
considerations in a student’s process of reasoning, not that motivations and character will 
always be most the important considerations or that this rule makes students have these 
considerations. To illustrate, consider T.M. Scanlon’s (1998) distinction between 
standard normative reasons and operative reasons in respect to explanation (and, in turn, 
justification). Standard normative reasons are those that support the explanation or 
justification of persons for holding a belief or doing an action in general (i.e., this is a 
good reason for persons to hold this belief or do an action). Operative reasons differ in 
that they are reasons that support a particular person’s explanation or justification for a 
belief or an action (i.e., this is the reason for that person’s belief or action).79  
It is possible to use the framework of Scanlon’s distinction to formulate a useful 
distinction and apply it to student use of enhancements in academia. I contend that there 
is a distinction between permissible reasons and operative reasons. According to this 
virtues-based institutional rule, seeking understanding and accurate beliefs are 
permissible reasons: these are the reasons that permit a student to use a cognitive 
enhancer. However, students do have operative reasons, their own particular reasons for 
wanting to use cognitive enhancers.  
                                                
79 (Scanlon 1998, 18-20). 
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Because seeking understanding and accurate beliefs determine the permissibility of 
using cognitive enhancers, a student has to at least consider whether their operative 
reasons are also permissible reasons. This student may choose to take a particular 
operative reason as being important in a given situation. Still, under this virtues-based 
institutional rule, a reasonable student has to at least compare their operative reasons 
against the permissible reasons. This comparison makes permissible reasons, the 
motivations of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs, the prominent rational 
considerations in a student’s process of reasoning about the use of cognitive enhancers. 
This virtues-based institutional rule does not make students have these motivations but 
works to develop these motivations as having a significant role in students’ processes of 
reasoning about enhancements.  
4.10.2 Shaping Students’ Reasoning: Automatic Mental Process 
If implemented, this virtues-based institutional rule not only shapes students to regard 
motivations and character as prominent rational considerations in their process of 
reasoning; it is also likely to affect this process of reasoning in a profound but less 
explicit way. Contemporary research in neuroscience and social psychology indicate 
that—in general—humans are often not consciously aware of their reasons for acting, and 
many actions are not consciously controlled (Levy 2007; Wegner 2002; Bargh and 
Chartrand 1999). This research has not shown that conscious control of actions or 
reasoning is illusory but rather focuses on neuroscience and social psychology to examine 
the role automaticity has in human cognition.80 People have automatic mental processes, 
meaning cognitive processes for assessing information and undertaking certain acts, 
                                                
80 Although some, such as Daniel Wegner, hold this position, I do not (Wegner 2002). 
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mindsets, or affective orientations without a conscious or intentional deliberation (Bargh 
and Chartrand 1999, 464).81 These automatic mental processes are part of our human 
neurological “hardwiring.” For example, there is an automatic mental process referred to 
as the perceptual-behavioral link82 in which a person unconsciously and unintentionally 
mimics the behavior of another person during social interaction (Bargh and Chartrand 
1999; Lakin, Chartrand and Arkin 2008; Wiltermuth and Heath 2009).  
According to Bargh and Chartrand, it is the environment that provides conditions for 
developing automaticity: 
The necessary and sufficient ingredients for automation are frequency and 
consistency of use of the same set of component mental processes under 
the same circumstances–regardless of whether the frequency and 
consistency occur because of a desire to attain a skill, or whether they 
occur just because we tended in the past to make the same choices or to do 
the same thing each time. These processes also become automated, but 
because we did not start out intending to make them that we way, we are 
not aware that they have been and so, when that process operates 
automatically in that situation, we aren’t aware of it. (Bargh and Chartrand 
1999, 469) 
 
The consistency and frequency of a person’s circumstances dictates the likelihood of an 
individual developing a particular automatic mental process. Research indicates that the 
development of automatic mental processes are a way of off-loading mental tasks to 
preserve the energy these conscious deliberations require for processing time (Levy 2007; 
Wegner 2002; Bargh and Chartrand 1999). This is not all that shocking considering that 
many activities, with a range of complexity, can be done automatically: turning on one’s 
computer, eating and conversing with others, driving to work, filing paperwork while 
reading, driving home after work, etc.  
                                                
81  Intentional mental process is the cognitive process for consciously and intentionally responding to a 
certain range of rational considerations for undertaking certain acts, mindsets, or affective orientations 
(Bargh and Chartrand 1999). 
82 Also called “behavioral coordination,” “movement synchrony,” or “behavior matching” in the literature.  
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Yet as these examples illustrate, these automatic mental processes are not solely 
behavioral but also extend into the realm of human reasoning: deliberation and evaluative 
judgments. Research by Ambady and Rosenthal (1993) demonstrates the prevalence and 
reliance of automatic mental processes for evaluating acts, events, and people. For 
example, when shown five-second clips of professors teaching, people were rather 
successful in predicting these professors’ student-evaluation scores. Drawing upon a 
range of situational, sensory, and other considerations, a person can quickly evaluate acts, 
events, and people. However, people are not consciously aware of this process of 
reasoning in the automatic evaluation of acts, events, and people, and automatic 
evaluations often do reflect the values of a particular person (Dijksterhuis, et al. 2006).  
This research in neuroscience and social psychology impacts this virtues-based 
institutional rule because it is plausible that were such a rule implemented, it could lead 
to students developing an automatic mental process about the use of cognitive enhancers. 
If implemented, this virtues-based institutional rule is likely to result in an environment in 
which the motivations of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs are taken—in being 
the motivations that determine permissibility—as prominent rational considerations in a 
student’s process of reasoning about cognitive enhancers. With consistency and 
frequency, students can be able to develop an automatic mental process such that the 
appropriate use of cognitive enhancers is for reasons of proper motivation and character, 
all without the student being consciously aware of this process. 
 Initially, the claim that students can develop an automatic mental process about the 
appropriate use of cognitive enhancers seems difficult to accept. Yet imagine the 
following situations. In the first situation, Edith, who has developed an automatic mental 
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process about the appropriate use of cognitive enhancers, happens to cross paths with 
Oliver in the library. During their conservation, Oliver offers Edith cognitive enhancers. 
In this brief encounter, Edith does not have to time to consciously deliberate but politely 
turns down the offer. Edith politely declines because her automatic mental process made 
a rapid evaluation of Oliver and the situational circumstances, including her motivations, 
and made a “snap judgment.”  
In the second situation, Edith wakes up in her dorm on campus during fall break. 
There are no classes and she has the day to herself. Without any reflection, she gets up, 
takes a cognitive enhancer and immediately begins working on her coursework. In both 
of these situations, Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is consistent with the appropriate 
use as stipulated by this virtues-based institutional rule in her academic institution. In the 
first situation, she does not use them when she is not certain of situational information or 
her motivations; in the second situation, she uses a cognitive enhancer appropriately and 
is only sub-optimally aware of her process of reasoning. Moreover, it might also turn out 
that Edith, even given time for reflection, might not be able to articulate her 
considerations for her decision.  
One might be concerned that Edith’s inability to articulate her reasons for her actions 
means that she didn’t go through a process of reasoning. Yet even if Edith were unable to 
articulate her reasons, it is plausible that she went through an automatic process of 
reasoning about the appropriate use of cognitive enhancers that was developed through 
consistent and frequent experience of this virtues-based institutional rule. Humans are 
able to make rapid and often accurate evaluations of a situation without conscious 
awareness of their reasons for doing so. In an experiment called the Iowa Gambling Task, 
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participants could choose cards from two decks of cards, either being rewarded or losing 
money, and participants were frequently asked about their decision-making process while 
measurements of their bodily responses were taken (Bechara, et al. 1997; Bechara et al. 
2005; Maia and McClelland 2004; Maia and McClelland 2005; Levy 2007). The cards 
chosen from deck “A” always resulted in a loss of money, whereas cards from deck “B” 
always resulted in a reward. This experiment suggested that a person’s bodily responses 
often indicated a person’s switch in strategy, moving from deck “A” to deck “B”, before 
the person was able consciously to provide a reason for doing so.  
There are controversies surrounding the conclusions that certain researchers have 
drawn from this experiment in respect to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (a person’s 
body provides signals that guide beneficial decision-making) and processes of reasoning 
(Levy 2007). Yet for the purposes of this chapter, what this experiment does suggest is 
that in certain situations, likely many situations, a person’s evaluations are done without 
her consciously being aware of it. Thus, it is more than possible that were Edith to 
develop an automatic mental process for evaluating the appropriate use of cognitive 
enhancers, she could make a choice about the use of an enhancement and not be 
consciously aware of it.83  
This virtues-based institutional rule in academic institutions could shape students’ 
processes of reasoning about the use of cognitive enhancers. This shaping of students’ 
process reasoning can be explicit, by making motivation and character prominent rational 
                                                
83 This implication is likely to make many people uncomfortable since the assumption is that if there is 
anything that a person has complete control over it is their reasoning process. Yet it is important to note 
that the claim is not that humans have no control over their reasoning processes but simply a modest claim, 
backed by empirical evidence, that humans simply do not have complete or absolute control over their 
reasoning process. Were it the case that humans did have complete control, then the suggested attempts to 
suppress certain thoughts would not clinically be shown to be so futile (Wegner 1989). 
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considerations, or implicit, by working so that students develop an automatic mental 
process about the appropriate use of cognitive enhancers. By shaping students’ practical 
reasoning in this way,  students currently in academic institutions would begin to think 
about the use of enhancements as the kind of student wanted  in academia would. The 
kind of student to want in academia, the right sort of student, does not use cognitive 
enhancers in all situations regardless of the circumstances, or only for reasons of 
instrumental benefit, or because the institutional rules, for example, permit them. The 
right sort of student is able to consider the relevant information in a given situation, 
assess the relevant considerations, and act accordingly.   
Although this virtues-based institutional rule would shape the way academic 
institutions think about using cognitive enhancers, it does not mean that under this rule 
students would become virtuous. It also does not mean that after implementing this rule, 
students will always make the correct assessments about the appropriate use of cognitive 
enhancers. Instead, implementing this virtues-based institutional rule offers a way for 
motivation and character to be included within the discussion of enhancement in 
academia. The importance of including motivation and character is illustrated by the fact 
that we are not troubled (or at least are troubled less) by the thought of a virtuous student 
using a cognitive enhancer because, in part, they have the right reasons for using them, 
and this is reflective of good character. The uneasiness about the use of cognitive 
enhancers among students in academic institutions currently is because the students are 




Although many students in our existing academic institutions are likely to lack proper 
motivation or good character when using cognitive enhancers, this does not diminish the 
importance of these considerations. Administrators, faculty, and staff in academia should 
work to implement institutional rules that, at a minimum, strive toward promoting the 
motivations and character that strive toward attaining understanding. As Xunzi 
eloquently states, academia is the way to develop and transform students to think about 
things (here the use of enhancements) so that they do so in the correct manner:   
If the man in the street applies himself to training and studying, 
concentrates his mind and will, and considers and examines things 
carefully, continuing his efforts over a long period of time and 
accumulating good acts without stop, then he can achieve a godlike 
understanding and form a triad with heaven and earth. (Tzun, Man's 
Nature is Evil 1963, 170)  
 
According to this research project, we want to have students use cognitive enhancers in 
the same way that the kind of students we want in academia would use them. We want 
students to use cognitive enhancers for the right motivations and in a way reflective of 
good character. To do this, we need to have the resolution and courage to change our 
institutional rules and policies to transform existing students into the kind of students we 
want by relying on the ideals of human excellence.    
4.11 Resisting Simplification  
I conclude this chapter by discussing the final advantage of this virtues-based 
approach and institutional rule. By acknowledging the complexity of enhancement use in 
academia, this virtues-based approach and institutional rule understand that there are 
limitations to the amount of clarity that can be brought to issues of enhancement in 
academia. Enhancement in academia is inherently complex, and one should resist 
simplification. For the moment, put aside this virtues-based approach and institutional 
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rule and consider the following example as illustrating at least some of the ambiguity and 
complexity.   
 Nora and David both have an exam in their Wittgenstein course in two weeks. Nora 
is a senior with an impeccable GPA, and if she gets an “A” on the exam, she likely will 
graduate magna cum laude. Graduating magna cum laude is not only a highly respected 
academic achievement, but it is also an academic achievement that greatly improves her 
chances of getting into a top-tier medical school. Nora has a legal prescription for 
cognitive enhancers that is specifically for enhancement purposes from a neurologist. 
Typically she enjoys academic activities and learning, but currently she has difficulty 
understanding Wittgenstein’s arguments and is often distracted by all of her prep work 
for the Medical College Admission Test.  
David is a senior who does not have an impeccable GPA and most certainly will not 
graduate magna cum laude. David does not like Wittgenstein or any academic activities, 
for the most part. What David does enjoy is crunching numbers on spreadsheets, and he 
already has a job lined up contingent upon graduating. To graduate all David needs is a 
“D” on his Wittgenstein exam. David does have a legal prescription for cognitive 
enhancers, but these enhancements give him a headache, and the efficacy of these 
enhancements in understanding Wittgenstein is not proven.  
Two weeks ahead of this Wittgenstein exam, both Nora and David have to decide 
whether or not to use cognitive enhancers and begin studying for the exam. What should 
Nora and David do?   
Nora and David’s case illustrates caution against claims that it is easy to identify the 
important considerations for whether or not to use a cognitive enhancer. Is it the 
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consequences of graduating magna cum laude and going to medical school or simply 
graduating? Is it having a legally obtained prescription or that this legal prescription is 
being used for enhancement? Or is it Nora and David’s motivations for using cognitive 
enhancers? Opaque motivations are serious problems in student use of enhancements 
because some evidence has shown that students rely on self-diagnosis of ADHD as a 
rationalization for using cognitive enhancers (Judson and Langdon 2009). 
The difficulty in identifying considerations does not suggest that these institutional 
rules are unable to govern the use of enhancement. Instead, this difficulty suggests 
caution for any approach or institutional rule attempting to always and in every case 
claim that it has identified the most important consideration for students. Such an 
approach or institutional rule presumes to have identified the most important 
consideration, and therefore, it has weighted rather than weighed considerations. Neil 
Levy, drawing on the work of Robert Nozick, explains the difference between weighting 
and weighing reasons84: 
We weigh reasons when we try to find out how significant they are for us, 
given our beliefs, values, plans, goals, and desires. We weight reasons 
when we assign them a weight and thereby significance for us, either 
ignoring any pre-existing weight they might have had or varying it. (Levy 
2007, 234) 
 
An approach or institutional rule that weights a particular consideration for all cases is 
likely to result in student use of enhancements as being either strictly permitted or 
prohibited. Implementing such a strict institutional rule is problematic. First, strict 
institutional rules overlook the complexity for students in a given situation. For example, 
if an institutional rule permits student use of enhancements in all cases, then risks to a 
student’s health and information in that given situation are overlooked and not considered 
                                                
84 (Nozick 1981). 
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significant. Conversely, if an institutional rule prohibits student use of enhancements in 
all cases, then the benefits they might provide are overlooked and not considered. Yet 
Nora and David’s cases show that it’s important to allow for a broad range of 
considerations and relevant information.  
Moreover, consider Nora and David in their particular circumstances. Imagine that 
Nora only considered the consequences of graduating magna cum laude or that David 
only considered whether he had legally obtained his prescription. One would think that 
both Nora and David misjudged or failed to account for all the considerations and 
relevant information in their circumstances. Just as there are concerns about institutional 
rules that do not account for a broad range of considerations and relevant information, so 
one would have concerns if Nora and David did not account for these either.  
The second problem is that were an institutional rule to permit or prohibit the use of 
cognitive enhancers in all cases, then generally speaking there would be many instances 
in which students would be permitted to use enhancers for bad reasons and students with 
good motivations would be prohibited from using cognitive enhancers. Yet as argued in 
this research project, the reasons that students use cognitive enhancers are important: 
motivations do matter. A student’s motivation for using cognitive enhancers is reflective 
of his character, and both motivation and character are important in academia.  
I do concede that this virtues-based institutional rule does not always provide a single, 
determinate answer as to whether the use of a cognitive enhancer is permitted or 
prohibited. However, an advantage of this rule is that it acknowledges the complexity of 
enhancement use in academia. A component of this virtues-based institutional rule is that 
it offers an ethical outlook. In certain situations, motivations and character may not 
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always be the most important consideration for a particular student (e.g., Nora and 
David). However, by focusing on motivation and character, the significance for 
implementing this virtues-based institutional rule is not in arriving at a single, 
determinate answer about enhancement; the significance is that this rule aims to develop 
students in existing academic institutions into the kind of student we want in academia. 
 Although specifying this kind of student in detail is difficult, it is reasonable—even 
under non-ideal conditions—to generally take this student to be one who persistently 
inquires about the information and facts given in academia, assesses these beliefs in 
respect to the world as it is currently known, and applies the information and facts 
learned in academia to his life. In a narrow sense, this kind of student neither takes 
cognitive enhancers to augment their capacities regardless of cost nor takes these 
enhancements in all situations. This student understands that motivations and character 
are relevant considerations in their decision of whether or not to use an enhancement. 
This kind of student is one who would use cognitive enhancers for the right reasons.  
This virtues-based approach and institutional rule might be incorrect, implausible, or 
infeasible for governing and guiding student use of cognitive enhancers. Yet this research 
project’s virtues-based approach and institutional rule does not attempt to reduce the 
ambiguity and complexity in the discussion of enhancement in academia. While it does 
not offer a single, determinate answer in all cases, it does allow for the reasons a student 
is using cognitive enhancers to be a relevant consideration. Moreover, it allows for 





Chapter 5 Conclusion 
“Abashed the Devil stood, and felt how awful goodness is, and saw Virtue 
in her shape how lovely.” 
— John Milton, Paradise Lost 
5.1 Re-examining the Question of Cheating 
This research project outlined three questions and centered on two goals. For the 
moment, leaving out the question of cheating, I want to consider these questions and 
goals.  The first question was whether student use of cognitive enhancers was 
permissible. I argued that under existing institutional rules and policies, a student is 
permitted to use cognitive enhancers. The third question was what the institutional rules 
should be regarding student use of cognitive enhancers. I offered a virtues-based 
institutional rule: Students are permitted to use cognitive enhancers if their reasons for 
using these enhancements are reflective of ideals of human excellence.   
The first goal of this research project was to identify problems with the contemporary 
discussion of enhancement in academia. One problem is that questions about cheating do 
not properly frame all the considerations in this discussion. As I have argued, while this 
is an interesting question, it should not frame or be considered the only question in 
respect to the use of enhancements in academia. The other problem is that existing 
institutional rules and policies of academic institutions do not decisively determine the 
permissibility of student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs and seem to conclude that the 
use of cognitive enhancers is permitted because nothing explicitly prohibits their use.  
The second goal of this research project was to offer a systematic approach towards 
enhancement in academia. I suggested that one approach is from the ideals of human 
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excellence or virtues. I stipulated a virtues-based approach in which the use of cognitive 
enhancers is permissible on the grounds that the virtuous student has the right 
motivations for using cognitive enhancers. A virtuous student, at a minimum, would have 
the virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs. These virtues, as motivations, 
are good reasons for using cognitive enhancers and reflective of good character. This 
virtues-based approach generated an institutional rule for governing student use of 
enhancement in academia on an ideal conception of academia. Next, I considered this 
virtues-based institutional rule under non-ideal conditions and held that it could be 
implemented in existing academic institutions because in many ways, it is similar to an 
honor code. This virtues-based institutional rule and an honor code both rely on 
motivations and character for governing and guiding students.  
While these are two of the questions and the goals for this research project, I now 
want to return to the question that was the intellectual impetus for this research project: Is 
a student who uses cognitive enhancers cheating? If we re-examine the question of 
cheating within the context of existing institutional rules and policies for governing 
student use of cognitive enhancers in academia, it becomes clear why this question 
shouldn’t always frame issues of permissibility. Under existing institutional rules and 
policies in academia, a student who uses cognitive enhancers cannot decisively be 
determined to be cheating, and as long these enhancements were legally obtained, it is 
permissible for students to use them.  
Within the context of existing institutional rules and policies, I contend that this 
virtues-based approach and institutional rule would advance enhancement in academia in 
two ways. First, it provides a better justification for the permissibility of using 
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enhancements than do existing institutional rules and policies; second, it offers a way to 
acknowledge and support significant concerns about the use of enhancements in 
academia regarding fairness and improving well-being.   
However, before illustrating why the question of cheating shouldn’t frame issues of 
permissibility, it is important to understand why this question is so often relied upon to 
frame issues of permissibility. The question of cheating offers a familiar and 
straightforward conceptual framework for evaluating the permissibility of enhancement 
in academia. It is familiar because the use of enhancements in athletics is also commonly 
framed as being a question of cheating: Is an athlete cheating when using a biomedical 
technology or medical procedure during a sports competition? For many people, their 
first encounter with biomedical technologies and medical procedures used for 
enhancement is in athletics and is typically framed as a question of cheating. Recent and 
rather public revelations and investigations into prominent athletes such as Lance 
Armstrong, Barry Bonds, Marion Jones, Mark McGuire, and many others illustrated the 
context in which the permissibility of enhancements is discussed.  
Also, it is admittedly easy to think about enhancements in academia in the same way 
as enhancements in athletics. For example, a student using a cognitive enhancer is 
cheating in the same way that an athlete is cheating by using a performance-enhancing 
drug such as steroids; or alternatively, a student using cognitive enhancers is not cheating 
in the same way that an athlete using performance-enhancing technologies or medical 
procedures such as sleeping in a hyperbaric oxygen chamber is not cheating.85 I think but 
do not argue here that the overlap between academia and athletics is often exaggerated 
                                                
85 Hard-cased hyperbaric oxygen chamber’s provide 100% oxygen and have been used to assist patients 
after surgeries. Soft-cased hyperbaric chambers that professional athletes use only provide 40% oxygen, 
and it is not clear how much they do help the athletes.    
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greatly, and analogies between academia and athletics reinforce misperceptions about 
biomedical technologies or medical procedures. Yet it cannot be ignored that people 
naturally frame the permissibility of student use of enhancements in academia to 
something seemingly similar—the use of enhancements in athletics—and familiar as a 
question of cheating.  
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the question of cheating also provides a 
straightforward conceptual framework for evaluating a student’s use of cognitive 
enhancers. This conceptual framework focuses on evaluating students’ discrete acts (did a 
student use a cognitive enhancer?) and holds that cheating is an act regarded as being 
wrong under normal conditions. Thus, this conceptual framework provides a 
straightforward way of thinking about enhancement in academia: a student who uses a 
cognitive enhancer is cheating and is wrong to do so.  
However, by re-examining the question of cheating, specifically its conceptual 
framework, it becomes clear that framing the use of enhancements in academia as 
cheating does not encapsulate many salient considerations. First, because focusing on 
students’ acts is rather straightforward, too much is left out of the assessment. For the 
sake of argument, let’s assume that using a cognitive enhancer in academia is cheating 
and that a student was caught using an enhancement. Now, evaluating the student’s act is 
straightforward, and it would seem irrelevant for assessment purposes to consider the 
student’s year in the academic institution. Yet this information might change the 
assessment of this student. If the student were a senior, then their cheating seems worse 
because, unlike freshmen, more is expected of seniors. In this case, while either a 
freshman or senior would have been wrong to use cognitive enhancers, it seems 
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reasonable that the severity of the assessment of the student would change depending on 
the student’s academic level.  
Second, an act (or action) that is cheating is considered wrong under normal 
conditions. A reason it is wrong is that under normal conditions, there is a rule 
prohibiting it. It is reasonable to hold that under normal (existing) conditions, there would 
be institutional rules or policies stipulating, or at least indicating, that the use of cognitive 
enhancers is cheating.86 Yet few academic institutions87 have a rule or policy stipulating 
that a student who uses a cognitive enhancer is cheating.   
By re-examining the question of cheating, it becomes evident that there are 
significant problems with framing the permissibility of student use of enhancements in 
academia in regards to cheating. The framework of the question of cheating does not 
include salient considerations such as information relevant in that given situation, and 
there are few, if any, existing academic institutional rules or policies that stipulate that 
student use of enhancement as cheating.  
The question of cheating does not resolve issues of permissibility for student use of 
enhancements in academia. This again pushes for further re-examination of existing 
institutional rules or policies about enhancements in academia. Most, if not all academic 
institutions do have rules that prohibit a student from using an illegal drug during 
academic activities.  
Although students are not permitted to use illegally obtained pharmaceuticals, I have 
argued that relying on a legal prescription or the notion of misusing cognitive enhancers 
                                                
86 The familiarity between assessing the use of enhancements in athletics and academia is unhelpful. A 
particular sport often has explicit institutional rules and policies (I would include etiquette as policy) that 
constitute a certain act as cheating. 
87 I know of no academic institution that directly stipulates that the use of cognitive enhancers is cheating, 
but it is possible that there exist at least one or two that do have such a rule.  
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leads problems establishing permissibility. First, a legal prescription is often an unreliable 
factor for determining the permissibility of a student’s use of cognitive enhancers because 
obtaining a legal prescription rests on a difficult diagnosis by a medical professional or, 
in many cases, on a particular medical professional’s personal discretion regarding 
enhancement. Second, an institutional rule concerning illegal drugs that relies on a 
conception of misuse supposes that off-label use of prescription pharmaceuticals always 
constitutes misuse. This perception of misuse is inaccurate because off-label use of 
pharmaceuticals is a common, accepted, and often-necessary practice in medicine. The 
point is not that off-label use of cognitive enhancers is always justified, but rather that it 
is not clear that just because the use of these cognitive enhancers is off label, it 
automatically makes it a misuse (Dresser and Frader 2009). Therefore, if an academic 
institution operates under existing institutional rules and policies, it does seem 
permissible for students to use legally obtained cognitive enhancers.  
This re-examination of the question of cheating within existing rules and policies 
shows that a student is permitted to use cognitive enhancers and is not cheating in doing 
so. Now consider if this virtues-based institutional rule were implemented in existing 
academic institutions that are operating with these rules and policies. According to this 
rule, a student is permitted to use cognitive enhancers as long as (i) these prescription 
pharmaceuticals were legally obtained and (ii) a student’s reasons for using them were 
for self-improvement, or seeking understanding and accurate beliefs. This virtues-based 
institutional rule is consistent with existing rules and policies in academic institutions and 
does not consider students to be cheating when using an enhancement.  
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Now consider that in respect to the contemporary discussion of enhancement in 
academia, this virtues-based approach and institutional rule advances in two ways. First, 
it provides a better justification for the permissibility of using enhancements than do 
existing rules and policies; second, it offers a way to acknowledge and support concerns 
about fairness and improving well-being.   
5.2 Permissibility by Default 
 To begin, consider the justification for permissibility as provided by existing rules 
and policies: students are permitted to use cognitive enhancers because unless they are 
illegally obtained, there are no institutional rules and policies that directly govern or 
prohibit them. The permissibility of using enhancements in academia is what I refer to as 
permissibility by default. Generally speaking, the justification for students being 
permitted to use enhancements in academia is that there are no institutional rules or 
policies that prohibit them from doing so. In the case of enhancement in academia, 
permissibility by default is a problem. 
To be clear, I am not claiming that permissibility by default is always a problem. In 
many circumstances, permissibility by default is an acceptable justification. Institutions 
and institutional rules cannot stipulate all permissible actions. Yet there are some 
circumstances in which permissibility by default is not a good justification.  
The following example illustrates the difference in circumstances in which 
permissibility by default is, and then is not, considered a good justification. Imagine that 
Oliver is sitting in his Wittgenstein class daydreaming. Oliver is not breaking a rule by 
daydreaming because there is no institutional rule that prohibits Oliver from 
daydreaming, making permissibility by default an acceptable justification. Now imagine 
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that Oliver is using a cognitive enhancer instead of daydreaming. The lack of institutional 
rules or policies prohibiting Oliver from using a cognitive enhancer is the justification for 
Oliver being permitted to use enhancements.  
However, a relevant difference is that permissibility by default does seem to be a 
good reason for Oliver being permitted to daydream, but it does not seem to be a good 
reason for him to use cognitive enhancers. Cognitive enhancers are powerful 
psychotropic pharmaceutical agents that impact—both positively and negatively— a 
student’s neurological system, overall health, academic career, and well-being. The 
impacts for students who use cognitive enhancers in academia are such that the 
circumstances under which a student uses an enhancement at least needs a good reason 
for justification— rather than simply the lack of an institutional rule prohibiting them. In 
respect to student use of enhancements, permissibility by default does not seem to be a 
good reason for justifying permissibility.  
Some might think that needing a good reason for the justification of using 
enhancements in academia is too demanding. If existing rules and policies permit the use 
of enhancements, even if it is permissibility by default, then students should be allowed 
to use cognitive enhancers as they see fit. This position could be further supported by 
drawing on John Stuart Mill’s notion of experiment of living. For Mill, the individuality 
of a person, the freedom to choose his or her own actions, is a central component for 
well-being:  
If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and 
experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not 
because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode … it is only 
the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-




A reason against setting strict limitations on permissible actions is because of the value of 
personal freedom and our infallibility. In this way, people are all engaged in experiments 
of living. As Mill notes,   
[S]o is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free 
scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; 
and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, 
when any one thinks fit to try them.  (Mill 2008, 72) 
 
In respect to students and cognitive enhancers, one could hold a view that as long as 
students do not injure others and there is no institutional rule directly prohibiting them 
from using cognitive enhancers, then permissibility by default is the reason for justifying 
permissibility. Moreover, that there is no institutional prohibition is also the means for 
justifying the permissibility of cognitive enhancers. In this way, the use of enhancements 
in academia can be thought of as an experiment of living.  
This view is philosophically strong and matches many inclinations people may have 
about the use of enhancement. Preserving students’ well-being by not restricting their 
freedom of choice is not only instrumentally beneficial but also good for its own sake.  
However, despite the initial appeal of this view, the circumstances of students in 
academia and their use of enhancements provide reasons for doubting this view.  
First, individuality is a central element of a person’s well-being. However, as an 
institution, academia is designed to regularly limit and restrict students’ freedom of 
choice. Some of the ways it does so are rather mundane, such as only offering certain 
courses or scheduling classes at certain times. Other ways are far more controversial, 
such as speech codes or the expression of certain attitudes or beliefs, (e.g., overtly racist 
or misogynistic speech or beliefs).  
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It might be that some of the more controversial ways—and mundane ways as well—
turn out to be too limiting or restrictive of students’ freedom of choice. Nonetheless, that 
academia has the institutional power to limit and restrict students’ individuality is not 
controversial or surprising. When a person is a student in academia and occupying a 
specific identity or role, the student is accountable for following these rules and policies 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Feldman 1981; Strike 1983). Moreover, as previously 
mentioned, occupying the identity or role of a student means that a student is accountable 
to certain rules and policies that other persons outside the institution are not. So the view 
that limiting or restricting students’ freedom to use cognitive enhancers is incorrect 
because it infringes on students’ individuality seems to misunderstand academia as an 
institution and the responsibilities of being a student at such an institution.    
The second reason is that there are significant difficulties when thinking about student 
use of enhancements as being an experiment in living. By definition, an experiment is a 
procedure to test a hypothesis or make a discovery. In this experiment in living view, the 
hypothesis is that allowing all students to use cognitive enhancers will be practically 
beneficial for some students and that it increases students’ individuality.  However, when 
setting up a legitimate experiment, it is also prudent to consider the past history of an 
experiment. The past history of accepted and promoted pharmaceutical enhancements 
poses a problem because it has been disastrous. Previously touted and accepted cognitive 
enhancers such as cocaine and amphetamines have been empirically proven to be more 
harmful than beneficial when used as cognitive enhancements (Bell, Lucke and Hall 
2012). At the beginning of the twentieth-century, cocaine was regularly promoted for its 
ability to augment mental performance, increase focus, and provide high levels of energy 
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(Spillane 2000). The promotion and acceptance of cocaine was due in part to 
overestimating its properties of cognitive enhancement. After cocaine fell out of favor, 
amphetamines were regarded as the next pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement and were 
introduced to those outside of the military after World War II (Rasmussen 2008). During 
World War II and even currently, amphetamines were used to maintain or improve 
soldiers’ levels of alertness and counteract fatigue. Following World War II, 
amphetamines were introduced to the general population by returning soldiers and, as 
with cocaine previously, were embraced for a wide range of uses. In Great Britain in the 
1960s,  
About one third of amphetamine prescriptions were for weight loss, one 
third for clear-cut psychiatric disorders (depression, anxiety), and the 
remaining third for ambiguous, mostly psychiatric and psychosomatic 
complaints (tiredness, nonspecific pain). (Rasmussen 2008, 977) 
 
While cocaine and amphetamines were once accepted and promoted as pharmaceutical 
cognitive enhancers, empirical evidence shows little benefit and substantial, unwarranted 
health risks. To be clear, a past result is not a clear indication that current or future 
pharmaceutical enhancements will fail. Nonetheless, the history of cognitive enhancers 
does suggest that making them permissible for all students to use will end poorly. 
The view that permitting all students to use cognitive enhancements in academia 
endorses students’ individuality as an element of well-being and is an experiment of 
living has strong appeal. However, it overlooks that as an institution¸ academia limits 
students’ freedom of choice; also, in respect to cognitive enhancers, it does not seem 
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prudent or sensitive considering past history to allow students to be phase 1 participants 
for pharmaceutical cognitive enhancements.88  
This is not to claim that cognitive enhancers should be prohibited but rather that if 
students are going to be permitted to use cognitive enhancers, then permissibility needs to 
be justified by something more than default. I am not claiming that (i) permissibility by 
default is always a bad reason for justification, (ii) limiting or restricting students’ 
freedom of choice is always a good thing, or (iii) harmful and negative impacts on 
students’ health or well-being are always cause for restricting the permissibility of certain 
actions. Instead, the argument is that because of the circumstances of academia, 
permissibility of cognitive enhancers by default is simply not a good justification for 
existing rules and policies.  
I suggest that this virtues-based approach and institutional rule offers a better 
justification than permissibility by default. According to the virtues-based approach, a 
virtuous student chooses to use cognitive enhancers after assessing the relevant 
information and considerations in a situation. In a given situation, the virtuous student 
assesses the relevant considerations pertaining to existing rules or policies, consequences 
(benefits versus risks), and their motivations. Permissibility rests upon the virtuous 
student having sufficiently proper motivations of self-improvement, or seeking 
understanding or accurate beliefs, for using cognitive enhancers. That these motivations 
are regarded as being good reasons for using cognitive enhancers and reflect well on the 
character of the student makes using cognitive enhancers permissible. This claim about 
permissibility is rather modest; in comparison to permissibility by default, it offers a 
                                                
88 A phase 1 drug trial only tests for safety and is neither curative nor considered a therapeutic treatment. 
However, many patients hold the “therapeutic misconception” and mistakenly enroll in phase 1 trials 
thinking they may be cured of their disease.  
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better justification for permissibility. I am not arguing that a virtues-based approach is the 
only way to justify the permissibility of cognitive enhancers. However, having 
permissibility be determined by motivations of self-improvement, or seeking 
understanding and accurate beliefs, does seem like a good justification for permissibility. 
Therefore, the first benefit of implementing this virtues-based institutional rule is that it 
offers a better justification for the permissibility of using cognitive enhancers under 
existing rules and policies.  
5.3 Concerns of Fairness and Well-being  
The second benefit of implementing this virtues-based institutional rule is that it 
supports concerns about fairness and improving well-being. I regard these concerns as 
being central, if not the impetuses, for the arguments that were attempting to answer the 
question of cheating. To demonstrate how fairness and improving well-being could be the 
central concerns in answering the question of cheating, consider the following. If one 
could show that the use of cognitive enhancers is decisively determined to be cheating (or 
not), then academia and academic institutional rules and policies would have to be altered 
in respect to this conclusion. If students using cognitive enhancers were cheating because 
the enhancers provide an unfair competitive advantage, existing institutional rules and 
policies would need to address concerns of enhancement and fairness. Alternatively, if 
students using cognitive enhancers were not cheating because these enhancements 
resulted in better goods, services, and scientific discoveries, then existing institutional 
rules and policies would have to address concerns about improving well-being. In the 
following, beginning with those who think that a student who uses a cognitive enhancer 
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is cheating, I show in detail how this virtues-based approach and institutional rule are 
able to acknowledge and support concerns about fairness and improvement of well-being.  
For those who think that a student who uses a cognitive enhancer is cheating, their 
central concern is often about fairness. Their mistake is addressing fairness in terms of 
competitive advantage at the level of a student rather than at the institutional level. To 
consider cheating at the level of a student requires providing a relevant distinction 
between the advantages provided by cognitive enhancers from those provided by coffee, 
caffeine-based energy drinks, laptops, and quiet apartments. 
Assessing a student’s use of cognitive enhancers in respect to competitive advantage 
does not indicate whether using this enhancement is wrong. If drinking coffee improves 
focus and concentration and this provides a competitive advantage, it does not follow that 
a student is wrong to drink it. Similarly, while using a cognitive enhancer improves focus 
and concentration and this provides a competitive advantage, it does not follow that a 
student is wrong to use it. This conclusion, however, does not mean that concerns about 
fairness are without merit. There is a sense, even if only as an intuition or pre-reflective 
judgment, that something about using cognitive enhancers is unfair.  
The strength of this intuition indicates the need to address these concerns about 
fairness and the use of enhancements not at the level of a student but instead at the level 
of distributive justice.89 One could hold that because access to cognitive enhancers is 
often largely determined by the social lottery — meaning the reasons a student was born 
into one socio-economic class was luck rather than merit — then certain students will 
systematically be provided greater access than others.  
                                                
89  Arthur Caplan argues that an unfair distribution does not mean that it is wrong to use (Caplan 2009).  
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How is a virtues-based approach and institutional rule meant to govern and guide 
student use of cognitive enhancers to acknowledge and support these complex notions of 
fairness? It is admittedly difficult for an institutional rule focusing on governing and 
guiding the use of enhancements at the level of students always to acknowledge and 
support concerns about fairness or about a pattern of inequity in distribution. Yet it is not 
impossible; because it is focused on governing and guiding students does not mean an 
institutional rule is unable to account for concerns about the fairness. By allowing for 
fairness to be regarded as relevant information in a student’s assessment of whether or 
not to use an enhancement, this virtues-based institutional rule recognizes fairness as 
being important. Identifying a concern is a way to support a concern.   
One modest way this virtues-based institutional rule can allow for considerations of 
fairness to be supported is by relying on the notion of a virtuous student. A virtuous 
student would consider fairness to be a relevant consideration. A pattern of inequity in 
the distribution of these enhancements is a relevant consideration for a virtuous student 
because his concern is not only about whether or not he is permitted to use an 
enhancement but also about how using this enhancement reflects on the sort of person he 
is. A virtuous student might choose not to use an enhancement because his use reinforces 
a pattern of inequity. Moreover, fairness could be understood in a context besides a 
pattern of an inequity to access and instead as a consideration about material resources. A 
virtuous student is not going to use enhancements if his use of an enhancement deprives 
another student that needed this psychotropic pharmaceutical as treatment for a condition 
or disorder. The following example illustrates the manner in which a virtues-based 
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institutional rule could incorporate concerns of fairness and use them to govern and guide 
real, non-virtuous, students.  
Imagine Edith and Teresa are not only roommates but also in the same Wittgenstein 
class. Edith and Teresa prepare for an exam and both use cognitive enhancers. The 
difference is that Edith uses hers for enhancement and Teresa uses hers for treatment of a 
condition or disorder. Although both just ran out of their cognitive enhancers, they are 
preparing to get their prescriptions filled. However, because of a recent shortage, Edith 
and Teresa find out that their local pharmacy does not have enough cognitive enhancers 
in stock for both prescriptions to be refilled. Since this situation involves the use of 
cognitive enhancers and Edith is using them for enhancement, she adopts the ethical 
outlook of a virtuous student.  
Were Edith to get her prescription filled, she would neither have cheated nor done 
anything impermissible. But by adopting the ethical outlook of a virtuous student, she 
makes fairness relevant in her given situation. A virtuous person would, at a minimum, 
consider the lack of material resources in her assessment and in following this virtues-
based institutional rule, so would Edith. This virtues-based institutional rule 
acknowledges and supports concerns of fairness regarding the use of enhancements in 
academia.  
For those who think that a student who uses a cognitive enhancer is not cheating, the 
challenge in valuing education solely for instrumental benefits misrepresents all the 
reasons that it is valued. However, although this argument was incorrect in expressing the 
value of enhancement solely in instrumental terms, a central concern for this argument is 
articulating the value of these cognitive enhancers in improving well-being for humanity. 
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By this I mean that enhancements, even those that only provide moderate augmentation 
such as cognitive enhancers, could make all of our lives better. By definition, 
enhancement is something good. Improving our capacities of focus and concentration, 
generally speaking, is a good thing. Beyond the walls of academic institutions, 
particularly in the United States and other developed nations, improving one’s capacities 
of focus and concentration specifically for education is instrumentally beneficial and 
good for its own sake.  
Administrators, staff, faculty, and institutional rules and policies should not overlook 
the significance of permitting students to use enhancements because augmenting 
students’ capacities of focus and concentration, even if only moderately, could likely 
result in assisting the development of intellectual capacities and understanding. Advances 
in technologies, broadly ranging from faster computers to Internet access to recent 
discoveries in neuroscience to child development regarding learning, have already been 
shown to be tremendously beneficial to students in academia.90 The greater enrollment of 
students currently in academia shows that advances in technologies can be beneficial for 
students. The benefits of cognitive enhancers for students if they augment capacities of 
focus and concentration, even if moderately, would likely be great.  
This virtues-based institutional rule accounts for this concern because a virtuous 
student knows that in certain situations, these cognitive enhancers can assist them. This 
                                                
90 Case in point: it has been established, with twenty years of testing and documentation, that I am learning 
disabled to the point that I have legal protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In fact, not only 
is the level of severity of my phonological learning disability rather rare, but the level of academic 
achievement is quite unique. That I have made it this far is a credit to technological advances; computers 
and software; institutional changes in educational programs in middle school, high school, and 
undergraduate studies; and advances in neuroscience. Sadly, this credit has to be tampered because I cannot 
credit a single university or department in my post-undergraduate career that was accepting and 
understanding of the difficulties of this disability. This, at least to me, is an indication that academia has 
quite a ways to go to meet the needs of disabled students.  
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virtues-based approach allows for the consequences—in this case the benefits—of using 
enhancements to be a consideration for a virtuous student. For reasons of making the 
topic manageable, this project has explicated the relevancy of consequences only in a 
limited way. Nonetheless, that cognitive enhancers could result in better goods, services, 
and scientific discoveries would be a relevant consideration, even for an ideal virtuous 
student. Consider that depending on the relevant information in a given situation, a 
virtuous student might choose to use a cognitive enhancer because the consequences of 
doing so are of such a magnitude. The virtues-based approach and institutional rule do 
not hold that consequences should not be a relevant consideration, only that it is not 
consequences alone that would be considered by a virtuous person.  Thus, this virtues-
based approach and institutional rule supports concerns about improving well-being by 
making the consequences a significant consideration in respect to using enhancements.  
Therefore, by starting with a re-examination of the question of cheating, it is clear 
that under existing academic institutional rules and policies, the use of cognitive 
enhancers is not cheating and, as long as they are legally obtained, is permissible. This 
virtues-based approach and institutional rule is not only consistent with existing rules and 
policies regarding the use of cognitive enhancers but provides two benefits if 
implemented in current academic institutions. First, it provides a better justification for 
the permissibility of using cognitive enhancers, and, second, it acknowledges and 
supports concerns about fairness and improving well-being.  
5.4 The Virtuous Approach Towards Cognitive Enhancers 
According to Aristotle, a “discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as 
the subject matter admits of” (NE 1.3 1094b12-13). The discussion of enhancement in 
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academia—focusing on the subject matter of permissibility, cheating, and what the 
institutional rules should be—is not only ambiguous and complex but one we should 
resist simplifying.  Not only is education something that is good both instrumentally and 
for its own sake; the ideals of human excellence are as well. J. B. Schneed holds that,  
[V]irtue is natural to humans, not in the sense that it need be learned or 
that it is easy to acquire, but in the sense that virtuous agents individually, 
as well as the community they compose, benefit from virtue. This fact 
indicates our social nature. Living alone, and living without virtue, are 
both harmful to us. (Schneed 1997, 178) 
 
Considering the value of education and virtues, it is reasonable to want students in 
academia to possess certain virtues. Were these students to use cognitive enhancers, it 
would be for reasons of self-improvement, or seeking understanding and accurate beliefs. 
Whether or not a student could develop these virtues is important. The assessment of a 
person or their actions is not complete if the person’s motivation and character are not 
included as relevant considerations. It seems that the assessment of student use of 
enhancements in academia should be no different. Whether this virtues-based approach is 
correct or not, any future investigation into enhancement in academia must at some point 
examine the motivations and character of students.  
This virtues-based approach and institutional rule does not always bring clarity and 
simplicity or, in fact, settle all matters pertaining to enhancement in academia. Yet what 
this research project has shown is that in respect to issues of enhancement, we should 
navigate a middle path. We need a path that goes between broad acceptance or rejection, 
unreflective reception or acquiescence of student use of enhancement in academia. In this 
research project, I have suggested that the ideals of human excellence or virtues approach 
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offers not only interesting and unique insights but also a way that compromises between 
extreme positions regarding student use of cognitive enhancers.  
5.5 The Virtuous Approach Towards Neuroenhancement  
This research project focused rather narrowly on the issue of student use of cognitive 
enhancements in academia. Attention was centered on the psychotropic pharmaceuticals 
that augment a person or their capacities of focus and concentration. However, 
pharmaceuticals are also used as enhancements for a person’s memory and moral 
capacities. Some pharmaceuticals such as 3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine 
(MDMA) and propranolol have been shown to be memory attenuating (Cukor, et al. 
2009; Lanni, et al. 2008). 91 Oxytocin and vasopressin have been shown to increase 
attachment bonding between mammals. In some circumstances, it has been suggested that 
propranolol suppresses implicit racial bias (Terbeck, et al. 2012; Keverne and Curley 
2004; Savulescu and Sandberg 2008). 
Discussion about the ethical application and limitations of these pharmaceuticals 
(broadly referred to as neuroenhancements) has generated many interesting and differing 
positions. Even if one were roughly to group positions in respect to whether they think 
neuroenhancements should be permitted or prohibited, there is a wide range of positions. 
For those who think that neuroenhancements are permissible, their position is usually 
grounded in reasons relating to the benefits these pharmaceuticals offer. Some such as 
Julian Savulescu, Anders Sandberg, and Guy Kahane argue, according to their welfarist 
approach, that if these neuroenhancements increase the chances of a person leading the 
                                                
91 Mentanine has been used in Germany for nearly 25 years to treat memory loss in the elderly and 
Alzheimer’s disease, but it has not been tested on persons whose memory is functioning proficiently 
(Lipton 2006).  
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good life, they should be made available (Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane 2011; Kahane 
and Savulescu 2009). Others such as Thomas Douglas (2008) argue that augmenting a 
person’s moral capacities via neuroenhancement is no different from and possibly better 
than traditional methods such as education for developing an individual’s moral 
capacities. Going a step further, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2008) argue that 
society has a moral imperative to focus on developing and making available moral 
neuroenhancements to improve the character of humanity.  
For those who think that neuroenhancements are impermissible, their positions are 
usually grounded on reasons relating to pharmaceutical manipulation of the human 
condition. Some such as Michael Sandel (2007) argue that the use of neuroenhancements 
is a sign of human hubris because it illustrates a refusal to accept certain limitations in 
our abilities. Others such as Francis Fukuyama (2002) go one step further and argue that 
neuroenhancement poses the greatest threat to humanity because in manipulating 
ourselves, there is a chance that humanity will lose the properties that make us unique. 
In regard to these memory and moral neuroenhancements, I have only provided 
positions on opposite ends of the permissibility spectrum.92 Yet any attempt to 
understand the role, application, and limitations of neuroenhancement is going to be 
confounded by three problems: complexity, philosophical overextension, and the 
potential for biases in explanation.  
As neuroscience progresses, its research and discoveries provide a rich but complex 
picture of the human brain. Recent empirical studies and research challenge fundamental 
notions about our lives, such as human volition. Consider personal self-control, the 
                                                
92 In respect to moral enhancements, some such as John Harris Chris Zarpentine contend that we should not 
be so certain that pharmaceuticals would work better than traditional methods of moral development 
(Harris 2011; Zarpentine 2012).  
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ability to refrain from certain behavior. In what is referred to as ego-deletion, a person 
refraining from one kind of action, such as not eating a cookie or keeping a straight face 
while watching a funny video, has a marked decreased ability for self-control in other 
situations, such as grip strength or problem-solving (Baumeister, et al. 1998; Baumeister 
2002; Schmeichel and Baumeister 2004; Vohs and Heatherton 2000). While it is not 
controversial to think that self-control is often dependent on social situations, what is 
surprising is that self-control is only a finite resource and, in some cases, not simply a 
matter of one’s own volition. In addition, there are certain psychiatric conditions such as 
Tourette’s syndrome, Anorexia Nervosa, and some instances of Borderline personality 
disorder that result in compulsive desires building up and, crudely put, overriding an 
individual’s volition. What is interesting is the broad range of compulsive actions, not 
simply behaviors, that occurs: experiencing a tic, desiring to not eat, and deliberately 
ingesting sharp objects (Leckman, King and Cohen 1999; Klein 2012; Kwok, Matorin 
and Kahn 2012; Campbell and Aulisio 2012; Henderson 2005).  
My point is not to argue that people lack free will (although we might) but rather to 
illustrate that neuroscience has shown that many fundamental notions about the human 
experience, such as volitional control, are complex and unable to be neatly categorized.  
The second problem is that philosophers have a tendency to overextend the claims 
that recent research and advances in neuroscience support. For example, consider Joshua 
Greene and Jonathan Haidt’s work on the neuroscience of moral judgment. Greene relies 
on fMRIs of participants when they are providing answers to moral dilemmas (Trolley 
and Footbridge cases), and Haidt has examined students’ responses to moral violations 
from across different cultures and educational levels (Greene, et al. 2001; Greene 2003; 
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Haidt, Koller and Dias 1993; Haidt 2003; Schnall, et al. 2008). Both Green and Haidt 
have argued as the basis of their research on the neuroscience of moral judgment, what 
Neil Levy refers to as the deflationary account of morality (Levy 2007). By Haidt and 
Greene’s accounts, morality is reducible to intuition, which in turn is only an affective, 
not rational, response that is the result of biological and evolutionary hardwiring. If moral 
judgments are based upon intuitions, which are emotional and part of evolutionary 
hardwiring, then it is not evident that they track morally relevant features in the world. If 
this is the case, then theories of morality that are rationally based, such as deontology or 
those of Kant, or theories that hold that there can be reflective equilibrium between 
theory and intuition, such as those of Rawls, seem to be unjustified. If a person’s moral 
intuitions are merely the product of evolutionary hardwiring, then deontologists or 
Kantian thinkers cannot hold that morality and moral judgment are fundamentally reason-
based. If a person’s moral intuitions are merely the product of evolutionary hardwiring, 
then it seems there cannot be, as Rawls (1999) claims, reflective equilibrium between our 
theories and intuitions. For Greene and Haidt, a deflationary account of morality holds 
that being moral is merely a part of our evolutionary hardwiring. 
Nevertheless, while Greene and Haidt’s work shows that intuitions are often the result 
of biological and evolutionary hardwiring and affect moral judgments, it is not clear how 
this research supports Greene and Haidt’s conclusions about morality and moral theories. 
Kahane and Shackel argue that Greene has methodological flaws that result in his work 
not sufficiently appreciating the “step from philosophical discourse to the ascription of 
belief to lay persons” (Kahane and Shackel 2010, 580). Neil Levy (2007) contends that 
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neuroscience has shown that intuitions, even if emotional and not rational, are relevant 
considerations that guide decisions and moral judgments.  
While I remain neutral on this debate about the neuroscience of moral judgment and 
moral theory, I believe that Greene and Haidt’s work is indicative of an overextension of 
neuroscience to support conclusions, particularly philosophical conclusions. It is not yet 
clear that Greene and Haidt’s research shows that deontological or Kant’s moral theory is 
not justified or that intuitions or theory cannot achieve reflective equilibrium.   
The final problem, which combines complexity and philosophical overextension, is 
what I refer to as the potential for biases in explanation. It has been shown that even 
when presented with a good explanation that uses no neuroscience research and a bad 
explanation that relies on irrelevant neuroscience research, persons prefer the bad 
neuroscience explanation (Weisberg, et al. 2008). This is not surprising since people 
commonly prefer certain types of explanations despite a type of explanation being 
fundamentally flawed when used to explain a particular thing (Keil 2006). What is 
troubling is that people are more likely to exonerate a person’s behavior and actions if 
they are explained in respect to physiological causes such as the neurology of the brain 
than if they are explained in respect to psychological causes (Monterosso, Royzman and 
Schwartz 2005). Monterosso, Royzman and Schwartz (2005, 2012) refer to this 
phenomenon as naïve dualism, the idea that in the human brain, psychological and 
physiological causes are categorically distinct. Stephen J. Morse (2005) contends that this 
is a significant problem when neuroscience mechanistic explanations (physiological 
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causes) are given credit over reason-giving explanations (psychological causes) when 
assessing legal responsibility.93  
All three of these problems are present to some degree when attempting to understand 
the ethics, role, application, and limitations of neuroenhancements. Our current 
understanding of neurology shows that we barely understand human cognition let alone 
our cognitive, memory, or moral capacities.94 The role that our executive function and 
memory play in cognition and a pharmaceutical’s effect on these capacities and cognition 
will be complicated. Moreover, caution is needed when assessing a pharmaceutical’s 
affect on a person or on their cognitive, memory, or moral capacities so as to not 
overextend this evidence when being applied for (or against) particular philosophical 
positions. 
In an assessment of the ethics of neuroenhancement, there is a great potential for one 
to present a biased explanation. When using empirical evidence about the effects of 
pharmaceuticals on a person’s cognitive, memory, and—in particular—moral capacities, 
it is easy to rely on neuroscience mechanistic explanations (physiological causes) rather 
                                                
93 There is another problem, and this concerns the role of clinicians (medical professionals) and advances in 
neuroscience and neuroenhancement, in particular issues centering on patients’ responsibility and care. I 
suggest but do not argue here for adapting Eran Klein’s framework of strong neuroskepticism as a way for 
clinicians to approach handling such issues (Klein 2011). In respect to neuroenhancement, Jayne C. Lucke 
(2012) contends that there is a need to study the attitudes of students, parents, and medical professionals 
about the use of cognitive enhancers to make the proper and appropriate guidelines and policies. Not only 
do I endorse Lucke’s proposal, but I have already taken preliminary steps in this direction. My study with 
Robert E. Enck, M.D., and John Bossaer, Pharm.D. (2013), was the first study to examine the attitudes of 
those training to be medical professionals and only the second study to examine the attitudes of those 
working in the medical profession about cognitive enhancers. At the University of Texas MD Anderson, I 
am currently conducting an attitudinal survey that examines medical professionals’ attitudes concerning 
cognitive enhancers, the treatment-enhancement distinction, and off-label prescribing practices. This 
study’s findings will have interesting implications for developing institutional rules and policies for 
medical professionals about cognitive enhancers, but it also is likely to facilitate the use of cognitive 
enhancers on chemotherapy-related cognitive dysfunction, crudely referred to as “chemo brain” (Boykoff, 
Moieni and Subramanian 2009; Hede 2008; Raffa, et al. 2006). 
94 To illustrate, consider Capgras Delusions, a condition or disorder in which a person believes that their 
loved one or family have been killed and replaced by aliens, robots, or imposters (Ellis and Lewis 2001). 




than reason-giving explanations (psychological causes). This is because of the 
complexity of our lives; in other words, there are good reasons for and against a person 
using neuroenhancements. Consider, on one hand, that altering a person’s memories in 
some situations or assisting people in building more attachment to others or suppressing 
implicit racism would benefit people’s lives and are good reasons for using 
neuroenhancements. However, on the other hand, it is important to note that 
pharmaceutically induced attachment is not the same thing as attachment that occurs from 
love or respect, and chemically suppressing implicit racism or promoting moral behavior 
seems to bypass difficult matters of personal responsibility and are good reasons against 
using neuroenhancements.   
I suggest that at least one reason for applying the ideals of human excellence or 
virtues approach to neuroenhancement is that it adequately handles these three problems. 
The approach handles these problems by focusing less on biomedical technologies, 
medical procedures, and neuroscience and instead focusing more on the motivations and 
character of persons. This approach is consistent with other philosophical positions and is 
at least one element of the normative account of enhancement. Moreover, this approach 
centers on reason-giving explanations, focusing on motivation and character, and 
contends that there are good reasons both for and against the use of neuroenhancements 
in a given situation.  
 In detail, this ideals of human excellence or virtues approach holds that biomedical 
technologies and medical procedures can only go so far in enhancing a person or their 
capacities. This approach does not overestimate recent research and advances by arguing 
that by taking an enhancement, a person will be smarter or more morally good. Instead of 
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starting with questions about pharmaceuticals augmenting our capacities or applying the 
most recent research and advances in neuroscience, the ideals of human excellence or 
virtues approach begins by examining a person’s motivation and character. What are the 
appropriate reasons for using these neuroenhancements, and how does using them reflect 
on a person’s character? There is value in examining our motivations and character 
regardless of whether or not one does so in order to use a pharmaceutical. 
If we cannot determine the appropriate motivations for using these 
neuroenhancements, then one needs to ask about the reasons an ideal virtuous person 
would have for using these pharmaceuticals. It is reasonable to hold that in a given 
situation, a virtuous person would assess all the information in her circumstances and the 
relevant considerations and then act accordingly for the right reasons when using a 
neuroenhancement. The virtuous person, even if an ideal, illustrates that depending on the 
information and relevant considerations in a given situation, there are good reasons for 
and against using a neuroenhancement.    
If people do not have the correct motivations for using neuroenhancement, then the 
next step is to consider changing certain institutional rules to re-structure and develop the 
proper motivations and character of people in respect to using these neuroenhancements. 
If certain institutional rules are changed, then it seems that a person could come to use 
neuroenhancements that attenuate their memory, strengthen their bonds of attachment, or 
suppress implicit racial bias for the right reasons as a matter of character. Therefore, as 
with cognitive enhancers in academia, concerns about the use of neuroenhancements are, 
in fact, concerns about motivation and character.  
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Whether it is about the use of cognitive enhancers in academia or 
neuroenhancements, the ideals of human excellence or virtues matter. All too often, 
discussions regarding the permissibility of biomedical technologies and medical 
procedures have focused too narrowly on consequences and rules being the only relevant 
considerations. Yet as Mo Tzu points out, 
Whoever criticizes others must have some alternative to offer them. To 
criticize and yet offer no alternative is like trying to stop flood with flood 
or put out fire with fire. It will surely have no effect. (M. Tzu 1963, 39-40)  
 
Therefore, while still retaining consequences and rules as relevant considerations, I 
offered in this research project a way for motivation and character also to be included. 
Moreover, I provide a way for the permissibility of using biomedical technologies and 
medical procedures for enhancement to be grounded in the ideals of human excellence as 
well as a way of linking an individual’s use of enhancements to his or her motivation and 
character. 
This ideals of human excellence or virtues approach is only one approach toward the 
ethics of enhancement, but it merits serious consideration because it offers interesting and 
unique insights and helps to explain at least one element of a normative account of 
enhancement. Although biomedical technologies and medical procedures will continue to 
progress parallel with issues of permissibility, the significance of a person’s motivation 
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